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PREFACE

There are several persons who have contributed directly to the com
pletion of this project.

Without the patient encouragement of my parents,

Roy and Lorraine Valentine, my sister Christine Valentine, my brother
Greg Valentine, and my grandmother Jody Valentine,
this study would have succeeded.

it is doubtful whether

Mr. Milton Wuerth, Operations Director

of the Omaha Airport Authority, was always willing to help in any way and
aided greatly in an understanding of airport problems.

Mr. Raymond

Fahrlander and Mr. William Dean Noyes took time to discuss their recol
lections of the Omaha airfield and aviation in general during the 1 9 2 0 ’s
and were of substantial assistance.

The Inter-Library Loan Office of the

University of Nebraska at Omaha Library was of great help in the acqui
sition of source material as was Joyce Jenson of the Library’s Microforms
Section.

The records of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Omaha Post Number

One of the American Legion and the Omaha-Douglas County Election Com^missioner's Office were an important part of this thesis and these groups
cooperated extensively in making these sources accessible.

Finally, Dr,

Harl Dalstrom, Dr. Tommy Thompson, and Dr. Orville Menard deserve much
credit for their constant support during the preparation of this study.

INTRODUCTION

In 1920, American aviation was still in its infancy, a descrip
tion applicable to every aspect of the industry.
this period were delicate, curious,

The airplanes of

contraptions.

Still, these fragile

craft, dwarfed by the magnitude of today’s ships, were amazingly effi
cient, agile, and thrilling methods of transportation.

Few realized

then what importance these airplanes would have in the future.
The expansion of aircraft use and development necessitated
another aspect of the industry:

government control.

Well into the

1 920 ’s,' though, governmental regulation was almost non-existent.
Typifying the glamor and freedom of these early years were the barn
stormers— gallant young men in goggles who would captivate the public
with their aerial maneuvers.

Many observers were so enthralled by these

aviators that they readily spent $2.50 per person for a five to ten
minute ride."*"

The passengers usually got their m o n e y ’s worth, but the

fear and occasion of tragedy did much to prompt government certifi
cation of pilots, aircraft, mechanics,
aviation.

2

and the general regulation of

Some people began to realize that aviation had more to

offer than World War I veterans on barnstorming tours.
of the future, aviation promised and almost insured

As an industry

huge dividends

Raymond Fahrlander, private interview held in Plattsmouth,
Nebraska, November 30, 1978,
2

U.S. Congress, Senate, Civil Air Navigation B i l l , H.R. 1262,
68th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1925),
2, 9-10.
1

2

for the state,

city, or individual who did not delay, but got in on the

ground level.
Local public reaction to aerial development was a very im
portant aspect of this new industry.

If the taxpayers in a certain

area did not share a farsighted attitude toward aviation, aerial
development could be a slow, difficult, at times extremely frustrating,
process.

This situation plagued Omaha as its aviation enthusiasts tried

to develop a municipal airport from 1924 to 1930.

Contrary to the

claims of unity and air-mindedness expounded by one politician in
1931, the c it y’s polarized views on the

subject

of aeronautical de-

velopment had surfaced on practically every aviation issue.

3

A list

less uncaring attitude by a large portion of O m a h a ’s population con
tributed greatly to the delays and problems encountered in the quest
for an airport.
From the spring of 1924, when the search for what became the
present airfield began, to the dedication of the Boeing hangar in the
fall of 1930, the city battled over the development of the airfield.
On one side were the proponents of the project:
men, and, generally,

politicians, business

the more affluent section of the population.

These people knew that they stood to gain much from Omaha as an air
center, both financially and because a faster method of transportation
would be at their disposal.

This is not to say that all active supporters

were compelled solely by opportunism.

Many seemed genuinely dedicated

3

Dean Noyes, "The City of Omaha and Aviation," Official
Souvenir Program of the Omaha Air Races, May 15-18, 1931, 24-25.

3

to the development of the city's aviation facilities.
On the opposite side were those people who were not necessarily
against Omaha's expansion, either from a general or an aeronautical
standpoint, but were more concerned with day to day life.

This group

primarily, but not exclusively, came from the less than affluent areas
of Omaha,

and saw no indication that the development of aviation would

touch their lives or help their city.

After all, up to the middle of

the twenties, aviation seemed to be a hobby or sport of the wealthy— a
youthful side show carried on by barnstormers and displaced World War I
pilots.

4

Understandably, many persons in the working class found it

difficult to identify with any one in these categories.
Due to the intense efforts of a handful of business and
political leaders, and in spite of apparent apathy, Omaha succeeded in
building an airfield.

These were the "frontier days of aviation," a

period in which even air-minded citizens considered an airport a novelty,
a luxury, a gamble.^

According to aerial leaders in Omaha,

the cities

that were willing to gamble the most in the shortest time would be the
ones to profit from aviation's clear destiny.

The fact that this

destiny was not obvious to a great number of people is interesting.
study of the struggles to develop an airport in Omaha,

A

then, is more

than merely another chapter in the progress of aviation.

It provides a

valuable insight into the type of city Omaha was during these years and

Raymond Fahrlander, private interview held in Plattsmouth,
Nebraska, November 30, 1978; Sunday World-Herald, April 18, 1943, 2C.
^Jimmy Doolittle, "'I am not a very timid type . .
an Inter
view by Robert S. Gallagher, American Heritage, XXV (.April, 1974)^ 101.

4

the struggle its leaders had to undertake to develop an aviation status
for their community.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND:

GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION AND EARLY

DIFFICULTIES FOR OMAHA AVIATION

Government regulation of the aviation industry and concern over
its development had a great effect upon aviation in Omaha and came about
for two reasons.

First, the deluge of fatalities among the unregulated

pilots was shocking."^

The safety records of private American aviators

did not even approach those of the Post Office and the Army, whose
flying

was regulated to some extent by the government.

In the period

1922-25 the Army flew over 900,000 miles "without a single casualty."
The air mail had also accrued an impressive record.
travelled over 2,500,000 miles with only two deaths.

In 1925,

the mail

2

These records contrasted sharply with that of the "itinerant"
pilot.

In 1924, over 1,000,000 miles were flown by private parties.

The result, seventy-five deaths and ninety-one injuries,

constituted

3
"a ratio of one fatality for every 13,500 miles flown."

In the years

between World War I and 1925
300 persons [were] killed and 500 injuried in flying accidents

"Hi.S. Congress, House, Civil Air Navigation B i l l , II.R. 1262, 68th
Cong., 2nd sess. , (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1925), 2, 9.
Hereafter cited as Civil Air Navigation B i l l ,

2

U.S. Congress, Senate, The Promotion of Commercial Avi ation,
S. Rept. 2, 69th Cong,, 1st sess., (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1925), 2, Hereafter cited as Commercial
A vi ation.
3 Ibid,
5

6

which could have been prevented had there been in existence
and enforced a statute regulating the operation of commercial
aircraft in interstate commerce.^
These statistics were powerful weapons to those who advocated governi

ment regulation of the airways.
Realizing that aviation development within the United States
had failed to keep pace with that in other countries, the supporters of
regulation had another argument for increased government control.
Although President Calvin Coolidge claimed that the United States did
not lag behind, evidence was found to the contrary.^
Many countries in Europe "far more distraught in their political
and industrial affairs" after World War I than the United States, had
£
developed air regulations capable of being models anywhere.
England,
France, Germany, and other air-minded European countries, by 1925, were
providing government aid to aviation.

England granted $1,750,000 for

the support of private aviation in 1924 and,

along with France and

Germany, created government offices for the promotion of aeronautics.
The air-minded position of foreign nations combined with the
dilatory stance of America to cause certain diplomatic difficulties.
In 1919,

the United States, along with twenty-two countries, par

ticipated in the International Air Navigation Convention,

As a primary

objective of this meeting, these nations sought to insure that each

4

Ibid.

5Ibid,

3.

^Civil Air Navigation B i l l , 2.
Commercial Aviation,

1-2.

7

enacted regulatory and safety laws regarding commercial aviation.

The

fifth article of the convention prohibited "from flight above the
territory of any nation a party to the convention the aircraft of any
g
nation not a party to the convention."

The proposals of this convention

were never presented to the Congress for approval.

Consequently,

the

airplanes of the United States were not legally allowed in the air space
of Canada, which had approved the articles of the convention.

Supporters

of government regulation looked upon this condition as both as incon
venience and an embarassment.

They envisioned a tremendous future for

commercial aviation and were fearful that America would be unprepared.
Legislation had to be developed that would solve the safety
problem and help the country keep pace with other nations.

Valid

precedents for such legislation existed then in the form of government
regulations covering all aspects of water transportation.

Many aerial

supporters found it ironic that a myriad of laws regulated how passen
gers could be transported from one side of Long Island Sound to the
other while almost none covered a transcontinental airplane trip.^^
If the United States enacted suitable aerial legislation it would be
insured proper preparedness for the "boom period’’ currently on the

t
. .
c
. •
11
horizon
for
aviation,
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 provided

g
Civil Air Navigation B i l l , 8.
9

Ibid, 9.

^ Commercial Aviation, 4,
^ Civil Air Navigation B il l, 9

the solution to these

9

8

problems.

Probably the most important statute governing American

aviation in the entire decade,

this act granted the Secretary of

Commerce the power to begin the registration and rating of planes,
pilots, and air facilities.

12

In addition, this legislation authorized

the Secretary to appoint an Assistant Secretary of Commerce to aid in
the performance of this act and to supervise the general encouragement
of commercial aviation.

13

The passage of this legislation marked the

end of a free-wheeling romantic era in the history of American aviation.
Just months before, aviation in America had very little government
attention.

1A

Now, at least the United States government thought of

aviation as a first class industry worthy of aid and requiring regu
lation.
While air commerce received deserved attention in Washington,
it experienced decidedly slower development in Nebraska.
air-minded groups in the entire state,

Of all the

the Aerial Transportation Com

mittee of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce had the most impact upon the
advancement of aviation.

The Chamber began this committee in 1919 when

it looked as though Omaha would be chosen as an airmail station due to
its central location.

The government chose Omaha as the western

terminus of the transcontinental airmail and in November,

1919, the

Chamber of Commerce gave the Aerial Transportation Committee the

^ U . S . Statutes at L a r g e , Vol. AA, pt. 2 (Dec. 1925-March 1927),
"Air Commerce Act of 1926," May 20, 1926 (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1927), 569.
13Ibid, 573,
Commercial Aviation, A.

9

responsibility for directing the construction of a hangar to house the
airmail planes.

The hangar was completed under the committee’s guidance

and

the airmail service out of Omaha began on May 15, 1920.^“*

the

importance of this committee had grown tremendously.

supported the Air commerce Act and thought
the

entire country, as well as Omaha

By 1926,

Its members

it should be "of interest to

. . ..

The concentrated

efforts of this group were invaluable in the establishment of an air
field in Omaha by 1931.
On the state level, Neb ras ka’s first major action upon aviation
came in 1921 when the legislature passed House Roll 206.
ized cities "of the metropolitan class,
or of the second class . . .

...

This author

of the first class,

. . .

to acquire lands for the purpose of estab

lishing an aviation field" and to make improvements upon the land funded
by the sale of bonds.

Not until April 24, 1929, when it had the ex

ample of'the Air Commerce Act to imitate, did the Nebraska legislature
pass another significant piece of aviation legislation.
required airmen and mechanics to be licensed.

House Roll 374

This law also gave the

15

George H. Tweney, "Air Transportation and the American West,"
Montana, The Magazine of Western History, XIX (Oct., 1969), 70; Omaha
Chamber of Commerce, Public Finance Committee Minutes, September 8, 1927,
309-310.

16
20, 1926,

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Executive Committee Minutes, April
133.

^ Session Laws Passed by the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, 40th sess., H.R. 206, "An Act to authorize cities . . .
to acquire lands for the purpose of establishing an aviation field
. . ., "March 15, 1921 (Lincoln:
The Kline Publishing Company,
1921), 658,

10

State Railway Commission the power to oversee aviation within the
state.

18
Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut, sponsor of the Air

Commerce Act of 1926, sharply criticized Nebr ask a’s slow response to
aviation.

Three months before the passage of House Roll 374, Senator

Bingham denounced the lackadaisical attitude in Nebraska:

" ’It is

quite extra-ordinary that a state that has as much flying territory as
Nebraska has no legislation whatever regulating flying of an intrastate character.’"

19

Calling the situation "one of unusual gravity,"

Bingham stated that eighty-five per cent of the fatal accidents in the
preceding year were "with unlicensed pilots and unlicensed planes."
This being the case, Bingham argued, Nebraska should immediately adopt
laws requiring federal inspection and licensing of all aircraft within
its boundaries.

20

The Aerial Transportation Committee expressed

similar sentiments and supported House Roll 374 while the legislature
had it under consideration.

21

With the approval of that bill,

Nebraska had finally recognized the need for regulation— almost three
years after the Air Commerce Act pointed out the necessity of such
action.
On the same day the legislature approved House Roll 374, another

18

Session Laws Passed by the Legislature of the State of
Neb ras ka, 45th sess., H.R. 374, "An Act relating to the licensing
of airmen and aircraft . . .," April 24, 1929 (York:
Blank Book
Company 1929), 145-147.
19

Sunday World-Herald, January 13, 1929, 9A.

20Ibid.

21

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Aerial Transportation Committee
Minutes, February 15, 1929, 8. Hereafter cited as ATC Minutes.

11

bill concerning aviation in Nebraska went into effect.
expanded upon the law of 1921.

House Roll 424

This legislation made it possible for

a city developing an airfield to levy a property tax for the airport.
It also stated that the United States Department of Commerce must
approve "the location and specifications" of such an airfield before
any bonds could be sold or taxes levied.

22

More importantly, as far as

airfields in general were concerned, House Roll 424 formally declared
what had been implied by House Roll 206 in 1921, that airfields within
the state of Nebraska,

if organized properly, were "a public purpose."

23

The debate over whether municipal airports were a public pur
pose helps to explain the infantile state of aviation at this time.
Many people still thought that aviation had strictly private ad
vantages and that public land, facilities, and money should not be used
for its advancement.

In a 1929 article for the Aeronautical Chamber of

Commerce of America, Harry J. Freeman of New York University discussed
this subject.

Freeman argued that the prohibition of public funds for

aviation purposes under the guise of private advantage was invalid.
other words, he contended that aviation and its advancement did,

In

indeed,

constitute a public purpose and pointed out that "the courts which have
had occasion to consider the question have without exception so held."

24

Session Law Passed by the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, 45th sess., H.R. 424, rAn Act relating to~YnunTcipaT corpora^ions
. ,l ." April 24, 1929 (York:
Blank Book Company, 1929), 147-149.
23
24

I bi d, 148.

Harry J. Freeman, as cited in U.S. Congress, Senate, Municipal
Airports as a "Public Purp ose ," 71st Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1929), 1.

12

Freeman cited examples from many states to prove his contention.
In a Missouri case the point of contention revolved around whether m u 
nicipal bonds could be issued to establish an airport.

Those who

argued that tax money could not be legally used for aerial needs
bespoke the image of the airplane as the toy of the leisure-seeking
rich:
It (the aiport) will afford a starting and landing place
for a few wealthy, ultra-reckless persons, who own planes and
who are engaged in private pleasure flying
k

k

k

The number of persons using the airport will be about
equal to the total number of persons who engage in biggame hunting, trips to the Africian wilderness, and voyages
of North Pole exploration.
k

k

k

True, it may be permitted to the ordinary common gar
den variety of citizen to enter the airport free of charge,
so that he may press his face against some restricting
barrier and sunburn his throat gazing at his more fortunate
compatriots as they sportingly navigate the empyrean blue.
But beyond that, beyond the right to hungrily look on,
the ordinary citizen gets no benefit from the taxes he is
forced to p a y . 25
The court disagreed and contended that the promising destiny of aviation
certainly justified the money spent at that time.

26

Nebraska experienced a similar case when the Nebraska Supreme
Court ruled on the public propriety of aviation.

In June, 1928, the

city of Lincoln sought funds to develop an airport and the court ruled
"a majority vote . . . sufficient” to authorize the issuance of bonds
designated for the establishment of an airfield.

The Nebraska Court

also considered municipal airports a public purpose ”for which bonds

25I b i d , 3-4.
26Ibid, 4.
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may be voted and taxes levied and collected."

27

Congress passed an act that ended, at least on the national
level,
1928,

the confusion and debate on this subject.

Approved on May 24,

this law authorized "the leasing of public lands for use as public

aviation fields" and dealt,
public aspect of airfields.

in general, with the controversy over the
This act allowed the Secretary of the

Interior "to lease for use as a public airport" public land "not to
exceed six hundred and forty acres in area . . . ."

28

The enactment

of this legislation, though perhaps of limited substantive signifi
cance, along with the previous Air Commerce Act of 1926, reflected the
growth of aviation.

The safety of the airplanes and the quality and

experience of their pilots and mechanics were dealt with in 1926.

Now,

with the right to set aside public lands for aviation purposes, an
increase in the number of landing fields was at least theoretical and
the dream of famed aviator Harry F. Guggenheim,

to see "airports

within 10 miles of each other in every direction all over the country,"
seemed less idealistic.

29

Just because Congress dignified the status of aviation did not
mean the public response would be swift and positive.

A sense of

apathy best described the reaction of the people in Omaha regarding the
furtherance of aviation in their community.

Yet in spite of this

State ex. rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson,
North Western Reporter, 273, (1928).
28

State A u d i t o r , 220

U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 45, pt. 1 (Dec. 1927-March 1929),
"An Act to authorize the leasing of public lands for use as public avia
tion fields," May 24, 1928 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1929),
728.
29
Omaha World-Herald, February 1, 1929, 9,

14

attitude,

Omaha held a stop along the transcontinental airmail route.

From March,

1920, through June, 1924, the government operated the air-r

mail out of the Chamber of Commerce Hangar stationed on land owned by
the Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Company.

Located on Sixty-Sixth Street one

block north of Center Street on the southwest outskirts of Omaha,
Ak-Sar-Ben was a public enterprise organization "for the promotion of
the civic and commercial interests of Omaha" and was happy to help the
city succeed in aviation.

30

The hangar cost nearly $32,000, an amount

the Chamber raised from public subscriptions and which the postal
service suggested would be reimbursed by the federal government.
1924,

By

Congress had not refunded any of the money spent on the airmail

hangar.

The close proximity of the mail service,

though, provided

many benefits for the business community as well as the city in general
and undoubtedly counterbalanced some of the initial expense.

31

The Chamber of Commerce realized this but remained concerned
about the large investment in the hangar.

When Ak-Sar-Ben expressed

the desire to have the "property vacated," and the Airmail Service gave
notice that it planned to move to another site, the Chamber looked to
the July 1 lease expiration with dismay.

32

Not only would the Chamber

possess a $32,000 hangar without an airfield, but the city would lose a

Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Post
Office and Post Roads of the House of Representatives on H.R. 4326 and
H .R . 4 6 4 2 , 69th Cong., 1st sess., May 3, 1926 (Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 1926), 23. Hereafter cited as Post Office and Post
Roads Subcommittee Minut es .
~^Ibid, 16, 26.
32

ATC Minutes, January 17, 1924, 20.

15

valuable aerial connection.

In January, 1924,

the Aerial Transportation

Committee began searching for ways to keep the mail service near or
within Omaha.

Some committee members thought a bond issue should be

floated in the spring for the purchase of a level expanse of land east
of Carter Lake, Iowa.

Although there was no official study of the

site, it was generally thought to be an excellent location for an air
field, and the Ak-Sar-Ben hangar could be moved there easily.
committee soon learned, however,

The

that the government had already

decided to move the mail service to Fort Crook, a military installation
a short distance from the city.

33

Had Ak-Sar-Ben not desired to end the lease arrangement,
airmail would have moved anyway.

the

Night flying was coming into general

acceptance at that time and the postal authorities thought the field too
small to fly safely after sunset.

The mail service found Fort Crook

not only spacious but equipped with much needed lighting facilities.

34

Late in its search for another field, the Chamber could not hope to
compete with the advantages of Fort Crook.

The Aerial Transportation

Committee dropped the matter with the meager hope that the airmail
would not move to a military installation after all, but to a location
nearer Omaha.

They also abandoned immediate debate over whether the

hangar should be moved to a new site.

35

On June 22, 1924, eight days before the lease expired, a

33Ibid, April 23, 1924, 22.
34

Post Office and Post Roads Subcommittee Minutes, 25.

33ATC Minutes, April 23, 1924, 22,

16

tornado destroyed the hangar and seven of the planes it sheltered.
The consequences for the airmail were surprisingly minor.

36

Fortunately,

the Post Office had the airmail hangar at Fort Crook almost completed
and the transfer

of operations underway when the storm occurred.

The

airmail experienced only a "weeks delay" and no "serious confusion."

37

The ease with which the mail service handled the situation contrasted
sharply with the feeble attempts of Omaha to establish itself, once
again, as an airmail center.

The Chamber of Commerce received only

$20,000 insurance for the hangar and suffered a $12,000 loss.

The

deficit would have been unnecessary had the government lived up to the
reimbursement understanding.

38

This initial ill fortune was prophetic.

It turned out to be over six years until the airmail was
officially established within the city of Omaha.

These six years

abounded with controversy and chronic delay at every turn.

The

failure of the exhaustive attempts by influential business and civic
groups to re-establish an airfield near Omaha very quickly can only
be explained by a public that was extremely apathetic and, at times,
openly contrary.

The same untiring efforts precipitated the eventual

success of the airport drive.

By late 1930,

though,

the people of

Omaha were still highly apathetic but gradually accepting the idea that

Of!

Omaha Daily N e w s , June 23, 1924, 1.
37
38

Post Office and Post Roads Subcommittee M i n ute s, 25.

Ibid, 26.
Apparently, no one in Omaha secured a written
promise from the government to repay the money spent on the hangar.
Had this been done it would certainly have strengthened the city's
claims for reimbursement.

17

aviation, as a permanent thriving industry, was here to stay and would
surely have an influence upon their lives.

CHAPTER II

YEARS OF INDECISION 1925-1927
By the end of 1924, O m a h a ’s significance as an aerial center
had dwindled substantially.

The offices of the Airmail Service remained

in downtown Omaha but the city did not have an airfield or hangar and
the mail planes landed at a field twelve miles away.^

Omaha seemed to

be drifting away from aviation while other cities moved speedily ahead.
In the unfortunate months before 1925 the Omaha Chamber of
Commerce established itself as O m a h a ’s leader in the advancement of
aviation.

For the next three years the Aerial Transportation Committee

served as the catalyst around which the aerial plans of the Chamber,
as well as the city, formed.

The members of this committee had to

start from scratch because the events of June had eliminated much of
the reason for their existence.
directions.

This committee decided to switch

Rather than continuing to mourn the movement of the air

mail and the loss of the Ak-Sar-Ben field and hangar,

the Aerial

Transportation Committee began urging Omaha to forge ahead with the
development of a municipal airport.
The reasons given for prompt construction of an airfield
resounded with civic duty and pride.

Seeing no reason to remain idle,

the Chamber thought Omaha had to act immediately to get to "the fore-

^Omaha Chamber of Commerce J ournal, XIII
Hereafter cited as Chamber Journal.

18

(August 30, 1924)s 5,

front in air traffic."

Convinced that "the greatest possibilities for

the future" were in aerial transportation,

the

Chamber members believed

that if Omaha acted quickly the city could compete with other areas that
were not as centrally located.

2

The Chamber of Commerce expressed an understandably civic-minded
approach to the problem.

As shock over the loss of the Ak-Sar-Ben

airmail connection rapidly diminished,

the Chamber realized that the

Fort Crook location, "under army regulations," could not be "used for
3

commercial purposes."
perspective.

This placed the matter in a totally different

The quest for an aerial status for Omaha became more than

an attempt to bring the airmail nearer to the downtown area.

Although

the Aerial Transportation Committee foresaw the eventual return of the
airmail,

in early 1925

all thoughts were on the acquisition of an air

field and the prompt capture of any available commercial business.
Sources dealing with the beginnings of the Omaha Municipal
Airfield are very scarce.

One of these, a first-hand account written

by Ted Landale, appeared in the Omaha World-Herald on April 18, 1943.
In this generally helpful article, Landale claimed that three sites
were given equally serious attention by Omaha aerial authorities as
possible locations for an airport.

The first two potential locations

included a site thirteen miles west of downtown on Dodge Street and a
dairy farm at the north end of Sixteenth Street.

^I b i d , August 2, 1924,
3

Landale admitted that

8.

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Aerial Transportation Committee
Minutes, March 23, 1925, 58.
Hereafter cited as ATC Minutes.
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the third site had the best chance of approval:
between Carter Lake and the Missouri River.

4

a flat piece of land

Unfortunately,

the reason

Landale suggested for the elimination of the site in west Omaha casts
some doubt upon his credibility.

His story involved the air of affluence

which surrounded any mention of the western part of the city.
E. John Brandeis,

prominent west Omaha businessman,

Supposedly

owned an airplane

and his family desired a landing field in the western part of the city.
Yet Alan Baer, a nephew of E. John Brandeis, recalled that Brandeis never
owned an airplane, but the city commissioners at the time knew that many
Omahans considered "airplane piloting . . .
about as useful."

a sport akin to polo, and

These politicians were not willing to risk public

controversy by building an airport near what many people thought to be
a well-to-do area of the city."*
As this article suggested, there were indeed many suitable
£
locations for O m a h a ’s airfield.
However, from the destruction of the
Ak-Sar-Ben hangar onward,

the Aerial Transportation Committee gave

only one location more than off-hand attention.
Carter Lake,

Iowa, and southeast of Florence Lake consistently received

the most consideration.^

4

The 160 acres east of

Although highly criticized in later years,

in

Sunday World-Herald, April 18, 1943, 2C; September 3, 1961, 9J.

^I b id , April 18, 1943, 2C; Alan Baer to author, July 23, 1979.
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Chamber Journal, XIII (February 14, 1925), 18.
^Omaha World-Herald, February, 1925, 1; ATC Minutes, January 17,
1924, 21; April 23, 1924, 22; January 15, 1925, 54-55; February 24, 1925,
56-57; March 23, 1925, 58-61.
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g
early 1925 this area received much support as a potential airfield.
Two of the authorities that judged the worthiness of the Carter
Lake site were Carl F. Egge, head of the Airmail Service, and Major
Lawrence Churchill, head of the Seventh Corps Area Flying Service.
Egge labelled the proposed tract of land a very good spot for an air
field.

He also urged quick development of the site if Omaha wanted to

take advantage of the regulations disallowing commercial use of Fort
Crook Field.

Omaha, Egge thought,

to this location.

9

could easily lure aerial business

Major Churchill agreed with the appraisal of Egge

and thought this location could be developed into an "ideal landing
field.

The Aerial Transportation Committee valued the consultation

of Egge and Churchill and, although confident over the propriety of
the site, also sought the approval of most important political and
business leaders from within the c i t y . ^
In early spring, 1925,
seemed imminent.

the acceptance of the Carter Lake site

Due to the need for organized effort,

the joint aerial

committees of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce and the Greater Omaha
Association, a group of business men whose objectives were to promote
Omaha, formally looked into the matter,

The report of this joint com

mittee stated that of the 2,000 airfields in the country 228 were
"municipally owned fields."

To the committee,

Chamber Journal. XIII

this proved the

(February 28, 1925), 11, 14,

9ATC Minutes, March 23, 1925, 59-60.
10 I b id, 60.
^ Sunday World-Herald, April 18, 1943,
15, 1925, 54-55.

2C; ATC Minutes, January

22

feasibility of Omaha's desires to develop an airfield.

12

The report

cited the 1921 Nebraska law that allowed a city to vote bonds for the
purchase and improvement of an airfield.
the next election, however,
this option.

13

Due to the long delay until

the joint committee urged Omaha to ignore

As long as the value of the land remained under $100,000,

the property could be purchased through the c i t y ’s right of eminent
domain "as an addition to the Omaha park s y s t e m . T h e n ,
ment of aviation did not proceed as planned,

the city would still

possess a valuable and easily re-sellable tract of land.
proved that even the faith of these supposedly staunch
had limits.

if the develop

15

This caution

aerial supporters

The 'air-minded' members of this joint committee recognized

that Omaha must act quickly or be left behind by other cities.

Still,

this did not reveal their entire reason for circumventing the electorate.
A bond proposition of this sort, if allowed on the ballot in 1925,
would probably have been unsuccessful.
There are many reasons for this conclusion.

Apparently, many

Omaha citizens thought of aviation as a useless sport or hobby.

16

Also,

judging from the effort and anxiety which attended the passage of aerial

■^ATC Minutes, March 23, 1925, 58.
13

Session Laws Passed by the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, 40th sess., H.R. 206, "An Act to authorize cities . . . to
acquire lands for the purpose of establishing an aviation field . .
March 15, 1921 (Lincoln:
The Kline Publishing Company, 1921), 658.
^ A T C Minutes, March 23, 1925, 59.
~^~*Ibid , Chamber Journal, XIII (February 28, 1925), 14;
31, 1925), 11; (February 14, 1925), 18.
16

Sunday World-Herald, April 18, 1943, 2C.

(January

23

bond propositions in the future,

it seems highly unlikely that the

city could have approved the sale of bonds as early as 1925.

Even

certain politicians in this period were not convinced of the im
portance of aviation.

The views of Park Commissioner Joseph Hummel,

a highly respected and popular member of the City Commission,
the persisting image of aviation as a n o v e l t y . ^

typified

After the City

Council voted the new airport site within his department Hummel stated
that he had supported that action.
aviation "an activity, as gold,
followed,

then,

The Commissioner considered

tennis, baseball, horseshoes."

18

It

that an airport belonged within a city's park department.

Certainly many more people agreed, and believed aviation to have an
equally minimal value to their community.
Regardless of the lack of aerial enthusiasm within Omaha, on
May 5, 1925,

the city adopted an ordinance acquiring as park property

and by eminent domain the 198-acre expanse of land destined to become
the Omaha Municipal Airfield.

19

Although the Omaha World-Herald

reported the size of the purchase as 160 and 192 acres in 1943 and 1961
articles respectively,

198 seems to be the more reliable figure.

20

The difficulties that were to haunt the field began quickly.

It took

until August for the evaluation of the land to be completed.

When the

"^William Dean Noyes to author, July 21, 1979.
18

Omaha B e e , August 6, 1925,
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Omaha City Council, Chamber Journal Minutes, May 5, 1925, 5255.
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Sunday World-Herald, April 18, 1943, 2C; September 3, 1961, 9J ;
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City Council received the appraisals on August 5, 1925, the value
arrived upon,

$41,215, did not even approach the $100,000 limit for

this type of purchase.

However,

the eighteen property holders were

not satisfied with the appraised value of their land.

The Council

announced a meeting with these citizens in which the city intended to
appeal to them "from the standpoint of public spiritedness" to accept
the evaluation.

21

The City Commissioners in Omaha displayed "a feeling

of great urgency" in the acquisition and development of a municipal
field.

22

To these men the appraisal of farmland presented an obstacle

in O m a h a ’s quest for aerial supremacy.

Some of the landowners,

though,

were not willing to sacrifice a fair compensation for their homes in
favor of the future of aviation in Omaha.
In September,

1925, the City Council accepted the second

evaluation involving 117 acres of the disputed land.

Investor’s

Realty Company, owners of nineteen acres, received $12,000 rather than
the original appraisal of $8,500.

The price of George Warren Smith's

ninety-eight acres rose to $29,460 from $15,000.

Finally,

the

evaluation placed upon the lease-hold of Hans Christenson increased
from one dollar to $1,500.

23

These alterations increased the payment

for the future airport land from $41,215 to $60,574 and later

^ Omaha B e e , August 6, 1925,

22
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re-evaluations raised the total to over $80,000, still well beneath
the maximum figure for an eminent domain acquisition.

24

Omaha had finally acquired an airfield site and on September 3,
1925, a mere two days after the Council agreed upon these appraisals,
twenty-one men ’’armed with corn knives" began clearing sixty-one acres
of the property.

25

It looked as though Omaha's airport, as part of

Joe Hummel's Park Department, would soon take shape.

Although neither

he nor his department had any experience in airfield planning or
development, Commissioner Hummel vowed that the field would be usable
for the American Legion Convention to be held in Omaha that fall.

26

The enthusiastic hopes of Hummel and others for O m a h a ’s im
mediate aerial future,
fortune.

though, faltered under the onslaught of m is

With no explanation, Postmaster General Harvey S. New, in

the middle of September, announced that the government had made a
mistake by stationing the airmail headquarters in Omaha.

He intended

to see that the headquarters were transferred to Washington as soon as
possible.

27

Only an old law of 1882 prevented Omaha from losing the

airmail station immediately.

This statute stated that Washington D.C.

employees could not "be paid out of money appropriated for federal

24

Complete original property evaluations can be seen in City
Council Minutes, August 6, 1925, 6555r-6562; Omaha World-Herald, January
1, 1926, 10; Douglas County Legionnaire, VI (July 14, 1927), 1. Hereafter
cited as Legionnaire.
25
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employees outside the district."

Postmaster New, however, had declared

his intention to achieve "a switch in appropriation from the next congress" so that his plan might be implemented.

28

The headquarters, safely

in Omaha for the time being, seemed destined to move eventually and, as
could be expected, N e w ’s plans brought an immediate reaction from Omaha
aerial leaders,
Gould Dietz, treasurer at the Charles N. Dietz Lumber Company,
President of the Omaha Chapter of the Aeronautic Society of America,
and one of the city's foremost aerial enthusiasts, said he would use
every connection he possessed in Washington to prevent the removal of
the airmail headquarters.

Dietz, highly surprised at the announcement,

also declared his intention to " ’sit in the gallery of the senate all
winter if n e c e s s a r y , " ’ or until the Postmaster's plans were foiled.

29

The shock of Dietz and many other aerial leaders within Omaha at the
announcement seemed genuine.

Assistant

Postmaster General W. Irving

Glover, during a visit to Omaha in late August, had described the city
as " ’the logical location for airmail headquarters.'"

30

This position,

far from hinting at the airmail's removal from the city, had led Omaha
to believe that the headquarters would remain safely within the city.
Understandably,

the Aerial Transportation Committee and others con

sidered this plan unbridled government deception.
The Chamber's aerial committee reacted immediately to this

28t
k - i
Ibid.

29ibid.
3 0 Ibid,
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27

attempted "double-cross."

Victor Roos,

committee member and future gen

eral manager of the Swallow Airplane Company of Wichita, Kansas, stated
that " ’definite a c t i o n ™ would be taken on this matter.
from the initial statements of indignation,

31

However, apart

this committee did very little.

On October 23 and again on December 29, 1925, the Aerial Transportation
Committee considered this subject in their meetings.

On either date the

Co mmittee’s " ’definite a c t i o n ’" encompassed only general discussion and a
plea to Nebraska's representatives in Congress to do what they could to
combat the measure,

something they, perhaps, would have done without the

Ch amb er ’s encouragement.

32

As the weeks passed the controversy seemed to

fade away and the plans of Postmaster New were not carried out.

The threat

to the airmail headquarters revealed the limits of power wielded by the
Chamber of Commerce.

The Chamber's aviation committee paid scant atten

tion to the matter because it did not have much influence over national
policy.

The focus of the committee members remained near home during the

fall of 1925, where their influence continued to be a good deal greater.
Besides the problem over the retention of the airmail headquarters,
the Aerial Transportation Committee dealt with a more local difficulty;
one that could be handled easily.

The subject of quick aerial advance

ment received much attention in the newspapers from the beginning of
1925.

By the fall of the year, with Post Office objectives promising to

stall Omaha's aviation future, one newspaper's civic mindedness produced
friction with the Chamber of Commerce.

^ A T C Minutes, October 28, 1925,

66; December 29, 1925,

73.
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On September 20, 1925,
editorial,

the Omaha Daily N e w s , in a front page

argued against Postmaster N e w ’s plans to move the airmail

headquarters.

Such an attempt,

to arms" for Omaha businessmen,
illogical choice.

said the Daily N e w s , should be a "call
for the move to Washington was a highly

The headquarters should be in the Middle West "where

there is the greatest airmail activity."

Describing Omaha as "in

excusably indifferent" to the advantages that the airmail brought,
the Daily News claimed that the city must no longer "sit with hands folded
in its lap."

Omaha would have to accept the responsibility for the

entire controversy and must fight with much more intensity than it
had showed up to that time to remain an aerial center.

The editorial

pointed out that Omaha "accepted the airmail offices apathetically

. . .

dilly-dallied about getting a municipal airfield" near downtown and
had "to be prodded" into improving the usually muddy road to Fort
Crook.

33

The Daily News closed saying that, realistically,

the government

could not be blamed for wanting the headquarters removed from such an
.uncooperative location.

The newspaper hoped that the airmail head

quarters would remain, but warned that if the city continued to be
"as lukewarm in trying to keep them" as it had been in fulfilling its
aerial potential "we might as well kiss the headquarters good-bye
right now."

34

Little doubt remained as to the position of the Daily

News on this matter.
The Daily N e w s ’ ctiticism did not end there because on October 1,

33

Omaha Daily N e w s , September 20, 1925, 1.
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1925, a second editorial regarding Omaha's aerial stagnation appeared.
The Daily News quoted a statement by Major Howard Wehrie of the National
Aeronautical Association claiming that Omaha's potential "'as a leading
commercial flying center'" could not be beaten.
though,

Wehrie warned Omaha,

that other cities were proceeding more rapidly to overcome

Omaha's natural geographic advantage.

These comments were interpreted

by the Daily News as politely ignoring the city's "backwardness" in
establishing an airfield and its inability "to take full advantage" of
its chances for aerial leadership.

35

The Aerial Transportation Committee made little response to
these two editorials.

The members decided to reaffirm their faith in

Commissioner Hummel by drafting a letter commending him for his efforts
regarding the Municipal Field.

36

After a thorough discussion the

committee ruled that the improvements to the field had proceeded
adequately up to that point.

These men did not consider the airport's

development behind schedule or under poor direction and thought the
response and explanations they offered to the Daily N e w s ' initial two
editorials were sufficient.
Soon after,

though, a third editorial claimed that

the Omaha field was being used for pasturing cows and that no
effort was being made by either the Greater Omaha Committee or
the Chamber of Commerce to further develop or improve it.37
This criticism could have been prompted by the failure of the Municipal

35Ibid, October 1, 1925, 1.
3^ATC Minutes, October 28, 1925, 67.
37Ibid, 68.
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Field to attract members of the American Legion Convention.
Chamber felt, however,

that had the weather cooperated,

easily have been prepared for the convention.
brought about the Daily N e w s 1 statements,

38

The

the field would

Regardless of what

the businessmen on the Chamber's

aerial committee believed that "publicity of this kind served no
purpose" and constituted "poor advertising for the city."

Consequently,

the Aerial Transportation Committee created a four member Unfavorable
Publicity Committee.

This subcommittee,

interestingly enough, made no

attempt to deny the charges or criticism of the editorials.

These men

were merely to "wait on the 'News' and suggest that items of this kind
might well be discontinued,"

39

This subcommittee called upon the editor of the Daily N e w s , Joseph
Polcar.

Polcar assured the subcommittee members that his newspapers had

attempted to build "public sentiment in favor of the improvement" of
Omaha's aviation facilities.

Furthermore, Polcar told the subcommittee

that the Daily News fully supported the Chamber's aerial projects.

40

The members of this subcommittee achieved an almost complete reversal
in the position of the Daily News— from one of severe criticism to utter
approval of the Chamber's actions.
wielded much influence.

Yet,

Certainly the Chamber of Commerce

it cannot be proven that the Unfavorable

Publicity Committee applied inordinate pressure upon Polcar to alter

Q Q
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39
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41
the stand of the Daily N e w s .
Although the negative commentary from the Daily News had upset
the Aerial Transportation Committee, by the end of 1926,

the complete

lack of coordinated effort or communication among the major aerial
groups advocating the development of a municipal airfield would prove
the paper correct.

On September 29, 1925, the Ford Reliability Tour

had landed at Fort Crook Field.

These sixteen good-will pilots easily

recognized the great inherent potential Omaha possessed as an aviation
center and

praised

the city's location along natural air routes en-

compassing all directions.

42

Yet, near the end of 1926 William

McCracken, head of aviation for the United States Department of Com
merce, visited Omaha.
great aerial potential,

He,

too, found reason to praise only Omaha's

proving that the airfield had not undergone

any concrete improvements during 1926 and that the fears of inaction
expressed by the Daily News in October,

1925, had been realized.

43

Even though the actions of the Aerial Transportation Committee
.regarding the Municipal Field during 1926 were unstructured and not
widely publicized,

they established three main areas of concern.

were the improvement of the field conditions,

These

the search for a hangar,

and the education of the public on the advantages of aviation to Omaha.
The failure of this committee to achieve the basic improvements to the

41
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42
43

Omaha Daily N e w s , September 30, 1925,

1.

Omaha World-Herald, November 23, 1926, 1.

32

field best exemplified the lack of coordinated effort so common in
Om a h a fs early struggle for aerial development.

It took the city ten

months to finish the grading and levelling of the field.

In September,

1926, the committee announced why it had not seen that the airfield
improvements were completed.
purchase of the site,

Supposedly, in the months following the

the committee expected Carter Lake to be dredged,

with the excess dumped on the field.

This, it argued, would have

raised the level of the airfield two or three feet.
of the lake, however, prevented this action."

44

The "low condition

This answer was

superficially logical, for such an increase in the height of the field
would facilitate drainage.

However,

in their minutes during the first

half of 1926 the Aerial Transportation Committee had made no mention of
the Carter Lake dredging project,

the objective of raising the height

of the field, or of an engineering study that certainly would have been
necessary in a plan of this magnitude.
To the cpntrary,

in January of that year the Chamber’s aerial

committee, along with the Real Estate Board, called upon the City
Council to grant a $5,000 expenditure to grade and level the field
45
which would be finished by spring.

The action and optimism of this

committee during this month hardly supported their later claim that
they made "no immediate demand . , , for the improvement of thefield."

44
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The excuses offered by the committee for the almost total lack of prog
ress could have been easily refuted.

Had the Carter Lake dredging plan

been of such importance to the Aerial Transportation Committee's object
ives in 1926, certainly there would have been some mention of it in their
meetings prior to September.
In the winter and spring of 1926, with the airfield admittedly "in
a dangerous condition," the committee allowed themselves to get off the
track and begin debate over the necessity of acquiring a hangar for the
field.

47

Seemingly oblivious to the fact that they did not possess a

decent field on which to place such a structure,

the Aerial Transportation

Committee became convinced that the field needed a hangar at once.
April,

By

the committee had decided that a balloon shed from Fort Omaha

would make a possible hangar and could be remodeled suitably
of $2,000.

at

a cost

A hangar at Fort Riley, Kansas, also received consideration

from the committee members,
expenditure.

48

its movement to Omaha entailing a $4,000

The committee decided,

gars were prohibitive at that time.
much needed field improvements,

49

though,

that the cost of the han-

Rather than pushing forward with

the Chamber's aerial committee had spent

a great deal of time and debate over the acquisition of an airplane hangar
when the airfield remained in shambles and their finances were such that
they could not even afford $2,000 to remodel a balloon shed.
In September the committee seemed to have realized their mis-

47
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take.

The members observed that none of O m a h a ’s air-minded groups had

combined to discuss the needs of the Municipal Field.

The committee

decided that "the cooperation of the other organizations interested” in
aviation must be obtained and they also agreed that the grading and level
ling of the field should continue "before any other improvements" were
made.

50

The Aerial Transportation Committee’s realization of its lack of

planning did not arise without motivation.

They were well aware of the

renewed debate over whether the airmail service should be transferred to
O m a h a ’s airfield.

Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover had declared that,

due to the expected increase in commercial aviation and the fact that
Fort Crook could not be used for commercial purposes,
be moyed to the Municipal Field in O m a h a , ^

the airmail should

The Airmail Service had

announced earlier that, because of the fog hazard and the money already
expended at Fort Crook,
location.

52

the chances were not good of a move to that Omaha

Now there seemed increased hope of that transfer and

immediate need for organized cooperative field improvement.
The possibility that Omaha might once again receive the airmail
marked a turning point for the Municipal Field.

It had been allowed to

remain in deplorable condition for the first nine months of 1926.

In

October, after a definite plan of improvement and priorities had been
established,
tantly,

the grading and levelling began in earnest.

More impor

the Council placed the improvement of the field under the super^-

~^I b i d , Septemher 3, 1926, 53,
~^I bi d, September 30, 1926, 56.
~*^I b i d , February 23, 1926, 46.
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vision of City Commissioner Dean Noyes.

53

Within ten days of his

appointment 200 acres of the field were cleared and placed in "first
class condition."

54

As Street Commissioner, Noyes seemed the proper

man to see to the improvement of the field and the establishment of
runways.
With serious discussion of the ai r m a i l ’s transfer,

the

Aerial Transportation Committee began a campaign to educate the public
on the benefits of aviation.

This committee provided many speakers who

addressed public assemblies, urging the support of O m a h a ’s aviation
objectives.

They hoped that, within a year, Omaha could be instructed

in the necessity of supporting aerial growth.

55

The establishment of

Omaha as an airmail and eventually a commercial aviation center re
quired the support of its citizens and, significantly,

the Aerial

Transportation Committee believed that the people of Omaha were in great
need of such an aerial education.

Their optimism for the swiftness of

their success, however, proved unfounded.

It took most persons in

Omaha three or four years to show true support for the development of
aviation within their city.
The Aerial Transportation Committee, of course, did not realize
this and felt, as 1927 began,
looked bright.

that O m a h a ’s immediate aerial future

Although held up by cold weather,

the improvements to

the field were proceeding as planned and the committee thought the time

5 3Ibid, October 11, 1926,
54
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33ATC Minutes, November 10, 1926, 60.
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had come to renew their quest for an airplane hangar.

The committee

members held a meeting with City Attorney Dana Van Dusen to discuss the
hangar project.

Van Dusen stated that "the city could not legally use

park funds for the construction of a municipal hangar."

56

The City Attorney proposed three alternatives to get around
this legal obstacle.

One method involved the leasing of a portion of

the airfield by private individuals who would build a hangar at their
own expense.

The city would have to give assurance,

though, that it

would not build a municipal h a n g a r , thus destroying their investment.
Another possibility involved the passage of a bond issue at the spring
election allowing the property to be used for aerial purposes.

This

solution did not seem feasible due to the nearness of the election.
The committee agreed that it would require "a vigorous campaign" for
the bonds to carry.

The third plan suggested that private parties

raise and lend the city the money to build a hangar.

When the expense

became budgetable Omaha would repay the a m o u n t . ^
The first method involved a rather risky arrangement with the
city,

The lease would have to be temporary "and subject to withdrawal

at any time,n

58

Omaha would also be obliged to end its hopes for a

municipal hangar.

The suggested bond issue did not meet with the

approval of the Aerial Transportation Committee which did not seriously
consider seeking the approval of the electorate at this time,

~*^I bi d, February 4, 1927,
57 Ibid,
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37
with the on-going educational campaign, they surely realized that the
city's air-mindedness left something to be desired.
*

vious drawbacks of the first two alternatives,

Due to the ob-

the third plan proved

to be the most likely to succeed— if a reliable air-minded group could
be found to raise sufficient funds.
This description fit Omaha Post Number One of the American
Legion very well.

In June,

1927, concerned over the state of aviation

in Omaha and the public propriety of aviation matters,

the Legion filed

a test suit "to determine if the city could legally expend park funds"
to develop an airfield.

59

This began three years of headstrong

positive action by the American Legion to see that Omaha fulfilled its
potential as an aerial center.

The Legion considered an airfield

"valueless without a hangar," and expected a rapid and favorable judgement in the test case.

60

Their optimism turned into disappointment as

the case languished in the courts under one delay after another.
Court did not issue a ruling until December.

The

Under this judgement

Omaha could use the park property for aerial purposes "until the city
or the court" discovered that the park system needed the a r e a , ^
Omaha World-Herald

lauded the ruling.

The

Describing the airfield and the

future hangar as "only a small beginning," the paper declared that at
last proof had arisen of Omaha's commitment to a policy of "taking full
advantage" of its aerial opportunities.

59
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VThile this suit struggled through the legal process,the American
Legion did not remain idle.
sion,

Although they had hoped for an early deci

the Legion worked out a plan that would acquire a hangar for Omaha

and leave the legal "technicalities" to be "worried about later."

63

This plan, part of a nation-wide "community-betterment" program, involved
the raising of $30,000 in subscriptions to build a municipal hangar.

6A

The Legion, highly hopeful that this drive would succeed, also remained
very critical of O m a h a ’s aerial progress.

To these men,Omaha's leaders

had waited long enough— the airfield must be developed immediately:
The pioneers of Omaha met obstacles greater than this and over
came them.
They did not hesitate to do the things that had
to be done for O m a h a ’s progress, albeit they occasionally rode
roughshod over the feelings of some who did not agree with
them . . . There is too much at stake to give further con
sideration to those who preach delay.65
The Legion conducted their subscription drive with equal consternation
and enthusiasm.
Allan A. Tukey, Chairman of the newly formed Legion-Airport Cor
poration,

announced his hope to have all money collected by the fifteenth

of September.

The corporation would sell 30,000 shares of its stock at

one dollar per share.

Groups of Legionnaires would be formed to solicit

contributions from the people and businesses within Omaha.

63Ibid, July 15,

1927,

Ibid, July 18, 1927,
^ L egionnaire, VI
6 6Ibid, (July 28,

66

Potential

1.
1; L egionnaire, VI

(July 14, 1927), 1.
1927) , 1.

(June 16, 1927),1.
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subscribers were warned that, although the Legion intended to reimburse
all money collected,

if the city could not repay the entire amount

their "subscription may actually prove to be a donation."

67

Praise and support for the Legion program came from many areas.
The World-Herald described the Legion as "made up of young men who have
already shown as individuals capacity for vigorous work and inspiring
leadership."

Omaha's support, argued the World-Herald, must be immedi-

ate if it wants to compete with other cities in aviation.

68

The Chamber

of Commerce viewed this campaign not only as a way to secure the long
sought after hangar, but also as a method by which criticism might be
diverted from its Aerial Transportation Committee.

The Executive Com

mittee of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce strongly endorsed this project
and declared its intention to subscribe liberally to the drive.
a contribution,

Such

thought the committee, "would do much to offset the

thought that the Chamber had failed in their undertaking of the improvement of this field."

69

The Legion hangar drive began in late July, 1927, and ended
successfully in early September.

The goal of $30,000 had been achieved,

but hardly in as glorious a manner as city officials claimed at a later
date,^

The Legionnaires found themselves in a struggle at every turn

to raise the money by the target date.

From the start the World-Herald

67I bid.
k^Omaha W orl d-Herald, July 18, 1927, 8.
69

Executive Minutes, July 26, 1927,

196.

7% e a n Noyes, "The City of Omaha and Aviation," Official
Souvenir Program of the Omaha Air Races, May 15^-18, 1 9 3 1 7 24.
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urged Omahans to support this drive.

The newspaper thought M the

campaign should be short and sweet,” and the city must be appreciative
of the time these Legion men had sacrificed for its future.

The Legion

made its biggest appeal to the business interests since any investment
in O m a h a ’s aerial future would be returned many times over by vast
mcreases m

j
71
commerce andj industry.

Yet,people in Omaha did not readily see the advantages of avia
tion and the drive bogged down in August.

Immediately, the World-Herald

printed a scathing editorial criticizing the community for its backward
ness.

The newspaper considered it "shameful” that the Legion should

have received any resistance in its subscription efforts.

The drive

to raise $30,000, a mere "14 cents per capita," promised "direct and
material and great advantage to the city as a whole

. . . ."

paper printed a list of the contributors up to that point.
citizen in Omaha, argued the editorial,

72

The

Every

should study these names to

discover who has contributed and what monetary worth each placed upon
the quest for aerial supremacy.

The newspaper thought many people

could have given far greater amounts than they had up to now.

The

editorial closed with an assurance that this list resembled "a map
merely of Omaha asleep;" the city would, eventually, awaken to the
advantages of aviation.

73

Another World-Herald

editorial pointed out

the aerial progress of other cities and argued that Omaha lagged far

^ Omaha Wor ld -He ral d, July 27, 1927,
^ Ibid, August 10, 1927,

8,

14.
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behind those communities in such development.

One of these examples,

Buffalo, New York, had spent over $700,000 on its airport; another,
Baltimore, Maryland,

spent $1,500,000 on aviation facilities.

paper thought it shocking,

then,

The

that O m a h a ’s attempt to raise only

74

$30,000 should be so lengthy.

With the successful conclusion of the drive the same newspaper
congratulated the Legion for assuring Omaha "a place on the air maps of
the world."

In spite of an intense feeling of apathy and "an honest

feeling" by the Omaha people that the city, itself,
field,

the drive succeeded.

toward aerial primacy.7“*

should equip the

The people of Omaha had taken a giant step

A glance at the list of contributors

though,

showed that O m a h a ’s businesses rather than its citizens dictated the
success of the airport drive.

Allan Tukey had declared that, due to

the short time available to the Legion workers,

it would be important

that "business houses subscribe more than would normally be their proportion in a campaign of this size,"
of business,

76

The contributions in the name

led by Standard Oil of Nebraska and Northwestern Bell as

well as many local concerns, proved that they had much to gain from
O m a h a ’s development as an air c e n t e r . ^

This also meant that, even

though many individual citizens in Omaha contributed,

the success of the

Legion drive did not necessarily mean Omaha had developed into an airconscious city.

74lbid, August 12, 1927,

22.

7 I b i d , September 11, 1927,

8.

76Ibid, July 28, 1927, 1,
77I bid, July 27, 1927,

1; August 11, 1927, 1,
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The American Legion did not conduct their hangar drive in a
vacuum.

The dedication of the Municipal Airfield took place just before

the official beginning of the campaign and in a manner definitely
designed to swell the interest and pride of Omaha in their airport.
Approximately 25,000
1927,

people were present at the airfield on July 10,

to view the arrival of the sixteen Ford Reliability Flyers.

These aviators had much praise for Omaha's field development and, once
again, easily recognized its potential.

The Aerial Transportation

Committee organized the dedication and hoped that it would "have the
effect of interesting Omaha to the extent that there will be general
demand" for improvement of Omaha's air facilities.

78

As the airfield dedication greatly aided the beginning of the
drive in June,

so did two individuals come to the rescue of the

severely stalled drive in August.

Although the efforts of the Legion

in this month cannot be overstated,

the campaign got a big boost at

this crucial time by the visits of two world renowned transatlantic
aviators.

On August 23 Clarence Chamberlain, a Denison,

Iowa, native,

came to the city for the purpose of urging its people to support the
Legion airport drive.

79

Chamberlain's popularity brought a very warm

reception from the Omaha people.

His visit did much to draw attention
8,

to the airfield and "to inspire the men" who conducted the Legion drive.

78
79

fin

Chamber Jo u r n a l , XVI

(July 16, 1927), 3,.

Omaha World-Herald, August 19, 1927, 1.
Chamber J o u r n a l , XVI

(August 27, 1927),3.
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The real boost for the Legion program came on August 30, with
the arrival of Charles Lindbergh, just three months after the completion
of his famous

transatlantic flight.

"Lindy" had received his first

lessons in flight "at the Nebraska Aircraft Corporation" in Lincoln just
five years earlier and the welcome he received showed that Nebraskans
approved of his return.

8l

Judging from the tremendous reaction to

Lindbergh's visit no one would have suspected Omaha's faltering attempts
to improve its airfield.

Thousands of Omahans lined "Lindy's" parade

route cheering him as a conquering hero.

In a speech before a crowd of

10,000 at Ak-Sar-Ben F i e l d , Lindbergh urged Omaha to take an interest in
aviation:
Today the most necessary step . . . is the construction of
suitable landing fields.
There is very little use in having
airports at a distance of an hour or more from the city they
on
serve. ozL i ndb erg h’s words favoring the close proximity of airfields to the
downtown area were perhaps more appropriate than anyone in 1927 could
realize •
On July 25, 1927,

the South Omaha Merchants Association had

announced plans for the construction of an airfield near Bellevue
"which

would replace the current site at Carter Lake."

83

This pro

posal promised to have a definite effect upon the Legion hangar pro
gram.

The organizers of the

South Omaha project claimed that an

OO

Omaha World-Herald, August, 31, 1927, 2.
83 I bid , July 25, 1927, 1,
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extraordinary fog hazard and the low level of the municipal field
would prevent the Airmail Service and other major aerial concerns from
moving to that location.

Thomas Shea,

South Omaha businessman,

stated

that this fear alone prompted these actions and that his group desired
only a

safe

usable, field near Omaha.

The proposed South Omaha site,

claimed to be of adequate height and "absolutely free from fog," did
not develop at this time "due to the failure of a cash subscription
campaign , . .

84

However,

the publicity it received during the

hangar drive certainly showed the great need for positive action
regarding the Municipal Field,
The aerial situation in Omaha by the fall of 1927 had reached
a turning point— >a position reminiscent of a year earlier.

With the

hangar drive successfully completed and public consciousness of
aviation probably as high

as

it had ever been,

the city's air

enthusiasts saw a radiant future for the Municipal Field.

In the

next year, however, O m a h a ?s aerial leaders had to face a problem they
had avoided for quite a while.

In 1928 the people of Omaha were finally

allowed to voice their opinion on the fate of aviation in their com
munity.

^ I b i d , July 26, 1927,

1; August 26, 1929, 1.

CHAPTER III

THE PUBLIC VIEW OF OMAHA AVIATION
The year 1928 proved to be of pivotal importance to the Omaha
Municipal Airfield.

Following three years of generally indecisive and

uncoordinated action, O m a h a ’s aviation promoters now moved boldly toward
their objectives.

The airfield finally began to take shape in 1928 and,

at last, a feeling of cooperation appeared among major air-minded groups
as Omaha fought off its many critics and began to solidify the repu
tation of

its municipal airfield,

Aviation Bond

The successful adoption of an

Charter Amendment in November, more than any other

initiated O m a h a ’s new aerial status.

Indeed,

event,

this single issue turned

out to be

the most important step taken in the decade toward the formu

lation of

the airfield,

Credit for the extremely organized, methodical,

campaign required to achieve the charter amendment’s passage belonged
to the Chamber of Commerce,
proposition, however,

The extremely close polarized vote on the

lessened the sense of victory of its proponents

and proved to O m a h a ’s aerial critics that the city still hesitated to
see a public responsibility for the advancement of aviation.
Omaha airport promoters had considered soliciting the opinion
of the electorate for quite a while.

The events of late 1927,

though,

showed the absolute necessity of active public support for O m a h a ’s
aviation growth.

The successful hangar drive and the court decision

that permitted the land to be used for aerial purposes constituted
victories for those who supported aviation.

Along with those victories

came the realization that the city did not have sufficient funds to

45
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develop suitably and improve the airport as quickly as many air enthusi
asts had desired.

In January, 1928,

the City Council appointed a com

mittee of three of its members to consider the financial needs of the
airport from an official standpoint.
Hummel,

Along with Dean Noyes and Joe

the Council chose Commissioner John Hopkins, Vice-President of

the City Council and Superintendent of the Department of Accounting and
Fi n a n c e .^
This committee suggested that "in order for Omaha to keep
abrest of the times in aviation development" the city should submit
an ordinance at the November election.

This proposed ordinance would

allow the city to sell a certain amount of bonds each year for the
improvement and maintenance of an airport.

The committee thought

this suggestion should receive prompt consideration.

They did not want

Omaha in a position in which it would be "embarrassed for lack of funds"
and could not keep pace with other cities.

2

At this moment bond ordi

nance rhetoric sounded very public-minded but neither the Council nor
the Chamber of Commerce considered it seriously.

The monetary situation

would have to become very tight and the airfield conditions very bad for
the c i t y ’s aviation advocates to allow the voters to have a voice on air
development.
Yet,

such a critical situation arose in late August.

Water lines

had recently been extended to the field, and city officials expected gas
tanks to be installed within a short time which proved that the field

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Aerial Transportation Committee M i n 
utes, January 6, 1928, 10.
Hereafter cited as ATC Minutes.
2Ibid.
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had not been totally ignored.

Still,

these improvements did not proceed

quickly enough and an ancient argument of O m a h a ’s aerial proponents
appeared once again.

"Many thought that aerial advancement in Omaha did

not compare with other cities that provided "funds for fields to take
3

care of the increasing amount of air travel,"
the ring of truth because,
usage

had

This old argument had

since the purchase of the field in 1925, its

steadily increased regardless of the lack of technical improve

ments and the Omaha-Legion Airport Hangar had quite frequently become
overcrowded.

The claim that the city had failed to provide comparably

adequate funds for the a irp ort ’s development, however, received the most
attention.

4

The Aerial Transportation Committee held a meeting with repre
sentatives of many of O m a h a ’s staunchest aviation groups to consider
methods by which the city could provide increased financial assistance
to the airfield,

The first possible alternative involved obtaining funds

out of the current city budget, something all in attendance considered"
, , , out of the question , , . „”

Secondly,

a bond issue similar to

that suggested in January could be presented to the voters,

However,

because such a bond issue required "a threerfifths vote of the electorate,’’
the odds of its passage seemed slim, given the apathetic views of the
people in Omaha toward aviation.”*
The third plan involved a charter amendment allowing the city to

3I b i d , August 29, 1928, 55,
4I b i d , 55-56
3 I bi d, 58.
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issue $50,000 in general obligation aviation bonds per year for five
years.

All agreed that this would provide adequate funds for the improve

ment, maintenance,

and expansion of the airfield.

The fact that this

alternative required only a simple majority to pass made it very appealing.
The Aerial Transportation Committee officially voted to suggest that the
City Council place an amendment on the November ballot; confident on the
surface of its success yet highly cognizant of the intense struggle that
would

be necessary to achieve its passage.8
On September 4, 1928,

the Omaha City

Council accepted the idea

of an aviation bond charter amendment and took steps to place it in the
November sixth election.

These Councilmen considered aviation very

important to the city "as a business proposition."^
Allan Tukey of the Legion-Airport
more concern over its role in
out the United States.
Lincoln, Nebraska,

Corporation,

the tremendous

Others,

such as

thought Omaha should have

aerial competition through

If communities like Kansas City, Missouri,

and

could vote $800,000 and $200,000 respectively toward

aviation,

thought Tukey, Omaha must accept this proposition, take adg
vantage of its location, and move to the front in aviation.
The optimistic
expectations which Omaha aerial leaders expounded seemed genuine.

Actually,

this confidence was superficial and, perhaps, was a tactic designed to
conceal very real fears of groups like the Aerial Transportation Committee
that this measure could fail.

6Ibid,

55-61.

^Omaha World-Herald, September 4, 1928, 1,
8Ibid, 2.
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The true attitude of the Chamber's aerial committee appeared in
an October 9 meeting called to discuss the upcoming amendment.
Chairman Amos Thomas of Brome,
law, announced,

Thomas, Ramsey, and McGuire,

Committee

attorneys at

after consulting the Omaha newspapers and certain air-

minded organizations within the city,

that unless the city took "some

very drastic action . . . the amendment would be defeated."

This dire

prediction arose from the fact that many other financial measures appeared
on the same ballot and, as all knew,

the voters in Omaha tended to react

against anything that threatened to increase taxes.
aviation amendment,

9

Along with the

the proposed Douglas County Hospital Bonds,

for a

free Missouri River bridge, and a proposition that provided funds for in
creased fire and police protection would be up for a p p r o v a l . ^
many important monetary issues to consider,

With so

the Aerial Transportation

Committee thought that "a considerable amount of educational work" would
have to be done before the people considered the aviation worthy of
passage.

11
Another situation that promised to harm the amendment’s hopes of

passage was the "division between classes of voters" in Omaha.
Transportation Committee recognized that this class distinction

The Aerial
would

prompt certain Omahans to vote against any "increased expenditure,"
particularly that for aviation advancement.

9
ATC Minutes,

October 9, 1928,

12

The actions of the Aerial

62.

Omaha Wo rl d-Herald, November 5, 1928, 1.
"^ATC Minutes,
^Ibid,

63.

October 9, 1928, 62.
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Transportation Committee members proved their awareness of this division.
From the beginning,

the campaign adopted by the Cha mb er’s aerial com

mittee differed from their earlier efforts at producing air-mindedness.
The committee created a "strategy board" to coordinate all actions
regarding the charter amendment.

13

Due to the short time available, on

October 19 this special air subcommittee accepted a program of sheer
propaganda labelled the Manly Plan (after committee member Robert H.
Manly).

This program promised to solicit by impulse the votes of those

who would not normally favor the proposition.

14

The subcommittee

admitted that Omahans "were not air-minded at . . . present" and its
members thought that "no active campaign should be started in favor of
the charter amendment until just prior to the election . . . .
sequently,

the special air

Con

subcommittee spent most of October organizing

their campaign into an effective propaganda and publicity force.
The air subcommittee chose the week of October 29 as the target
date for their campaign, entitled "Aviation Week."

16

Although they

planned no mention of the charter amendment until two or three days
before the election,

the people would be deluged by aerial publicity

during this period.

One of the most significant methods by which the

13Ibid.
14

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Special Air Subcommittee Minutes,
October 15, 1928, 67-68, Hereafter cited as Subcommittee Minutes; ATC
Minutes, October 19, 1928, 73-74.
"^Subcommittee Minutes, October 15, 1928, 66; ATC Minutes, October 9, 1928, 63.
"^Subcommittee Minutes, October 15, 1928, 6 6 } 69,
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special air subcommittee hoped to draw the v o t e r ’s attention to aviation
in Omaha consisted of dropping free airplane ride tickets from the air
or distributing them in downtown stores.
dollars,

the committee decided,

Since each ride cost about two

in an obvious expression of their

business-like approach to this campaign,

that "just a few rides would

serve the same purpose from a publicity standpoint as 400 or 500 free
ri•ad e s .H 1 7
The importance of Omaha's future as an air center would also be
pointed out to the people through the abundant use of speakers, posters,
advertisements, and announcements in theaters.

Posters urging passage

of this amendment were placed in several downtown stores,
Brandeis, Kilpatricks, Orchard-Wilhelm,

including

Haydens, and Herzbergs,

The

organizers of "Aviation Week" had hoped that Charles Lindbergh would visit
Omaha before the election.

During this time, though,

!'Lindy" was on a

hunting trip in Mexico and unable to bring this support to the campaign.
Although the Lindbergh visit would have been ideal,

the Aerial Transport

ation Committee arranged for seven pilots from Fort Riley, Kansas,

to

give an aerial show at the Municipal Field on the Sunday before the elec
tion,

The committee thought this would "stimulate interest in aviation

and , . . bring . . . ’Aviation W e e k ’" to a successful conclusion but,
due to "mud and lack of spectators,"
day,

the show was postponed to the following

The Aerial Transportation Committee and the special air subcommittee

believed that the events of "Aviation Week" and a "short, quick demon
stration and publicity campaign" just before the election "would put

"^ATC Minutes,

October 19, 1928,

71,73,
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over the charter amendment."

18

Approximately two weeks before the election, an item appeared in
the Omaha Bee-News that greatly upset the special aviation bond sub
committee and promised to lessen the effect of their upcoming drive to
secure the passage of the amendment.

On October 22, 1928,

the Bee-News

reported that certain key city officials favored a proposal to transfer
control of the Municipal Airfield to the Metropolitan Utilities District
Board.

The report quoted Omaha Mayor James C. Dahlman as highly re

sponsive to the proposed transfer.

A member of the Utilities Board

himself, Dahlman expressed confidence that the board would "be able to
handle the muny airfield efficiently and successfully."

19

Perhaps a

more important endorsement for Utilities Board control came from Street
Commissioner Dean Noyes, who had received sole responsibility for the
field in March.

20

As reported by the Bee-News, Noyes seemed anxious

to rid himself of the airfield:
Two weeks ago I offered to turn the field over to any city
commissioner who would run it . . . .
I do not believe any
one could have done any better than I have done without any
money, and it takes money to equip and operate an airfield.
So far as I am concerned the Metropolitan Utilities Board
^
may have the field tomorrow with my blessing and best wishes.
The Bee-News reported N o y e s ’ remarks in an inaccurate context.

The

18

Omaha Sunday Bee-News, October 28, 1928, 3A; Omaha Bee-News
October 29, 1928, 3; October 30, 1928, 2; November 5, 1928, 11; November
6, 1928, 4; Subcommittee Minutes, October 15, 1928, 68,
~*~^0maha Bee-News, October 22, 1928,

20
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Commissioner’s feeling toward Omaha aviation did not resemble the un
caring attitude suggested by his published remarks.

Rather, N o y e s ’

words represented very evident frustration after months of pressure to
develop an airport with only the meager funds he scraped from his Street
Maintenance budget.
The accuracy of Bee-News reporting did not concern the Chamber of
Commerce as much as the effect such a story could have upon the election.
If the voters thought a chance existed that the Metropolitan Utilities
District Board would control and finance the airport there would be no
need to risk additional taxation by the passage of the aviation bond
charter amendment.

The special subcommittee held an unscheduled meeting

on October 24 to discuss fears over the possible consequences of the
Bee-News story.

The seriousness of the crisis brought about debate over

whether Aviation Week should be cancelled.

The subcommittee, however,

decided to continue with their plans while taking the precaution of
calling on the editor of the newspaper and requesting that the Bee-News
no longer ’’publish stories detrimental to the airport bonds until after
the election."

22

Evidently this subcommittee and the members of the

Aerial Transportation Committee as a whole did not dread the transfer of
airport control to the Metropolitan Utilities District Board.

Their

only fear continued to be the effect that rumors of a transfer might
have upon the Aviation Bond Charter Amendment and the rapid development
of the airfield.

22
23
30, 1928,

23

Subcommittee Minutes, October 24, 1928,

75.

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Executive Committee Minutes, October
242.
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Although the Omaha Chamber of Commerce remained the primary
advocate of the special charter amendment,
from all over the city.

calls for its passage came

No doubt due to the substantial commitment they

had placed in the airfield, Omaha Post Number One of the American
Legion highly encouraged the amen dme nt ’s passage.

24

A resolution adopted

by the Legion Executive Committee warned the people of Omaha that the
defeat of the measure "would be

’a vital blow to the c i t y ’s development,

and a nullification of the air program . . . .

The "apathy and

seeming indifference" of many Omahans had the Legion "up in arms" and
its members worked strenuously for the success of the amendment.

25

Amos Thomas of the Aerial Transportation Committee agreed with the
Legion and urged Omaha to "keep faith with the people who contributed
the 30 thousand dollars" for the Municipal Hangar.

Without this

amendment the promise to develop the airport could not be fulfilled.
If the aviation measure should go down to defeat, thought T h o m a s , it
would break the faith with the American Legion and seriously hinder
O m a h a ’s aerial development,

26

Other groups which supported the aviation amendment included
the Tax Research Association,
the Real Estate Board.
whose opinion was

the National Aeronautical Association, and

Members of the Tax Research Association,

solicited on

any subject effecting taxation,

ferred the control of the Utilities Board but,

24

Omaha Douglas County Leg io nna ire , VII
Hereafter cited as L e g i o n n a i r e .
25
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Commerce, wanted field improvements to begin immediately and thought the
Municipal Field " ’an essential development . . . .
its proper place on the air map.'"
ation,

27

to assure Omaha of

The National Aeronautical Associ

though extremely displeased with the way the field had been

managed,

called for the amendment's passage.

28

Louis C. Thoelecke,

Secretary of the Omaha Branch and Chief Examiner of the National Security
Fire Insurance Company,

commented that the airfield needed "extensive

improvements" immediately, which would be provided by the aviation
amendment.
groups,

29

When compared to the air-minded accolades of many other

the Real Estate Board issued a less-than-warm approval of the

amendment.

After announcing their opposition to all other bond issues

on the ballot,

the Board offered its support to the charter amendment:

The board members are in favor of the airport bonds because
they will effect taxes only slightly, because of the small
amount involved, and because of the far-reaching effect
immediate improvement of our airport will have on the future
development of the city . . . .30
Although these three groups were rather peripheral to the advancement of
aviation in Omaha,

their support probably aided the campaign to secure

the passage of the charter amendment.

Yet, without a doubt,

the Omaha

World-Herald constituted the most vocal single element advocating the
aviation measure.
Unlike the Chamber of Commerce,

the Worl d-H era ld's impassioned

Omaha B e e -Ne ws, November 4, 1928,
OO
ATC Minutes, October 15, 1928,
29
30

2.

69.

Sunday Bee- New s, November 4, 1928, 2A.
Omaha World-Herald, November 1, 1928, 15.
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civic-minded pleas for the advancement of aviation reached into homes
throughout the Omaha area.

In an editorial on October 31, 1928, the

World-Herald declared its support for the amendment and described the
Omaha field as a highly inadequate "bit of cleared ground."
editorial argued that "groups representing every division of

The
public

opinion in the city" had announced support for the airport measure and
each realized its importance to O m a h a ’s future.
the civic pride of Omaha citizens,

In an effort to sting

the newspaper urged the city not to

lose this great opportunity for their community to rise to the pinnacle
of aviation.

31

The World- Her al d’s editor, Gilbert Hitchcock,

later

announced his n e w s p a p e r ’s support for all bond issues on the ballot.
Each,

thought Hitchcock, promised great material rewards for the city.

3

The Omaha Bee-News reacted differently to the upcoming aviation
charter amendment.

Regardless of the disapproval that its earlier

publicity prompted,

the Bee-News opposed the aviation measure and en

dorsed Metropolitan Utilities District control of the airfield.
the amendment pass, argued the paper,
the taxpayers for years

..."

Should

"it would mean a charge against

and the constantly altering political

situation in Omaha would severely hinder the efficiency of the field.
The Bee-News hoped that the transfer to the Utilities District would
occur very rapidly:
Should legal methods be worked out to transfer the airport . . .
it would be possible to use the district revenue to improve the
field, efficient management would be assured, and within the
course of a few years— when the airfield will have become a p ro f
itable
enterprise— the District will get the benefit of it,

^ ^I b i d , October 31, 1928, 14.
^ I b i d , November 5, 1928,

26,
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the c i t y ’s growing commerce will get the benefit, and the people
will have been saved the taxes that a bond issue would call for.
After the receiving the support of many important organizations and
influential citizens,
the electorate.

the charter amendment came under the scrutiny of

As a ’last-ditch’ effort, on election day the Omaha

World-Herald printed a telegram from Harry F. Guggenheim, President of
the Guggenheim Foundation for the Promotion of Aeronautics.

His words

of warning corresponded well with the fears of O m a h a ’s aerial leaders:
Any community that does not make provision for the establishment
of an airport must of necessity be excluded from the benefits
that this most recent means of communication offers now and in
the future.34
During the campaign to secure this ame ndm ent ’s passage, no orgnized
movement appeared in opposition to the aviation measure.

35

Still,

judging from the results of the election, many Omahans cared little
about the supposed benefits of an improved airport and only very faintly
heard their aerial le a d e r s ’ clamorous calls for the approval of the
aviation charter amendment.
Omaha voters approved the charter measure in such a manner as to
exemplify the c i t y ’s class division and lack of air-consciousness.

The

outcome in each of O m a h a ’s twelve wards showed the extremely polarized
stance of the electorate on the aviation charter amendment and the

Omaha Bee -News, October 25, 1928,

26.

Omaha World-H er ald , November 6, 1928,
35

7.

The Omaha Chamber of Commerce possibly had a hand in stifling
negative reaction.
Even the Union Pacific Railroad, many of whose
workers lived in wards that were not to pass the aviation amendment, did
not work for the i s s u e ’s defeat nor urge its employees to vote against
the measure.
At this time the growing use of the automobile worried
the Union Pacific much more than the increasing numbers travelling by
air.
See Report of President Carl R. Gray, 32nd Annual Report of the
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Year Ended December 31, 1928, 10.
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subject of aerial development in general (see map on the following page).
Seven of the twelve wards voted against the amendment; three of these
were in north Omaha and the remaining four were in south Omaha.

The

five wards that voted for the measure comprised the geographic center of
the city:

the downtown area and immediately west.

36

This obvious polarization of O m a h a ’s voting population appeared
due to the differing views on the nature and future of aviation.

This

was especially apparent in wards 5, 6, 7, and 8, south of Pacific Street.
Of the 22,515 total votes cast on this issue in these wards,
measure failed by 59% to 41%-^13,439 to 9,076,

the aviation

The negative reaction

was even more obvious by a study of the precinct vote.

Of the 49 total

precints that comprised the entire electorate south of Pacific Street*
only 6 voted for the aviation charter amendment.

The voters in the

southern neighborhoods of Omaha were primarily working class citizens,
separated both geographically and financially from those who advocated
rapid expansion of aviation.

Ward 7 best exemplified this status*— 10

out of 11 precincts voted against the aviation issue and this measure
was crushed by a 66% to 34% margin-— 3,072 to 1,553.
similar in the northern areas of the city.

The situation was

Of the 41 precincts that

made up wards 1, 11, and 12, thirty-one voted against the issue and
it failed by 55% to 45%— 11,402 to 9,140,

Many of the people in the

northern and southern sections of the city still thought of aviation as
an expensive,

relatively upper class,

sport or hobby.

Consequently,

94
Map taken from Omaha World-Herald, April 9, 1928, 10.
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the risk of higher taxation outweighted the argument of civic pride and
the threat of aerial backwardness utilized by pro-amendment forces.
Residents of the western,
viewed aviation differently.

37

definitely more wealthy, areas of Omaha

To most of these citizens,

aviation pro

vided rapid communication and travel, as well as the advancement of the
city.

Wards 9 and 10 comprised the wealthiest areas of the city.

Neighborhoods such as Dundee, Happy Hollow,

and Blackstone contained

many "elegant mansions" and represented the power base of the affluent.
As witnessed by their vote on the aviation charter amendment,

these

"wealthy and well-to-do" people supported aviation in their community.

38

Of the 40 precincts in wards 9 and 10, thirty-eight voted for the amend
ment, and it passed by a 62% to 38% majority— 11,377 to 6,784.

The

downtown areas of Omaha had a similar interest in the c i t y ’s growth and
also voted heavily in favor of the amendment.

Wards 2, 3, and 4 com

prised this area and only 7 out of 40 precincts in the downtown section
of Omaha voted against this measure, as the aviation bonds passed by
57% to 43%— 6,846 to 5 , 0 2 6 f

More than likely,

this represented the

influence of the business and political leaders in Omaha and an awareness

37

T. Earl Sullenger, Studies in Urban Sociology (New York:
The Survey, for the Bureau of Social Research, Municipal University
of Omaha, 1933), 119-157; Howard Chudacoff, Mobile Americans, Residencial and Social Mobility in Omaha 1880-1920 (New York:
Oxford
University Press, 1972), 61-83,
Sullenger and Chudacoff discuss
the effects of immigration and the working class ethnic background
of South Omaha from 1880-1920; Sunday World-H era ld , April 18, 1943,
2C; Raymond Fahrlander, private interview held in Plattsmouth,
Nebraska, November 30, 1978; William Dean Noyes, private interview
held in Omaha, Nebraska, April 3, 1979.
38

Omaha

Margaret Patricia Killian, Born Rich:
A Historical Book of
(Omaha:
Assistance League of Omaha, 1978), 41-51.
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of the advantages an Improved airport so close to downtown would have to
the heart of the city.
The extremely close vote totals on the aviation amendment pro
vided another interesting aspect about this election.

Of the 73,090

votes cast on this issue on election day, the charter amendment failed
to pass by 212 votes— 36,651 to 36,439.
absentee votes, however,
amendment.

A count of the large number of

showed a 875 to 508 plurality in favor of the

With the 367 vote edge provided by the absentee voters,

charter amendment passed by 155 votes— 37,314 to

37,159.

of the mail vote did not surprise most aerial promoters.

the

The outcome
Those persons

who travelled frequently had an opportunity to realized the value an
improved airfield could have to a community.

39

Reaction to this unique election came from many sources.
the official returns,
defeated,

Before

and when it looked as though the amendment had been

the Omaha World-Herald printed a highly critical editorial.

The newspaper admitted the possibility that the official count might
change the final result, but thought that such a count would probably
"increase the majority against the bonds."

The World-Herald could not

understand how the Omaha people had so easily "forgotten

Charles

Lindbergh and his spectacular campaign to develop a condition of air
mindedness among" Omahans.

Calling the defeat "deplorable," the World-

Herald seemed to recognize the city's divided views on aerial growth:

39

Omaha Chamber of Commerce Journal, XVII (November 17, 1928), 8.
Hereafter cited as Chamber J o ur nal ; Results of election taken from official
Douglas County Election Returns, November 17, 1928, No 3 Office of Election
Commissioner, Omaha-Douglas Civic Center, Omaha, Nebraska.
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Aviation, not as a sport or spectacle, but as the practical
handmaid of commerce is not of the future.
It is here now.
Its growth and development are almost as sure as the pro 
verbial death and taxes.
Yet,

the paper found that it had

'jumped the gun' and the aviation amend

ment had been saved from defeat by the absentee voters.
In an editorial cartoon appearing immediately after the announce
ment of the official results,

the World-Herald breathed an embarrassed

sigh of relief at the close victory for Omaha aviation (see following
page).

The cartoon depicted the mail

(absentee) vote flying in a single

engine,

two seat, vintage 1928 airplane after it had swooped down and

rescued the infant aviation bond issue from the clutches of a dastardlylooking cleaver-wielding man meant to represent the anti-bond vote.
Certainly this

'cliff-hanger-like'

scene described very well the view

of the city's aerial leaders toward the outcome of the charter amendment.
Regardless of the close vote,
ahead in aviation.

41

the city could finally plan to move

This feeling found expression in the second World-

Herald editorial designed as a reaction to the aviation ame ndm ent ’s out
come.

In this instance,

the paper praised the election results and, due

to the amendment's near defeat and the airfield's close proximity to death,
described the airport as "the heroine in a movie thriller."

The edi

torial placed the responsibility for the close election on those people
who had "no faith in the future of aviation and its influence upon city
growth

, , .

The World-Herald concluded that the last big step

toward air supremacy had been t a k e n , ^

40
41
42

Omaha World-He ra ld, November 9, 1928,

8.

Cartoon taken from I b i d , November 12, 1928,
Omaha World-Herald, November 12, 1928, 3,

3.
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SAVED f
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Like the W orld-H er ald , the Omaha Chamber of Commerce Journal
seemed very relieved at the amend men t’s passage.

The Jou r n a l , though,

remained highly critical of Omaha in spite of the victory and thought the
community as a whole should not be credited with this success.

Along

with the half of the electorate that proved their air-mindedness at the
ballot box and the few hard working organizations such as the Aerial
Transportation Committee and the American Legion,
mail votes deserved much praise.

those who submitted

These "intelligent” voters,

thought the

J o u r n a l , travelled very frequently and often found themselves "in a
position to see what other air-minded cities" had accomplished along
aerial lines.

With an air of disgust unusual after a victory,

Journal urged Omaha to "wake up
maps of the world.

43

the

. . ." if it desired a place on the air

The reaction of the World-Herald and the Omaha

Chamber of Commerce Journal differed from the response of the Bee- Ne ws.
Other than reporting the close victory,the newspaper remained editorially
silent on the success of this measure.

44

The passage of the $250,000 charter aviation bond amendment
suddenly made the airfield a far more important project.

The American

Legion seemed to be the first major group to realize this and their
reaction to the m e a s u r e ’s passage was calm and business-like.

Because

of the $30,000 investment that the Legion-Airport Corporation had in the
airfield,

43
44

the Legion intended to see that the city made adequate use of

Chamber J ou r n a l , XVIII

(November 17, 1928), 8,

Omaha Bee-News, September 9, 1928,

1.
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the first $50,000 installment.

45

The success of this measure solved the

continual obstacle to the development of the Municipal Airfield— adequate
financial backing.

Through the success of the amendment,

the c i t y ’s

aerial leaders got a clear picture of the quality of air-mindedness in
their community.
the

They had definite reason to hope that, from here onward,

air-consciousness of the city would increase, making the goal of

superior air facilities easier to attain.

Now, with sufficient monetary

support and at least the encouragement of part of the electorate, Omaha's
aerial officials could tackle the problems that had haunted the develop
ment of the airport throughout the past year.

45

Legionnaire, VIII, November 15, 1928, 1.

CHAPTER IV

EFFORTS AT FIELD DEVELOPMENT 1928-1929

The difficulties that the passage of the November,

1928, A via

tion Bond Charter Amendment promised to solve became apparent by Jan
uary of that year.

In the fall of 1927, between the completion of the

hangar drive and the court decision on the test suit,

the Municipal

Airfield remained in limbo and the problem of field development re
ceived little attention.

Without a positive judgement regarding the

use of the field, the city could not move ahead with improvements to
the Carter Lake site.

Near the end of 1927,

though, the district

court consented to the use of the land as an airport and Omaha's avia
tion leaders looked to 1928 with optimism.

The World-Herald admitted

that the current location needed much improvement and had "its dis
advantages as a landing field."

Yet, the newspaper expressed hope and

confidence that the city could now become more than "merely a w h i s 
tling post on the air lanes of the United States."^
For the Omaha airfield to achieve the superior status desired
by most aviation enthusiasts it had to be improved to the point where
the field received an A-l-A rating by the United States Department of
Commerce,

The Air Commerce Act of 1926 gave the Commerce Department

the responsibility of rating all airfields in the country and the A-l-A

^Omaha World-Herald, December 30, 1927, 18.
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designation constituted the highest status an airport could achieve.

2

The first "A" signified the airfield's rating on general equipment and
facilities.

The facilities required for an "A" rating included "at

least one hangar measuring not less than 80 by 100 feet," adequate first
aid and emergency services, enough personnel to run the airfield all
day, waiting and rest rooms, and a restaurant "not more than one-half
3
mile distant."

An airport also needed sufficient weather instruments,

"including an anemometer, barometer,

and a thermometer," with a bul-

letin board on which to post recent meteorological developments.

4

The numeral in the Commerce Department rating designated the
size of the airport's landing area.

To achieve a "1" status the field

had to have "at least 2,500 feet of effective landing area in all di
rections" and be in proper "condition for landing at all times

. . . ."

Another prerequisite for this rating involved the necessity for an air
field to have completely "clear approaches."

For an airport to have a

sufficiently clear approach in all directions there could not be any
"buildings,

towers,

[or] other obstacles over which a 7 to 1 glide or

climb to or from the edge of the landing area would not be possible

. .

U.S. Statutes at L a r g e , Vol. 44, pt. 2, (Dec. 1925-March 1927),
"Air Commerce Act of 1926," Ma y 20, 1926, (Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 1927) 569.
Hereafter cited as "Air Commerce Act."
3
United States Department of Commerce, Aeronautics Branch, Aero
nautics Bulletin No. 1 6 , "Airport Rating Regulations," Effective as
Amended January 1, 1929, (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office,
1929), 6-8.
Hereafter cited as "Rating Regulations."
^D.M. Little, "Meteorological Needs of a Class A 1 A Airport,"
Monthly Weather R e v i e w , Vol. 57 (August, 1929), 336,
^"Rating Regulations," 9.
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The final "A" in the rating represented the quality of a field's
lighting equipment.

Most importantly, a landing field had to possess a

permanent and very powerful beacon light.

Other necessary night flying

facilities included "an illuminated wind-direction indicator," ade
quate boundary and obstruction lighting, and sufficient personnel to
£
operate all lighting equipment during the night hours.
The Omaha Municipal Airfield did not develop an A-l-A dis
tinction by 1931.

As late as August,

1928,

the port had been developed

so poorly that it did not approach a superior rating in any of the
three Commerce Department categories.

Although the American Legion

completed a hangar of suitable size by the middle of the year,
of basic repair and customer facilities,

the lack

in addition to the failure of

the city to provide a permanent, knowledgeable,

caretaker for the air

field, precluded any possibility for an "A" rating on the f i e l d ’s gen
eral equipment.

The size of the airfield's landing area also failed

to meet minimum requirements.

The field had the required 2,500 feet

of landing surface northwest to southwest but had only 2,100 feet of
landing area north to south and east to west and just 1,500 feet north
east to southwest.

In the case of lighting equipment,

the Omaha A i r 

field did not install permanent boundary and field lighting until the
following year.^
The reason for the inability of the field to develop during

6I bi d, 12-17.
^Omaha Chamber of Commerce f Aerial Transportation Committee
Minutes, August, 23, 1928, 54.
Hereafter cited as ATC Minutes.
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1928 involved more than a lack of competent, organized,

leadership

because in many ways the supervision of the airfield improved greatly
during that year.

The Legion-Airport Corporation awarded their hangar

contract to Peter K i e w i t ’s Sons who submitted the low bid of $27,435
and completed construction in March.

8

Had the city played a major role

in the finance or construction of this structure,

its completion would

very likely have been delayed like many other improvements.

Another

positive influence in the leadership of the Municipal Airfield came on
March 13, 1928, when the City Council transferred the field from the
Park Department to the Street Cleaning and Maintenance Department under
the control of Commissioner Dean Noyes.

For the next two years Noyes

found himself caught in the middle— between the aviation leaders of
Omaha who desired rapid development and his fellow city officials who
could not or would not provide sufficient funding for field improve9
ments.
The chronic problem of inadequate financial backing plagued Com
missioner Noyes throughout his years in charge of the airport.
pecially bad during 1928,

Es

this problem prompted Noyes to speak out

publicly on the necessity of proper f u n d i n g , ^

One method of elimi

nating some monetary pressure involved the development of a system of
charges levied on pilots who used the field and hangar.

The fact that

Q

Omaha Wor ld-Herald, January 18, 1928, 6.
9

I b i d , March 13, 1928, 15; William Dean Noyes, private inter
view held in Omaha, Nebraska, April 3, 1979.
Omaha World'-Herald, March 15, 1928,

2; May 7, 1928, 1.
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such a policy had to be implemented by the city in the form of ordi
nances regulating the use of the field explained the delay of such an
obvious and necessary step.
The first formal suggestion of a series of field ordinances
appeared in January,

1928.

The district court had just ruled that the

city could utilize the field for aerial purposes and the Omaha City
Council appointed a committee of three of its members, Commissioners
John Hopkins, Dean Noyes,

and Joe Hummel,

to investigate and make

suggestions as to the next steps to be taken at the airfield,

This

committee proposed the adoption of "an ordinance for the control of
the field patterned after the ordinance suggested by the Department of
Commerce."^
idea.

This proposal was a highly important but hardly novel

Two years earlier the Air Commerce Act of 1926 encouraged the

establishment of
air traffic rules for the n avigation, pr ote cti on , and iden
tification of aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes
of flight and rules for the prevention of collisions b e 
tween vessels and aircraft,
The C o u n c i l ’s apparent consideration of this suggestion two years after
the government pointed out the necessity of such control exemplified
O m a h a Ts hesitation to commit itself on the future of aviation.
The Aerial Transportation Committee of the Omaha Chamber of Com
merce vigorously supported the proposal of these Councilmen to establish
field ordinances.

In contrast to the City Council,

the Aerial Transporta

tion Committee had often recognized the need for firm municipal control of

"^ATC Minutes^ January 6, 1928, 10.

12

"Air Commerce Act," 570.
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aviation.

In early 1926 the committee wrote to St. Louis, Missouri,

for information as to its field regulations,

including "charges made,

expenses incurred, and methods of financing."

The committee members

realized that this information would be of value when the city organized
an airfield.

13

A year later the Aerial Transportation Committee seemed

more convinced of the need for regulation of the Municipal Field.

The

committee thought the time would soon appear when "rules and regulations
governing the operation of the Municipal Field, as well as a schedule
of charges for the use of the field, hangar space, e t c . ," might become necessary.

14

Naturally,

then, when serious official consideration

appeared on the adoption of airfield ordinances,

the Aerial Trans

portation Committee strongly endorsed the proposal.
Immediately,

the Ch a m b e r ’s aerial committee appointed a sub

committee to draw up a series of ordinances.
Thoelicke,

On May 2, Louis C.

Chairman of the subcommittee and Secretary of the Omaha

branch of the National Aeronautics Association, submitted a draft of
potential regulations covering the use of the Omaha Municipal Field and
the general quality of flight above Omaha.

Tho eli cke ’s suggestions

had already received the approval of the American Legion and served as
the basis of future Omaha aviation regulations.

15

The prompt establishment of a system of charges for field usage,
however, was more immediately important.

If a sufficient fee could be

^ A T C Minutes, January 28, 1926, 34.
^IbjLd, January 14, 1927,
15Ibid, May 2, 1928,

30.

12.
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agreed upon,

the field would begin to finance its own improvements and

take some pressure off Commissioner Dean Noyes.

Noyes had been forced

to continue field improvements regardless of improper financing, and the
fact that he kept the Omaha field in usable condition at all during
the early months of 1928 proved his able leadership.

The Commissioner

utilized the equipment and budget of the Street Maintenance Department
as well as a large amount of donated labor from his employees "to aid
in getting the field in shape."

16

Noyes realized that the field could not develop suitably or
rapidly enough under those circumstances and heartily endorsed efforts
to establish a revenue generating system of airport and hangar fees.
Commissioner Noyes suggested that 15 per cent of a f l y e r ’s "net proceeds
should go to the city.""^

The City A t t o r n e y ’s office,

though,

spoke

out against this plan and claimed it would "make the city jointly liable
for acts of the pilots."

18

Noyes also found himself in disagreement

with the airplane owners who believed they should "have the privilege"
to charge whatever they wanted for an airplane ride and lobbied against
the city's attempts at fee regulation,

19

Commissioner Noyes became

1fi
Omaha World-He ral d, March 15, 1928, 2; July 31, 1928, 10;
August 24, 1928, 16; William Dean Noyes, private interview held in Omaha,
Nebraska, April 3, 1979.
According to William Noyes, Dean N o y e s ’ son,
such an expression of loyalty from his f a t h e r ’s employees would not be
unusual.
Dean Noyes was a popular Commissioner with the ability to get
along very well with his workers.
"^ATC Minutes, April 2, 1928,
18
19

24,

Omaha Wor ld -He ral d, May 12, 1928, 1,
Ibid, May 7, 1928,

1,
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understandably frustrated in the spring of 1928— along with his duties
as Street Commissioner, Noyes, as the only symbol of authority at the
airfield,

often found himself no more than a policeman attempting to

keep under control such dangerous and illegal practices as unlicensed
aircraft, mechanics, and pilots, and the new problem of "air-petting."

20

The burden of Commissioner Noyes lessened somewhat in July when the City
Council passed an ordinance regarding field

usage that eventually gen

erated over one hundred dollars a m o nth .21
While the discussion continued over revenue and field ordinances,
many weeks passed and the city made little concrete improvement at the
airfield. This fact did not go unnoticed and in
much criticism appeared once again
field.

the middle of

over the slow development of

1928
the

The World-Herald took the lead in this concern and by July

became quite obvious in its criticism of the a i r f i e l d ’s under-develop
ment,

With definite disgust at the slow progress of the airport,

the

World-Herald concluded:
A municipal airport in which landing directions are not plainly
marked, which conceals pitfalls that might cause an airplane to
be damaged in landing or taking off, which does not have facili
ties
for refueling the engine or oiling it, and which does not
have
running water, is not an airport.
Due to lack of these necessities,

argued the editorial, many fliers

ignored the Municipal Airport in favor of the Fort Crook Field,

2°Ibid, March 13, 1928,
21Ibid, July 31, 1928,
22

22

15,
10.

I b i d „ March 28, 1928, 6; Raymond Fahrlander, private interview
held in Plattsmouth, Nebraska, November 16, 1978,
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Commissioner Noyes responded by stating that all field improve
ments would be completed by early September.

The arrival of the Inter

national Air Race Pilots on their way to California on September 9 mandated that completion date.

23

Regardless of Noyes

,

optimistic expect

ations, many aviation enthusiasts became extremely impatient with the
city's aerial progress during the summer.

J.T.

Stewart of the Chamber

of Commerce aerial committee called it "an outrage" that pilots would
have to pass up the Omaha port for other landing fields.

W.A. Ellis,

secretary of the Aerial Transportation Committee, urged immediate
action at the field, even if it took a campaign similar to the hangar
drive to acquire funds.

Louis Thoelicke described the "present equip

ment" at the field as "an absolute disgrace" and warned that another
airfield would develop if the city did not provide its Municipal Field
"with necessary

facilities

at once.1' ^

The Omaha Municipal Airfield received some favorable publicity
in the summer of 1928.

In the midst of the reports of disgust and

frustration over the airport's lackadaisical development,

certain

sources actually praised the location, potential, and condition of the
landing field.
dicted

An article appeared in the Chicago Daily News that contra

arguments in the World-Herald that the Municipal Field received

only negative,

if any, national publicity.

25

In this story, Elsie Weil,

a travelling correspondent for the Daily N e w s , described her travels

^ Omaha W o rld-Herald, August 22, 1928, 2A.

2W
25Ibid.
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through Omaha and praised O m a h a ’s efforts to establish an airport.

Weil

labelled Omaha "a pioneer city in aviation" and admitted that " O m a h a ’s
participation in aviation was a little premature for municipal develop
ment," but stated that the political leaders of the city had committed
26
themselves to establishing "aviation on an active and practical basis."
Another positive reaction came from Dudley M.
sentative of the International Air Races.

Steele, a repre

Steele declared the field

ideally located, graced with perfect soil, and thought that, with
proper facilities,
country."

Mr.

the Omaha airport could be "second to none in the

Steele inspected the Municipal Field and safely rode

with Commissioner Noyes along its runways "at speeds ranging from 40
to 50 miles an hour . . . ."

After his trip, Steele admitted that the

field needed much work but remarked at the quality of the runways and
claimed that it was unusual to be able to drive an automobile so safely
at such high speeds on a dirt runway.

27

The complimentary statements

of persons not directly associated with O m a h a ’s airfield contrasted
sharply with the remarks of those close to the aerial difficulties
within the city.

The political and business leaders in Omaha knew that

money remained the key to the future of aviation in their city.

They

also realized that these funds would be difficult to obtain and looked
for ways to capture prestige and attention for the airport until proper
financing could be arranged.
One proposal that promised to draw attention to the Municipal

"^Chicago Daily N e w s , July 24, 1928, 5; Omaha Wor ld- H e r a l d ,
August 2, 1928, 4.
^ Omaha W o r ld -He ra ld, July 27, 1928, 1.
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Field revolved around the possibility of an Omaha to Winnipeg,
airmail and passenger route centered in Omaha.

Manitoba,

The Aerial Transporta

tion Committee of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce called a special
meeting of representatives from towns interested in forming the route.
The municipalities represented included Winnipeg, Fargo, North Dakota,
Sioux Falls and Watertown,

South Dakota, and Sioux City,

Iowa.

28

The

attempt of Omaha to exert itself as an aviation center received much
support at this time.

F.B. Wadsworth,

Service of the Post Office Department,

Superintendent of the Airmail
thought t hat "’Omaha should

develop as one of the leading air centers of the country because of
its central location.’"
mittee,

Amos Thomas of the Aerial Transportation Com

and one of the foremost aviation enthusiasts in the city,

stated

that such a route would surely succeed because people in the city
finally realized "the importance of making Omaha an air transportation
junction point

, . .

29

Among much civic-minded rhetoric,

the representatives of five

key northern cities met with the Aerial Transportation Committee on
April 26, 1928.

All in attendance vowed to support the proposed Omaha

to Winnipeg route and thought it a certain success due to the 700,000
persons

residing

along the route.

tives organized the

During the meeting the representa

Omaha-Winnipeg Airways Association.

Gould Dietz

of the C h a m b e r ’s aerial committee, and a member of the Omaha branch

no

ATC Minutes, April 26, 1928,
29

25-28.

Omaha World-Herald, April 19, 1928, 13; General Jimmy Doolittle
agrees about the importance of Amos Thomas to Omaha aviation and also
mentioned Gould Dietz.
These men, wrote Doolittle, "were aviation en
thusiasts.
They believed that aviation had a bright future and they
were very kind to itinerant pilots."
General Jimmy Doolittle to author,
May 1, 1979.
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of the National Aeronautics Association, volunteered to submit the proposals to the postal authorities in Washington within a week.

30

From the optimism expressed at the organizational meeting,
success of the Omaha to Winnipeg route seemed a certainty.

the

The Omaha

World-Herald also responded to this new air proposal with an overflow
of public spirit.

The newspaper remained convinced that the new

association would succeed
because the men of the cities concerned have organized to
bring it about.
With the same foresight that led the pio
neers to bring the railroads through their hamlets, so
that they might become towns and cities, the builders of
todat are encouraging the development of air ports so
that towns and cities may become greater.31
The Omaha Bee-News joined the World-Herald in its optimism over this
air route.

The Bee-News was certain that Omaha would seize this oppor

tunity for aviation advancement and described the city's aviation
future in idealistic terms:

"As the cross roads of the air, Omaha will

experience all the advantages of this development that is certain to
follow this great advance in quick and safe transportation."
tunately,

32

Unfor

this public spiritedness and confidence escaped the Post

Office Department.

Assistant Postmaster General W, Irving Glover informed

Gould Dietz that there would not be "'enough business to warrant'" an
Omaha to Winnipeg airmail route.

30
31
32
33

33

ATC Minutes, April 26, 1928,

28.

Omaha Wo rl d-Herald, April 28, 1928, 6.
Omaha Bee-News, April 28, 1928, 16.
Omaha World-Herald, May 1, 1928, 1.
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The attitude of confidence and expectation that promoters in
Omaha had for the proposed Omaha to Winnipeg route was mirrored in
Fargo, North Dakota.

The Fargo Forum was very proud of the city's

future in aviation and felt that this route, and air travel in general,
had a bright future:
Transportation by air is rapidly taking its place in
American commerce and industry.
It is developing and growing
far more rapidly than one imagines.
It will not be long before
there is a network of air routes throughout the country and
Fargo is one of the strategic centers that must be taken into
consideration in laying out new routes.
Vc
•>':
~k
The Omaha-Winnipeg Airway Association must have the cooper
ation of the entire city.
It will get it, for Fargo is anxious
to grow and develop and to take advantage of every opportunity
to its own interest and the interests of the territory it serves
[sic]. 34
The Fargo Forum did not react editorially to the failure of the Omaha
to Winnipeg route.

The newspaper merely reported that the Post Office

Department was "swamped" with proposed air lines and did not have
sufficient funds "even to make preliminary surveys" of possible
routes.

35
The Sioux Falls Ar gu s-L e a d e r , of Sioux Falls,

expressed similar sentiments.
tary of the

South Dakota,

The newspaper was proud that the secre

Sioux Falls Chamber of Commerce, Ben B. Lawshe, had been

elected President of the Omaha-Winnipeg Airway Association and felt
that there was ample justification for the establishment of the airmail route.

34

36

The Argus-Leader thought that the Omaha to Winnipeg route

Fargo F o r u m , April 28, 1928, 6, 12,

35Ibid, May 8, 1928, 3.
3^Sioux Falls A r gus-Leader, April 30, 1928,

16.
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was just another step in the "well-defined line of travel through several
cities of the Northwest."

As did the F o r u m , the Argus-Leader expressed

confidence that this air route would be established.
however,

The newspaper,

thought that this new air line would necessitate the building

of much needed landing fields.
one of the "finest

...

Although the Sioux Falls airport was

in the Northwest," thought the Argus- Lea de r,

this section of the country badly needed proper aviation facilities.

37

The Sioux Falls paper reported that Postmaster W. Irving Glover frowned
upon the Omaha to
efficient:

Winnipeg proposal because it was not suitably

" ’The route hardly appears logical.

on the route moves toward the Twin Cities
Minnesota].

[Minneapolis-St. Paul,

Offhand I would say that a route from Winnipeg to the

Twin Cities would be more logical.'"
Sioux City,

Most of the mail

38

The Sioux City J o u r n a l , of

Iowa, also on the proposed Omaha to Winnipeg route, did

not comment editorially on the matter and gave only minimal coverage
to the proposal.

39

The International Air Races from Windsor,
Los Angeles,

California,

Ontario,

to

provided another method in which the Omaha

airport could be brought into the limelight.

Aviation leaders in

the city expected the arrival of the forty Canadian contestants to
bring favorable national publicity and force the immediate improvement
of the airfield.

In April,

1928, the California Air Race Association

3 ^ I b i d , April 30, 1928,

6.

38Ibid, May 2, 1928, 5.
39

Sioux City J o u r n a l , April 24, 1928,
May 1, 1928, 2.

1; April 22, 1928, 5;
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wrote to the Omaha Chamber of Commerce and announced that they had
chosen Omaha as an overnight stop in the September 9 race.

The

Association requested that the city offer lap prizes for the first
three arrivals,

provide contestants with gas and oil free from charge,

furnish mechanics,

and initiate reduced hotel rates.

40

The city heartily responded to the proposal and granted most
of the requests of the Air Race Association.

The Standard Oil Company

"agreed to contribute their part of the gas and oil,
companies

would

if other Omaha

do likewise," and the Conant and Eppley hotels agreed

to offer reduced rates.

41

The Executive Committee of the Omaha

Chamber of Commerce, however,

considered the city "not in the position

to offer" lap prizes but felt that "all possible encouragement should
be given this event, as it was necessary to encourage anything tending
to increase aerial transportation,
activity."

42

Obviously,

and O m a h a ’s importance in this

the Chamber desired the publicity and pres

tige that such an event would bring but did not want to invest a
large amount in the race itself.
In July, Dudley M.

Steele of the Air Race Association inspected

the Omaha landing field and, afterward, met with the Aerial Trans
portation Committee.

His descriptions of the field in the private

committee meeting did not differ substantially from those impressions

40

ATC Minutes, April 2, 1928,

41I b i d , May 2, 1928,
42

23,

29-30; July 27, 1928, 46.

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Minutes of the Meeting of the
Joint Meeting of the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee,
April 3, 1928, 92.
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related to

the public.

While Steele thought Omaha had the beginnings

of a very good airfield, he warned the committee that it "needed improve
ments in the way of

facilities? marking, etc."

condition of the field was highly inadequate,

Although the present

Steele stated, Commissioner

Noyes had given personal assurance that he would have the airfield in
first class condition by September 9.

Noyes intended to continue to

smooth and grade the field, outline the entire area with white paint,
and see that his workers painted "Omaha" on the top of the hangar.

43

The improvements to the airfield in August proved that the c i t y ’s
aviation leaders valued this event greatly and that the improvement of
the field required only impetus and momentum.

The Aerial Transportation

Committee acquired the needed facilities in an amazingly efficient
manner.

By the organization of a "special committee on g a s , supplies,

repairs,

lights, etc.," the Chamber of Commerce achieved greater con

crete improvement in the month of August,
in the previous two years.

1928,

than it had achieved

The special committee saw to the acquisition

of all necessary facilities,

including temporary lighting,

"a gas

tank and pump," and the connection of a water main to the airfield.

44

Commissioner Dean Noyes and his Street Maintenance Department also had
a key role in the successful preparation of the airfield.
short time and lack of money,

Due to the

twelve of N o y e s ’ street crews donated

"four days labor" before the arrival date to assure a safe airfield for

^ A T C Minutes, July 27, 1928, 45-48.
44

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Minutes of the meeting of the
special committee on gas, supplies, repairs, lights, etc., August 23,
1928, 53; ATC Minutes, August 22, 1928, 49-52.
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the air race contestants.

Through the efforts of Commissioner Noyes

and the Aerial Transportation Committee,

the Omaha airfield success-

fully received the International Air Race.
the Municipal Field came barely

45

Still,

the completion of

’under the w i r e , 1 which exemplified the

absolute need for proper funding and set another phase in the develop
ment of the Omaha Municipal Airfield into motion.
The success of the $250,000 bond issue in November marked the
beginning of this new phase of airport development.
the election,

Immediately after

the official attitude toward the Municipal Airfield

altered from the desire for immediate improvement to the call for
extreme caution.

Aviation leaders in Omaha began asking questions

which perhaps they should have asked and resolved much earlier.

Since

no bonds could be sold until the following year, the Omaha City Council
appointed a committee of Commissioners Dean Noyes, John Hopkins, and
Henry Dunn,

"to make a thorough investigation of conditions surrounding

the municipal airport."

The major question was whether an airport

commission should be appointed by the City Council to aid Commissioner
Noyes in the supervision of the airfield.

Another proposition came

from C.P, Sturtevant, President of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce, who
supported the "retention of expert advice before going ahead on the
field . . . ."

A6

Regardless of the many delays to this point, support

for the advisory commission,

the consultation of expert advice, and the

45

Omaha W o rl d- Her ald , August 23, 1928, 6; Sunday B e e - N e w s ,
September 9, 1928, 3A; Omaha B e e -Ne ws, September 10, 1928, 1.
46

Omaha World-H e r a l d , November 19, 1928, 2,
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generally cautious stance toward future improvement arose from many
sources.
Although the American Legion did not favor any delay in field
development,

its members expressed support for the advisory commission

through the auspices of the Legion-Airport Corporation.

Allan A. Tukey

of the corporation cited the $30,000 investment in the airfield and
argued that the Legion had the right to make suggestions regarding the
future of the airfield.
recommended that the
Airport Commission
the Council follow
the expenditure of
This body,

thought Tukey,

The Legion members,

announced Tukey,

control of the airport be vested in an
composed of interested citizens and that
the recommendations of this commission in
the money derived from the bond issue . . , ^
should have

and improvement of the f i e l d . ’"

entire

charge of the operation

48

Omaha Mayor James Dahlman agreed and led the movement for this
commission.

Before the city spent any more money at the airfield,

stated Dahlman,
I want a definite plan so we may know what is necessary to be
done, the cost of maintenance, whether the present field is
in the proper place, whether we need additional land, and how
much more it will cost us for a fence, hangars, lights, shop,
and equ ipm en t . ^
The mayor offered no explanation for this extremely late desire for
organization.
The World-Herald admitted that the organizational impetus

Douglas County L e g ion na ire , VIII
cited as Legionnaire.
48
49

(November 15, 1928), 1, Hereafter

Omaha W or ld-Herald, November 13, 1928, 1,
Ibid,

1-2.
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appeared "at a rather late moment

. . . ," but expected the final out

come to make up for the probable delay.

The newspaper expressed con

cern that Omaha had fallen behind other areas in aviation development.
The city must organize its efforts,

take advantage of its growing aerial

awareness, and make "the most of the opportunities" that have begun to
appear.

51
As with every year since 1925,

the approach of 1929 sparked

much optimism from O m a h a ’s aviation boosters toward the future of the
airfield.

In an ironic contrast to the suddenly blossoming aerial

future in Omaha,
Wright,

the World-Herald printed an interview with Orville

twenty-five years after he and his late brother altered the

world with their flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.

W r i g h t ’s

views differed greatly from the optimistic expectations in Omaha— he
thought aviation had neared its limit and that transoceanic flight
by heavier than air craft was impractical and should be left "to the
dirigibles."

52

Fortunately for the Omaha field and the future of

aviation, Orville Wright in this instance was behind the times.
Expressing the desire to forge ahead in Omaha aviation, on
January 14, 1929, Mayor Dahlman appointed the six members of the
Aviation Advisory Board.

The mayor selected James E. Davidson, Vice

President and General Manager of the Nebraska Power Company, and Amos
Thomas to serve for six years, Dr. John A. Tamisiea,

~^ I b i d , November 15, 1928,

24.

~^ I b i d , November 22, 1928,

10.

"^Sunday World-Herald, December 23, 1928, 8C.

long time Omaha
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physician and aviation enthusiast,

and Arthur H. Fetters, mechanical

engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad,

to serve four years each,

and Gould Dietz and John S. McGurk former Chairman of the BellevueOmaha Airport

movement

to serve two years each.

and President of the South Omaha State
53

Bank,

City Commissioner Dean Noyes continued to

have the airport in his Street Cleaning and Maintenance Department and
acted as head of the airport commission.

The Airport Advisory Board

found themselves unable to launch immediate improvements because,
"owing to legal delays," no revenue from bond sales would be available
until March.

54

Consequently,

the growing attitude of hesitation and

caution prevailed and the Board decided to consult expert advice
regarding the suitability of the present airfield site.
According to Amos Thomas who, along with his service on the
Airport Advisory Board,

served as Chairman of the Aerial Transportation

Committee, "one of the first actions taken by the . . . air board"
was to ask the United States Department of Commerce for expert advice con-'
cerning the airport.

55

As a result of the B o a r d ’s plea for assistance,

Assistant Secretary of Commerce William P. McCracken announced that
airport specialist William F. Centner planned to inspect the Omaha
Municipal Airport and offer suggestions as to its future.

56

The

Airport Advisory Board also organized two man committees which would

Omaha World-H er ald , January 14, 1929,

1.

Ibid.
■^ATC Minutes, February 8, 1929, 3.
Omaha W o r ld- Her al d, January 23, 1929, 6.
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look into airport matters in more detail.
committees on the development,
ning of buildings,

Commissioner Noyes appointed

lighting, management and in the plan

grounds, and weather facilities at the airfield.

The advisory commission also considered the old problem of
airfield and hangar usage fees.

The Board overturned the rate of

twelve dollars a month for use of the field and hanagar in favor of a
more complicated,

graduated,

system of charges.

The city now charged

airplanes according to their size:
Hangar space for ships with a wing spread up to 35 feet, $25 per
month, or $1.50 a day; between 35 and 45 feet, $30 per month, or
$2 a day; between 45 and 50 feet, $35 per month, or $2.50 a day;
over 55 feet, $50 a month, or $3 a day.
If no space existed inside the hangar,

the commission decided to charge

"the same rate for use of ground space where a ship is staked out."
Along with a one dollar landing fee, the Board set a minimum rate of
$2.50 per passenger,

of which the city received ten per cent, and set

a two dollar an hour fee on the use of field lights.

58

Although the

Airport Advisory Board later eliminated the one dollar landing fee
upon the suggestion of William Centner and plan owners,

these rates

succeeded in producing revenue and keeping "out the barnstormers of

•

the air.

i.59
The decision of the airport commission to seek expert advice

on the stability of the Carter Lake airfield site, however, proved
of more importance and controversy.

"^ATC Minutes,
58

Due to its investment in the

February 8, 1929, 6.

Omaha World-Herald, January 18, 1929, 8,

~^ I b i d , February,

21, 1929, 10.
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airfield,

the American Legion actively supported the present location

east of Carter Lake and spoke out in opposition to the statements of
persons such as Board member J.A. Tamisiea, who disliked the current
field and "favored any possible action to obtain a new location."

60

The American Legion felt very strongly on this issue and resolved "to
fight any move toward abandonment of the municipal field."

The great

role they had played in the development of aviation in Omaha,

thought

the Legion, entitled the "Omaha Post to some consideration at the
hands of the city administration,
field

. . . was concerned.

61

insofar as the future of the

As the situation developed,

it became clear

that such consternation was unnecessary.
The drastic changes in the airfield envisioned by the LegionAirport Corporation never materialized.

Two weeks before his formal

inspection of the airport, William F. Centner told the Aerial
Transportation Committee that he did not consider it unusual for a
city to desire official approval of its aerial facilities.
to Centner,

According

"25 to 30 cities" contacted the Commerce Department each

day with serious questions regarding their new future in aviation.
Because Omaha purchased the present airport "before the Department of
Commerce began to rate any fields," said Centner,
inspected at the soonest opportunity.
to strive for an A-l-A rating.

the location should be

He urged the committee members

Centner observed that if an airfield

^ I b i d , January 18, 1929,

8.

^ L e g i o n n a i r e , VIII (February 14, 1929),
5; Omaha Wor ld- Her al d, February 15, 1929, 2,

1;

(February 21, 1929),
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could be kept in first class shape and not looking "like a back yard,"
62
an airport would be "one of the best civic assets" possible.
William F. Centner conducted the long awaited official inspec
tion of the Omaha Municipal Airfield on February 21, 1929.
dismay of local authorities,
he observed . . . "

Much to the

Centner could not "comment on conditions

and the city had to await the arrival of a written

report of Centner's recommendations on further activities regarding
the airfield.

63

On March 6, 1929, the Advisory Board received the

report from the Commerce Department and Centner commented very favor
ably as to the suitability of the site.

The Commerce Department air

port specialist labelled the Omaha port "very excellent . . .

of

better than class A-l-A requirements and entirely commensurate with
present and future needs."

Centner recommended that "competent engi

neers be employed" to organize the growth of the field, that the
surface of the field be conditioned, and that "class
equipment be installed."

6A

'A' lighting

The report of the Commerce Department gave

many aviation authorities what they desired— competent, reliable,
assurance that they had located the airfield in the proper spot and
that its use and expansion were feasible.
On March 7, 1929, with the approval of the Commerce Department
in hand,

the Airport Advisory Board unanimously "recommended to the

f\9

ATC Minutes, February 8, 1929, 3-4; Omaha Bee -Ne ws, February
3; Omaha Wor ld- H e r a l d , February 9, 1929, 4.

9, 1929,
f.'

o

Omaha World-Herald, February 22, 1929,
64Ibid, March 7, 1929, 1, 11,

6.
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City Council that the aviation field be retained and developed."
the same date,

On

the Board solved another long standing problem— that of

an adequate caretaker for the airfield.

The Advisory Board directed

the City Attorney to draw up a contract with Lawrence Enzminger, owner
of the

Travel

Air Company of North Platte, N e b r a s k a . ^

Enzminger

offered, as early as the summer of 1928, to serve as superintendent
of the field "without salary.'1

The city, Enzminger said, would have

to give him permission "to establish a repair and service station,
using his own mechanics and furnishing his own stock of airplanes."
Omaha's cautious stance in aviation matters during that year,

66

though,

necessitated some delay in the acquisition of a permanent caretaker
for the airport,.

Although the City Council routinely approved A i r 

port Advisory Board suggestions,
Enzminger.

in this instance it rejected

Instead the Council offered the position to Jay Dudley,

former clerk in the Omaha Street Cleaning and Maintenance Department,
who became Omaha's first Airfield Superintendent.
1929, however,

67

In the spring of

the Airport Advisory Board successfully brought

Enzminger and his aviation company to the Omaha field.
gestion of the Advisory Board,

Upon the sug

the City Council gave Enzminger a ten

year contract to move his operations to the city, "the first three
years" of which he agreed to pay the city "five hundred dollars annually."

65Ibid,

11.

fi

ATC Minutes, June 6, 1928, 39,
^ Sunday Wo rl d-Herald, November,

24, 1929 7C,

^ Oroaha World-Herald, March 7, 1929, 11,

68
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By negotiating a long-term agreement with Lawrence Enzminger,

the Air

port Advisory Board made one of the most significant decisions in the
entire early development of the Omaha airfield.

Aviation authorities

expressed much hope that Enzminger and his associates would not only
aid in the actual development of the-airport but also offer the field
a measure of consistency and permanence that Omaha aviation had lacked

*
i
69
for
so long.
Lawrence Enzminger soon proved the expectations of these city
officials correct.

On April 7, 1929, Enzminger announced a merger

between his own Travel Air Company of North Platte and the BurnhamMiller Flying Service of Council Bluffs,
Aviation Corporation.

Iowa, to establish the Midwest

Enzminger served as President of the Omaha-based

company, which had service facilities in Sioux City and Des Moines,
Iowa, and Grand Island, Nebraska,
ization of $2,250,000."

and had "an authorized capital

Construction began almost immediately on a

one hundred foot square steel hangar and a "brick office building,"
along with the organization of an aviation school with famous airmail
carrier Jack

(Skinny) Knight in c h a r g e . ^

The formulation of the

Midwest Aviation Corporation brought an important organization to the
airfield and proved that the Airport Advisory Board has acted very
wisely by negotiating a contract with Lawrence Enzminger.

69

Omaha Chamber of Commerce J ou r n a l , XVII (March 23, 1929), 14.
Hereafter cited as Chamber J o u r n a l ; Omaha World-H era ld , April 27, 1929, 3.
^ S u n d a y World-He ra ld, April 7, 1929, 1A, 7A; For more infor
mation on Jack Knight see George Tweney, "Air Transportation and the
American West," Montana, The Magazine of Western H i s t o r y , XIX (October,
969), 72r-73.
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Another significant, but not as immediately successful, decision
of the Airport Advisory Board came on March 8, 1929, when its members
voted to recommend that the City Council
retain the Austin Company, airfield construction engineers
and contractors of Cleveland
Ohio
to make a survey of the
field and draw up a comprehensive plan for ist improvement.
The City Council approved the recommendation the following week and
expected William E. Arthur,
which

Charles

the "engineer who laid out the runway from

Lindbergh took off on his transatlantic flight," to take

charge of the "preliminary work."
of the Austin Company,

J.C. Prosser,

advance representative

inspected the Omaha field and considered it "in

better condition than 75 per cent of the landing fields in other cities."
Grading and drainage remained the biggest problems according to Prosser,
who stated that quite a bit of work could be completed with the 1929
allotment of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , ^
As payment for the preliminary s u r v e y , Omaha planned to give
Arthur and his company $2,000.

In addition,

the Austin Company received

six per cent of the costs of construction "for which it prepares spec
ifications and blueprints."

The Austin Company became responsible for

the complete organization of the airfield,

including the recommend

ations as to what improvements "should be undertaken each year with the
$50,000 annually available."

72

The establishment of Lawrence Enzminger and the Midwest Aviation
Corporation at the Omaha Municipal Airfield,

along with the hiring of the

^ Omaha World-Herald, March 9, 1929, 3,
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Austin Company as airport consultants,

showed that aerial leaders in

the city meant to succeed in aviation.

Proof of the possibility of

this quest came in May with the introduction of the first Omaha-built
airplane.

On May 12, 1929, the Overland Sport Trainer,

the "first com

mercial airplane to be built in Omaha" received its initial test flight.
A product of Overland Airways Inc., 4110 Commercial Street,
Trainer sold for just u n d e r $2,500,
pilot,

the Sport

According to Jack Kenwood,

the Overland plane handled quite well:

Omaha

" ’I t ’s a bearcat and I

like every thing about it,

. . . I ’ve handled a number of sport planes

and none of them compare.

I t ’s going to be a credit to Omaha to have

it manufactured here.

73

Another indication of O m a h a ’s advances in aviation came on May
25, 1929, when the Airport Advisory Board accepted the field drainage
plans submitted by the Austin Company.
as Chief Engineer of the company,

William Arthur,

in his capacity

considered drainage the most impor

tant problem and one that should be handled immediately with a cost of
approximately $20,000 to $25,000.

A r t h u r ’s plans called for the instalr

lation o f "s ev en and one half miles of drainage pipes
feet below the surface . . . ."
bodies of water,

tackle.

74

at least two

The position of the field, between two

the Missouri River and Carter Lake,

three foot water table,

...

combined with the

thought Arthur, made drainage the first job to

The quality and substance of the soil beneath the Municipal

Field proved to be another reason for the drainage difficulty.

7^I b i d , May 13, 1929,

1, 6.

74Ibid, May 25, 1929 2,

The
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Missouri River over m any centuries had deposited much of the soil on
the field in layers of sand, gravel, and clay— all of which drained
differently.

75

Despite the confidence of the Austin Company,

the proper

drainage of the Omaha Municipal Airfield and its cost remained the most
difficult problem throughout this period.

William Arthur, however,

saw no reason why the problems of the Omaha field could not be over
come and praised the potential of the field:
it . . .. had better get out of the air.

"'Any pilot who can't use

Within a year,

. . . .

I

predict one hundred planes will be stationed there at all times.'"
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The City Council did not take long to react to the suggestions
of the Airport Advisory Board and on May 29, 1929,
bids on the drainage work.

they advertised for

Although Commissioner Noyes had no experi

ence in airport planning, he publicly favored the establishment of a
circular field.

The possibility of collision prompted William Arthur

to disagree and plan for the beginnings of a square field. ^

The

Austin Company called for the laying of drainage pipes to serve three
runways, each of which would be three hundred feet wide.
plans called for the south runway,
feet long,

the west runway,

that ran east and west, to be 2,800

running north and south,

to be 3,300 feet

long, and the final runway, going southeast to northwest,

to author,

Lengthwise,

close to

Mr. Milton Wuerth, Chief of Operations, Omaha Airport Authority,
October 20, 1978.

7 f\
Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , May 25, 1929,

2.

^JLbid, May 17, 1929, 2; May 25, 1929, 2; Arthur's position
seemed more valid and corresponded with the prevailing attitude of many
municipalities throughout the decade.
See Archibald Black, "How to lay
out and Build an Airplane Landing Field,"
Engineering News-Record,
Vol. 89 (September 28, 1922), 504-507.
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3,300

feet long.

The Austin Company expected the runways to be covered

with grass and later treated with an all weather surface.

The approach

of June saw ’’unprecedented activity" at the Municipal Field.

Commis

sioner Noyes began work on a temporary landing area to be used while
drainage work continued,
Hangar,

construction began on the Midwest Aviation

and "numerous mechanics and assistants" remained "busily engaged

throughout the day."
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All of the bustling activity at the airfield initially prompted
positive responses from O m a h a ’s aviation leaders.

The Omaha Chamber of

Commerce Journal acclaimed the actions of Midwest Aviation Corporation,
the manufacture of the Overland Sport Trainer, and the growing interest
in the "American Legion model plane contest."

The Journal expressed the

view that interest in aviation had finally become "general in Omaha."
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The Omaha World-Herald expressed similar sentiments and claimed that the
Advisory Board "acted wisely" in seeking expert consultation on M u n i c 
ipal Field development.

A World-Herald editorial stated that aviation

was "at last going to be given a chance to grow here, after a dis
appointing apathy and an opportunity-killing indifference."

The

editorial called upon the people of Omaha to give the Airport Advisory
Board and the City Councilmen their "united support" and not allow
these officials "to relax,

for a day,

for Omaha a place in aviation,"

their vigilant efforts to achieve

80
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As happened so often in the growth of the airfield, a startling
reversal took place in the civic-minded expressions of support for the
progress of aviation in Omaha.

The frequent statements of optimism

that appeared in May deteriorated greatly in June.

William A. Ellis,

secretary of the Aerial Transportation Committee, and Assistant Com
missioner of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce, set a tone of impatience on
June 5 that continued,
"' O m a h a , 111 he said,

in varying degrees, throughout the month.

11'must step on the gas and get its municipal

airport improved as quickly as possible or we can't expect to progress
very much as an aviation center

As if he expected an air

field that had been mismanaged and often ignored for three years to
take form overnight,

Ellis strongly criticized the slow, cautious,

approach of the airport consultants.

8X

Although the Legion Hangar

became overcrowded quite frequently during this period forcing some
airplanes to be staked outside, E l l i s ’ criticism of the port's progr*
ress

seemed

invalid.

Midwest Aviation expected the completion of their

one hundred foot square hangar in the near future, which promised to
put an end to that practice.
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Regardless of the many improvements

that the airport consultants planned for the airfield,

progress was

jeopardized by ignorance of technical problems and ill-timed and illconceived booster rhetoric.
On June 18 the next stage of unrest appeared when Commissioner
Noyes called a special meeting of the Advisory Board to "consider

81I b i d , June 6, 1929,

5.
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specifications for lighting the muny airfield."

Local businesses

com-’

plained that the Austin Company's lighting plans "were drawn for par
ticular types of lighting,

so that other firra's appliances would not

fit in with the general scheme."

These specifications greatly dis

satisfied Noyes and he claimed that "'It would be illegal for the city
to advertise for bids on a system for which only one type of lighting
could be used.'"

The controversial lighting facilities called for in

the Austin scheme included "12 landing area flood lights, one beacon
tower . . . various obstruction lights,

. . . and a switchboard for

central control," all in the Crouse-Hinds variety "or its equal."
Two days later,

83

the City Council announced its decision to

"readvertise for bids on lighting equipment."

This announcement came

on the heels of the refusal of the Council to accept the bids for
drainage due to the exorbitant cost.

Consequently,

the concern over

the seemingly slow development of the field "which had been smouldering
for some time,

. . . burst into flame . . . ."

84

The Airport Advisory

Board laid the blame for the unrest and delay on the Austin Company.
James E. Davidson, Board member

expected a certain amount of delay but

thought the actions of the Austin people "somewhat dilatory,"

Com

missioner Noyes conveniently forgot the unanimous vote of five months
earlier to succumb to caution and seek expert advice.
proved his "openly impatient" stance:

I b i d , June 17, 1929, 1,
8AIbid, June 19, 1929,

1-2,

remarks

'"If they had turned all this

work over to me instead of calling in these

oo

Noyes'

'experts'

I would have had
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the field drained and the lights ready to install by this time."'

Con

vinced that the public could not fault him or the Advisory Board for
the delay, Noyes criticized the Austin Company's blueprints for develop
ment:

"'.

. . all the Austin Company has done is to

I can't build anything by pictures.

draw pictures.

If they would leave it to me I'd

build that field so fast it would make them dizzy.'"
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Other interested persons in Omaha expressed similar,
brash,

sentiments.

if less

Aviation Board member J.A. Tamisiea stated that

Noyes remained the only man to do "'anything for the field this year.'"
Tamisiea thought that Noyes could accomplish the drainage work in less
time and with much less expense than the lowest bid of $31,000.
Eastburn,

Glen

Industrial Commissioner of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce,

warned that you had "'to run like hell to stand still in the air game
today,

[and] Omaha hasn't even been running.'"

Leo Bozell, American

Legion member and President of Bozell & Jacobs Advertising Agency,
stated that Omaha had made a "'mighty poor showing'" and that other
cities did not let "'grass grow under their feet.'"88

The Journal of

the Omaha Chamber of Commerce entered the controversy by a comparison
of the Omaha airfield with the Kansas City, Missouri,

field.

The

Journal stated that the airport in Kansas City had so much activity
that it "resembled a state fair."
many ongoing improvements,
Consequently,

The Kansas City field, with its

far surpassed the Omaha Municipal Field.

pilots landed at Kansas City "in numbers resembling

85Ibid, June 21, 1929,

1,
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ducks coming into a blind."
because,

87

The J o u r n a l ’s statements were confusing

a little more than a month earlier,

the Douglas County Legion

naire reported that the Omaha field did not lag "so far behind if
compared to Kansas City's."

The Legionnaire described the field in

Kansas City as "just a piece of ground" similar to that in Omaha and,
although it possessed more hangars, none of them were the quality of
the Legion Hangar.

88

The reason for the often misinformed criticism

of the Austin Company and the less than immediate field development
had its roots in the c i t y ’s virtual infancy in regard

to

aviation

matters.
William E. Arthur proved O m a h a ’s aerial immaturity in the de
fense of his co m p a n y ’s actions,

Arthur declared that the Austin

Company had "more experience in airport designing than any other firm
in the country" and defended his methodical approach to the develop
ment of the Omaha field.

As he said, " ’You could have started to

work right away and made a lot of dirt fly, but it w o u l d n ’t have done
any good,

. . . ,

When you are building an airport you want to do

things right and you must plan carefully. '"

In response to the lighting

specifications controversy, Arthur argued that he had "specified the
best lighting system made

. , . .

Omaha,

stated Arthur,

should not

"sacrifice its lighting system to please a bunch of local contractors
who c a n ’t provide the kind of equipment we s pec ify .’"

89
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The piping specified by
William Arthur, for example, was, indeed, of superior quality because,
according to Milton Wuerth of the Omaha Airport Authority, the origi
nal piping was not replaced until 1946,
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Aviation Board member A.H.
this controversy.

Fetters remained a calming force in

Fetters saw no fault in either the Austin engineers

or the city and still supported the decision to consult experts who
could "'help us avoid'" the errors of other municipal airfields.

Com

missioner Noyes received support from Fetters who described the Com
missioner as having "'given more time, and more hard work, and more
intense interest
the airport.

. .

than any other person to the improvement of

Fetters was convinced that the Austin engineers desired

only the best equipment for the field and stated that '"thorough
engineering'" always took much time and defended the lighting and
drainage specifications of the Austin Company.

Nevertheless, Fetters

announced an alteration in the original lighting specifications so
that they no longer called for an individal compa ny’s lighting system.

90

On June 21, 1929, a break in the controversy appeared when the
Crouse-Hinds Company demonstrated its five thousand watt flood lamp at
the Municipal Airfield.

Dean Noyes'

son Billy threw the switch that

fully illuminated much of the field in the presence of "hundreds of
spectators."

The whole event generated much excitement and the giant

lamp appeared more than sufficient.

91

The suitability of the flood

light served as a redeeming factor for the Austin Company and William
Arthur— who had originally called for Crouse-Hinds lighting at the field.
For the remainder of June a stalemate existed between the Austin
Company and the city.

Austin officials thought the current progress at

9QIbid, June 20, 1929,
91

2.

William Dean Noyes, private interview held in Omaha, Nebraska,
April 3, 1979; Omaha Wor ld- Her ald , June 21, 1929, 2.
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the field sufficient and the drainage and lighting specifications per
fect for the Omaha field.

The city,

though,

led by Dean Noyes, con-'

sidered the progress minimal and all specifications either unnecessary
or much too costly.
tention.
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Drainage continued to be the main point of con

Commissioner Noyes, despite his lack of technical knowledge,

absolutely refused to spend the specified amount for drainage supplies
and questioned the need for "such elaborate drainage" at a field "where
water sinks away almost immediately."

93

Unlike William Arthur, Noyes

did not realize the difficulties of draining this large an area and
should not have taken the unusual complexities of the soil beneath
the Municipal Field so lightly.

The obvious need for experience and

organization in the preparation of a class A-l-A landing field even
tually became evident and O m a h a ’s aviation enthusiasts stopped meddling
in the affairs of their own experts.
On July 13, 1929,

the representatives of the Austin Company

successfully convinced the Airport Advisory Board that its methods and
plans best suited the Municipal Field.

On the motion of James E.

Davidson, who feared that if Omaha varied from the Austin plans it
would " ’have a mongrel f i e l d , ’" the Board recommended that the entire
field development be placed in the hands of the Austin engineers.
William E. Arthur appealed to the Board to give his company " ’. . . a
free hand

. . , 1" in the development of the airfield and vowed that

his blueprints gave the city a quality airfield and its " ’m o n e y ’s

92
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w o r t h . ’1'

The decision of the Airport Advisory Board constituted a

victory for Arthur.

From the beginning he argued that the proper

facilities, not the cheapest costs, were most important.

Although the

B o a r d ’s expression of faith in that position cleared the way for the
eventual improvement of the Omaha airfield,

it also helped bring about

the major financial burdens of the following twelve months.

9 4 Ibid, July 13, 1929,
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CHAPTER V
THE BOEING ACQUISITION 1927-1929

From 1927 to 1929 the possibility that the Boeing Airplane Com
pany of Seattle, Washington, might locate at the Omaha Municipal A i r
field underscored all actions of the city's aviation leaders.

Every

time Omaha took a step toward development or slipped into controversy
and delay it had to consider the reaction of the Boeing Company.

Many

air enthusiasts viewed Omaha's future in aviation as directly related
to the appearance of Boeing at the Municipal Field.

The roots of the

desire to reach an agreement with Boeing stretched back to 1924—
before Boeing was a househould word and when the city seemingly had more
importance as an aviation center.
In that year Omaha served as a landing spot on the trans
continental airmail route, which the government extended to Omaha on
May 15 and expanded to San Francisco, California,

on September 8, 1920.^"

Aviation promoters in Omaha seemed satisfied with Ak-Sar-Ben Field,
the Chamber of Commerce Hangar,
their city.

and the general status of aviation in

In 1924 several events destroyed this contentment and left

Omaha without any practical role in aviation.

During the summer the

Ak-Sar-Beh Exposition Company notified the Chamber of Commerce that it

George H. Tweney, "Air Transportation and the American West,"
Montana, The Magazine of Western H i s t o r y , XIX (October 1969), 70.
H e re
after cited as Tweney, "Air Transportation."
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wished the landing field vacated, a tornado destroyed the airplane hang
ar, and the government declared the field at Ak-Sar-Ben "too small for
night flying."

2

Before Omaha could argue the advantages of another site

within its b o u n d a r i e s , the Airmail Service moved to the government
installation at Fort Crook.

The success of the airmail proved the

feasibility of night flying and the move to Fort Crook, where lighting
existed,

coincided with efforts of the Post Office to develop lighted

fields all along the route from New York City to San Francisco.

The

transfer to Fort Crook helped the Airmail Service achieve this goal
and on July
The

1, 1925, it began overnight

mail service.

3

decision of the United States Post Office to remove

its

transcontinental stop from Omaha devastated the c i t y ’s immediate
future in aviation and necessitated the

difficulties it endured to

reestablish

community.

aviation prominence for the

sion of civil aviation in the U.S.

Because the "expan

in the 1 9 2 0 !s was concerned mainly

with carrying mail," air travel in Omaha had no where to proceed after
it lost the Ak-Sar-Ben airmail connection.

4

From 1925-1927, while

Omaha tried to get back on the track in aviation matters,
Service took on a new dimension.

the Airmail

By the middle of the decade the Post

Office made it clear that government operation of the airmail was only
temporary a n d , "as soon as possible,

the carrying of the mail by air

2
U.S. Congress, House.
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads on H.R. 4326 and H.R. 4 6 4 2 ,
May 3, 1926, 69th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington:
Government Printing
Office, 1926),25.
3
Tweney,
4 Ibid,

"Air Transportation," 72-73.

72.
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would be turned over to private industry."

The success of the airmail

initiated the "airline industry" and the "beginnings of air transpor
tation" in general.

Postal authorities, then, did not anticipate dif

ficulty in the establishment of private transportation of the airmail.^
Congress facilitated this on February 2, 1925, when it passed the Air
mail Act.

Also known as the "Kelly Act," after Clyde Kelly of Penn

sylvania,

this legislation intended to "encourage commercial aviation

and to authorize the Postmaster General to contract for airmail services."
Because the government considered the entire transcontinental expanse
"too arduous for a single operator," the Post Office Department accepted
bids for the New York to Chicago and the Chicago to San Francisco
routes separately.^
The Post Office awarded the New York to Chicago route to the
National Air Transport Company on March 8, 1927, but the Chicago to
g
San Francisco route remained of more interest to Omaha aviation leaders.
The government received bids from four companies for this route.
lumbia Air Lines bid $4.47 per pound of mail.

Co

Stout Air Services bid

$2.64 for the initial thousand miles and 26.4 cents for "each addi
tional hundred miles."

Western Air Express bid $2.24 per pound for the

"first thousand miles" and 22.4 cents for "each additional hundred

5 Ibid,

73.

^U.S. Statutes at L a r g e , Vol. 43, pt. 1, (Dec. 1923-March 1925),
"An Act to authorize the Postmaster General to contract for air mail
service," February 2, 1 9 2 5 , (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1925), 805.
^Tweney,
8Ibid.

"Air Transportation," 73.
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m ile s.”

The Boeing Airplane Company bid $1.50 per pound for the I:first

thousand miles and 15 cents for each additional hundred m il es. ”

The

Omaha Chamber of Commerce realized that if they wanted the airmail to
land within the confines of Omaha in the future they would have to
develop a working relationship with one of those four companies.
sequently,

Con

the Aerial Transportation Committee decided to "write each

one of these bidders,

offering the co-operation of the Omaha Chamber

9
of Commerce in case they were awarded the contract."

This marked

Omaha's first official correspondence with the Boeing Airplane Company.
Omaha's initial contact with Boeing came in 1927 but the im
portance of the Boeing Company to American aviation had been apparent
for many years.

In 1914 William E. Boeing took up flying at the age

of thirty-four "for his own amusement."

Convinced that he could

manufacture better aircraft than he had seen up to that time, Boeing
and C. Conrad Westervelt,

an officer in the Navy, began to build a

pair of seaplanes in a Seattle, Washington,

shipyard.^

Early in 1916

Boeing completed construction of two B & W Seaplanes, each of which had
a length of 27 feet,

6 inches, weighed 2,800 pounds, and had a top speed

of 75 miles per hour.

The "U.S. Army and Navy ordered derivations" of

this seaplane which proved the quality of Boeing's first effort at aircraft construction.

11

On July 15, 1916, William Boeing founded the

9

Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Aerial Transportation Committee
Minutes, January 21, 1927, 15.
Hereafter cited as ATC Minutes.
"^Tweney,

"Air Tr an sportation," 70-71.

"^Pedigree of Champions, Boeing Since 1916 (Seattle:
Company c. May 1977), 7.
Hereafter cited as P e d rig ree .
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Pacific Aero Products Company and on April 18, 1917, changed its name
to the Boeing Airplane Company.

12

Boeing produced several models of aircraft by 1919 but began to
be concerned whether there "was any future in the aircraft business."
Although Boeing and an associate,

former Army pilot Edward Hubbard,

decided that the aircraft industry had a bright future,

they thought

the formulation of a "commercial airmail contract" necessary to "keep
the company going."

On October 20, 1920, Hubbard used Boeing C-700

Seaplanes to begin the first contract international airmail route,
linking Seattle and Victoria,

British Columbia.

The Hubbard-Boeing

coalition did not operate the route "on a scheduled daily basis."
Still,

they averaged 100 flights and carried an average 400,000 pounds

of mail per year until the route dissolved in 1937.

13

From 1920 to 1927

the Boeing Airplane Company also continued the construction of aircraft
and became the "leading U.S.

supplier of single-seat fighting planes."

Through the success of the Seattle to Victoria airmail contract and
the "technological leadership" shown by the manufacture of quality
aircraft,

the Boeing-Hubbard organization achieved "preeminence in the

transport field" by the time it bid for the western leg of the Trans-

-i 14
continental Airmail.
This preeminence contrasted sharply with the inexperience of
Omaha officials regarding aviation matters.

12
13
14
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of Commerce sponsored the Ak-Sar-Ben Field and hangar, municipal author
ities had little opportunity to gain experience in aviation prior to
1924.

Regardless of this lack of aviation knowledge,

the removal of

the airmail to Fort Crook prompted the call for a municipal landing
field— one that the city owned and controlled.

After the acquisition

of the property east of Carter Lake the city's aviation leaders wanted
to improve the landing area very quickly because "promises were made
by air mail officials,

as well as army officials,

that the government

mail hangars would be moved to the municipal field for the reason that
it was much closer to the Omaha Post Office.""^

Realistically,

the

'promises’ of the government to return the airmail could not have been
given in earnest.

The newly-acquired property was in deplorable con

dition, totally undeveloped,

and as late as August,

unfit for landing by national aviation authorities."

1926,
16

"still classed

Amazingly,

the

Aerial Transportation Committee seemed generally convinced that the
Post Office planned to abandon a well equipped landing facility at Fort
Crook for 198 acres of farm land and cow pasture in Omaha.

The city

became aware of the actual intention of the Airmail Service in De 
cember, 1925, when the Post Office informed the Aerial Transportation
Committee that
no steps could be taken to move any of the post office hangars
to the municipal field, owing to lack of funds and that no
steps of this kind could be considered until further appropri
ation was made.

■^ATC Minutes, October 28, 1925, 65.
These promises were vague
and the Aerial Transportation Committee did not specify who made them.
Omaha W o r ld- Her ald , August 20, 1926, 3.
^^ATC Minutes, December 15, 1925,

70.

108

Considering the quality of the city's airport,
in Omaha

was

the aviation leadership

fortunate that the government even discussed the transfer

of the airmail to the Municipal Field.

The refusal of the Airmail Ser

vice to leave Fort Crook marked the final attempt of the city to acquire
the airmail landing franchise before Boeing took over from the Post
Office in June,

1927.

In January of that year, after the transcontinental airmail bids
were publicized,

little doubt remained that the government would award

William Boeing and Edward Hubbard the contract.

The Boeing bid "was

half of what the Post Office was prepared to pay" and considerably
lower than their competition.

18

Boeing planned to conduct the route

with twenty-five 40-A and 40-B airplanes,

all equipped with facilities

for carrying two to four passengers and 1,000 pounds of mail.

19

The

success of the Boeing Air Transport Company, which was formed to handle
the transcontinental service, amazed government authorities.

In 1926,

C.S. Cisler, General Superintendent of the United States Airmail Ser
vice, told the Omaha Chamber of Commerce Aerial Transportation Committee that the "service west of Chicago was not profitable."

20

The

Boeing people began the service on July 1, 1927, and proved the experts
mistaken.

During the initial two years of operation Boeing "carried

1,300 tons of mail

. . . 6,000 passengers," and "set new records in

reliability and regularity,

Tweney,
19

20

particularly with regard

to minimizing

"Air Transportation," 74.

P edi g r e e , 18; Tweney,
ATC Minutes,

"Air Transportation," 74,

February 23, 1926, 43.
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engine failures."

Through efficient management and the ability to carry

passengers safely, William Boeing,
and competitors,

"to the astonishment of his critics

did not lose mon ey on the operation."

21

Immediately after Boeing received the transcontinental contract,
authorities in Omaha began trying to convince them to move their h ea d
quarters to the c i t y ’s municipal field.

The Aerial Transportation

Committee realized that the landing area must be developed before the
Boeing Air Transport Company would consider a transfer to the Omaha
location.
decided

In an obvious expression of confidence,
to

the committee

secure proper lighting for the Municipal Field.

Due to the

"expected transfer of the landing of mail from Fort Crook to the Omaha
Field," thought the committee members,

an arrangement had to be ne

gotiated regarding the Fort Crook field lights.

The committee wrote to

Assistant Secretary of Commerce William McCracken relative to Omaha
"using the present lighting equipment" at Fort Crook.

22

In reply,

Secretary McCracken urged the Omaha Chamber of Commerce to contact
postal authorities and suggest the transfer of the lease from Fort Crook
to Omaha.

At the same time,

thought McCracken,

there must be "the

understanding that within a reasonable time effort to transfer the
lease would be surrendered and the lighting equipment moved to the
Municipal Air Field."

The Secretary seemed misinformed and the Aerial

Transportation Committee explained to McCracken that Fort Crook "was
an army field and was not under lease by the Postal Department."

21
22

Tweney,

"Air Transportation," 74.
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also told McCracken that they had just learned that the lighting facili
ties at Fort Crook belonged to the Army and were not capable of trans,
23
f er.
Another opportunity to achieve the airmail occurred in March,
1927, when Edward Hubbard, now a Vice-President of the Boeing Airplane
Company, visited Omaha and met with the Executive Committee of the
Omaha Chamber of Commerce.

The way Hubbard handled the pressure to

transfer the Boeing airmail planes to Omaha exemplified the wide crevice
between the city's enthusiasm for the advancement of aviation and its
actual accomplishments along aviation lines.

Hubbard began his talk

before the Executive Committee with idealistic rhetoric concerning the
advances in American aviation and the hopes his company possessed re
garding the newly-acquired airmail contract.

On the subject of the

Municipal Field H u b b a r d ’s words were honest and to the point.
Omaha's efforts to establish an airport pleased Hubbard and he
stated that his trip to the city "was

. . . for the purpose of arrang

ing with the city for the use of the field . . . ."

After inspecting

the field Hubbard found that Omaha "was not behind other cities" but
thought the field could hardly "be considered an airport without hangars,
lighting facilities,

shops,

etc."

In a statement that certainly bordered

upon sarcasm, Hubbard did not rule out Boeing's use of the Omaha air
port.

His company would greatly appreciate,

said Hubbard,

if Omaha had

the airfield "in readiness by July 1, at which time their contract be 

2 3 l b i d , March IS, 1927,

27.
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came effective."

24

Obviously,

the city could not obtain the needed

improvements in four months and, although the Hubbard visit could be
labelled a failure for the city, his statements pointed out the impor
tance of a suitably equipped landing field.
After the embarrassing meeting with Edward Hubbard, most avia
tion leaders in Omaha admitted the need for concrete improvement and
took steps to achieve the development of the airport.

Starting in 1927,

Omaha's aspirations to provide a home for the Boeing Air Transport
Company and the airmail contract took on greater proportions.

Aviation

advocates reacted to every effort at the advancement of aviation in or
around Omaha with the opinion of the Boeing Company in mind.

One of

the objectives of the American Legion when it conducted the successful
$30,000 hangar drive that summer was to convince Boeing officials that
the city planned to move ahead in aviation.

Hubbard announced during

his visit to Omaha in March that his firm would "not build a hangar
here but

[expected]

to lease from the city or whoever erects a hangar

on a basis of 6 per cent of the costs" and the Legion wanted such a
structure available at the field.

25

Rumors in July,

1927,

that Boeing

planned to move its airmail headquarters to Lincoln, Nebraska,
as an impetus for the hangar drive.

served

Edward Hubbard denied that Boeing

considered the Lincoln location seriously but admitted that his com
pany possessed only "'temporary permission to use the government field

Omaha Chamber of Commerce,
Minutes of the Meeting of the
Executive Committee, March 29, 1927, 94-95. Hereafter cited as Executive
Minutes; ATC Minutes, April 8, 1927, 29-30.
23ATC Minutes, April 8, 1927,
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at Fort C r o o k ’" and planned to search for a new location in the future.
Hubbard thought a move to Omaha possible, but described Omaha's field as
"'in pretty bad shape right now . .

and stated that if it was "'not

to be improved'" his company would make other arrangements.

26

Aviation authorities in Omaha feared that one of these
arrangements'
Nebraska,

'other

might be a move to a proposed airfield near Bellevue,

south of Omaha.

Announcement of the planned Bellevue airport

came at an inopportune time for Omaha's aviation leaders and promised
to hinder the American Legion drive to secure funds for the construction
of a hangar at the Omaha Municipal Airfield.

According to Thomas Shea,

President of the South Omaha M e r c h a n t 's Association,

the only group that

publicly supported this plan, his Association conducted the Bellevue
project in earnest and '"the Boeing people would def initely be interested
in a South Omaha field.'"

27

Apparently, Edward Hubbard agreed and, on

behalf of the Boeing Air Transport Company, decided "to lease for 10 years
a proposed 160 acre field near Bellevue for use by the company's air
mail planes

, . . ."

As an explanation,

Hubbard told Omaha officials

that these actions were necessary due to the "'indefinite'" nature of
the improvements to the Municipal Field,
the South Omaha Merchant's Association,

R.C. Biart, a spokesman for
said that the slow improvement

of the Carter Lake site did not constitute the only reason for Boeing's
actions.

In conversations with Boeing officials Biart learned that the

Omaha field did "'not meet their require me nts :’"

Omaha Wor l d - H e r a l d , July 17, 1927,
27Ibid, July 25, 1927,
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The muny field is situated on bottom land about 10 feet above
water level and there are certain air conditions such as a low
hanging layer of fog and the presence of a smoke hazard that
cannot be overcome.
In contrast,

the proposed Bellevue site was a perfect location for the

needs of the Boeing Air Transport Company.

28

William A. Ellis of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce characterized
the position of Omaha.

Ellis thought the Municipal Field considerably

more convenient than the Bellevue site:

" ’Locating a commercial air

field at Bellevue would be like building the new Union
Station the same distance from the c i t y . 1"

[railroad]

In spite of the Bellevue

situation, Ellis and others interested in aviation thought that efforts
at the Omaha field must "not slack off."

29

Fortunately for Omaha,

the

Bellevue sponsors could not raise the necessary $50,000 and abandoned
the South Omaha plan.

30

The debate over the possible utilization of the Bellevue lo
cation, however, brought to the attention of Omaha aviation leaders the
factors that Boeing considered unacceptable about the Municipal Field.
The fog threat was primary in their objections and a matter that haunted
the Omaha field from 1927 to 1930.
licity in

This controversy received much pub

the fall of 1927 after the success of the Legion Hangar drive

and caused some authorities to question whether the field should be
retained.

No effort should be made to develop the location,

O O

I b i d , July 26, 1927, 1.
29

Ibid.

30 Ibid, July 25, 1927, 1,

thought the
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Aerial Transportation Committee, without assurances that "the airmail
service would be transferred to the new field upon the completion of the
ne w hangar."

To the committee the threat of fog posed a definite barrier

to B o e i n g ’s use of the Municipal Airfield and its members decided to be
cautious and investigate the fog allegations.

31

Edward Hubbard approved of "a thorough test . . . as to fog
conditions" and told the Chamber's aerial committee that his company
"was very much in favor of moving" to the Omaha field.

The Weather

Bureau informed the Chamber of Commerce that the greatest danger of fog
occurred "between 4:00 and 7:00 AM."

Other than this information,

fog study in the fall of 1927 "was rather indefinite."
Transportation Committee decided,

then,

the

The Aerial

that in order "to satisfy the

Boeing-Hubbard Company it would be necessary to make an extended test
over several months."

32

Although these fog tests were authorized pri

marily for the sake of the Boeing officials, William Ellis expressed
the view of the Chamber of Commerce when he stated that, whether or not
the fog investigation showed a problem,
equip the Municipal Field

. . .

the city '"should go ahead and

Ellis argued that Omaha must do

what other cities did and develop a separate field for early morning
and night flying.

33

In the midst of their attempts to discover the validity of

31

ATC Minutes,

October 7, 1927, 36.

~^ I b i d , November 5, 1927, 58.
33

Omaha Wo rld -H e r a l d , December 2, 1927,
December 6, 1927, 332-335.
'

10; Executive Minutes,
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Boeing's charges against the Omaha Municipal Field,

the Aerial Trans

portation Committee learned that the airmail would not land at Omaha
in the near future.

Boeing had operated at Fort Crook from July 1

without a formal agreement but on November 28, 1927, Boeing announced
that it had been "granted a revokable license to use the army landing
field at Fort Crook . . . ."

Now, according to John S. McGurk,

Chairman

of the Omaha-Bellevue Airport movement, Boeing possessed a definite base
of operations and the license w ith the government meant "'that the muny
landing field at Carter Lake
. . . .'"

[would] not be used by the Boeing people

The government agreed to allow Boeing to use Fort Crook for

airmail and passenger service and Boeing officials seemed very pleased
with this agreement.
pilots,

This situation also satisfied Boeing's airmail

some of whom contended "that a landing field at Fort Crook . . .

would be far superior to the Omaha muny field because of better visibility,

particularly in foggy weather."

34

The actions of the Boeing Air Transport Company and the accu
sations it levied against the Municipal Airfield greatly upset Omaha
aviation advocates.

A full page editorial in the Omaha Bee-News on

December 1, 1927, exemplified this frustration.

Although the govern

ment could cancel the agreement with Boeing at any time,

the Bee-News

feared that it amounted to a "permanent license" to operate from Fort
Crook.

According to the editorial this agreement,

combined with

the statements of Boeing officials that "the Muny field

Omaha Bee- N e w s , November 29, 1927, 5.

[was] not
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attractive as a landing p l a ce, ” marked a "severe indictment of the
Municipal field."

The Bee-News considered the views of the Boeing Com

pany definitive and believed that if its officials refused to use the
airfield "the entire question of the municipal field should be reviewed,"
The editorial declared that Omaha authorities chose the Carter Lake site
because it was supposedly the "most acceptable" location.

Obviously,

argued the B e e - N e w s , these authorities were mistaken and an array of
experts should be consulted as to the suitability of the current airport
site.

35

The Chamber of Commerce Aerial Transportation Committee reacted

negatively to the Bee-News editorial.

The members of the committee

labelled the publicity "unfortunate," bound to have an improper effect
upon the test case to decide the propriety of utilizing the property
east of Carter Lake for aviation purposes,
r

i

i

[that] time.

and "wholly uncalled for at

t»36

The position of the Bee-News did not gain support and for much
of 1928 the prevalent view remained that of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce.
The Chamber was convinced that the Boeing Air Transport Company would
eventually leave Fort Crook and move to another field.
fidence,

37

Full of con

the Chamber of Commerce expected that upon the completion of

the Carter Lake site the new Boeing landing field would be in Omaha.
Consequently,

the Aerial Transportation Committee concentrated most of

its efforts during 1928 on the development of the Municipal Field.

~^~*I b i d , December 1, 1927,

24.

^ A T C Minutes, December 2, 1927, 65.
37

Executive Minutes, December 6, 1927, 333,
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While the Chamber of Commerce marked time with minor improve
ment of the airfield, B o e i n g ’s most important objection to the port,
fog threat,

remained fairly submerged throughout most of 1928.

the

The deci

sion to relegate the fog matter to a secondary status came from the Aerial
Transportation Committee on January 6.

The committee decided "not to

make further investigations until after the
was completed."

[American Legion] hangar

The reason for the postponement of further fog studies

came from a report that, since December 2, 1927,

there had been only one

"light fog of about an hours duration" at the Municipal Field.
Crook Field, however,

38

The Fort

endured at least one serious fog during that period.

On December 12 a Boeing Air Transport Company pilot "was forced down at
dawn by fog , , ," on the way from Fort Crook to Des Moines,

Iowa,

39

The

reports of serious fog along the transcontinental route did little to
gain complete Boeing support for the Omaha airport but seemed to add
credence to the view that "while there had been some fog

[in Omaha]

it

was invariably foggy over a wide territory and the conditions were no
worse at the Municipal Field than other places ,M

40

The Aerial Trans

portation Committee expressed this v i e w in February which served as
their

only word on the subject until November.
Near the end of the year Omaha aviation leaders found themselves

in a better position to battle the criticism of the Boeing Air Transport
Company.

The efforts of the Chamber of Commerce to formulate an Omaha

to Winnipeg air service,

38
39
40

ATC Minutes,

the success of the International Air Race recep-

January 6, 1928,

8,

Omaha World- Her ald , December 12, 1927,
ATC Minutes, February 12, 1928,

14.

1,
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tion, and the passage of the Aviation Bond Charter Amendment proved
that O m a h a ’s leaders were determined to seek aviation superiority for
their community.

The charter amendment,

especially, promised to enhance

Omaha's chances to secure Boeing and the airmail headquarters.
Thomas,

Amos

Chairman of the Aerial Transportation Committee, believed the

success of the bond issue fundamental to B o e i n g ’s transfer to the
Municipal Field.

Due to the "glaring lack of equipment at the muny

field,” argued Thomas, no one should be surprised that Boeing officials
disliked the Omaha airport.

Thomas expected Boeing "'to make its mail

contract only a side l i n e 1" and eventually " ’gain its chief revenue
from commerce and passenger t r a f f i c . " 1
this service " ’from . . .

Consequently, Boeing must locate

an accessible field . . . .'"

Situated a mere

"10 minutes from the Post O f f i c e ," Thomas thought the Municipal Field
the perfect answer to Boeing's expected needs.

The Charter Amendment,

argued Thomas, provided funds to begin improvements to the airfield in
anticipation of B o e i n g ’s arrival.

41

The success of the aviation amendment,

to the dismay of the Aerial

Transportation Committee, did not impress Boeing officials to a great
extent.

After the election, Frank Caldwell, head of Boeing's Omaha

offices,

said his company "would not use the Carter Lake site because

it [was]

’in the lowlands near the river susceptible to fog conditions.1"

42

41

Sunday Wo rld -H e r a l d , August 5, 1928, 3A; H.W. Peterson, Chicago
Traffic Manager of the Boeing Air Transport Company, seemed to agree.
Peterson thought Omaha would succeed as a commercial aviation center as
it had succeeded as a railroad center.
See Omaha W o r ld -He ra ld, September
6 , 1928, 10.
42

Sunday W o rld-Herald, November 11, 1928,
November 13, 1928, 2.

13A; Omaha World-Herald,
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The renewal of the fog controversy prompted further discussion on the
subject by the Aerial Transportation Committee during November,

1928.

The members of the committee discussed the extremely negative position
of the Boeing Company regarding the Municipal Field.

Boeing officials

did not have a fog investigation upon which to base its criticism and
committee member Lawrence Tholecke thought it unfair that they accepted
rumors of fog without proof.

The committee agreed that such proof was

needed and decided to ask Boeing to assist in the tests.
a Boeing Yice President,

43

W.J. Herron,

announced that his company consented to such a

survey and
would be more than glad to cooperate with Omaha in making
investigation of the present field, and in all other
matters that would be to their mutual interest in the
development of a satisfactory airport in O m a h a . ^
Although H e r r o n ’s words were very non-committal,

they tended to encourage

the members of the Aerial Transportation Committee.
The feeling of mutual cooperation imbued by Herron had not char
acterized the attitude of his company up to that time.

The fluctuating

positions of the Boeing Air Transport Company and their well known dis
satisfaction with the Omaha airport prompted the cautious attitude
adopted by Omaha aviation leaders during 1929.

The desire to investi

gate the charges of Boeing officials and determine whether the develop
ment of the Carter Lake site was advisable served as a primary reason
for the consultation of expert advice.

43
44

ATC Minutes November 22, 1928,

The inconsistencies of the Boeing

77-78,

Executive Minutes, December 18, 1928,

285,
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Air Transport Company concerning the Omaha Municipal Airfield became
discernable by the end of 1928.

As 1929 proceeded they became obvious

and aviation leaders in Omaha had little difficulty countering Boeing's
a c c usa tio ns .
The entrance of the Commerce Department into the controversy
countered the charges of the Boeing Company very well.

One of the

reasons the Airport Advisory Board requested the assistance of airport
specialist William Centner was to advise as to the seriousness of the
45

fog conditions.

Because the Municipal Field "was being delayed in its

development owing to doubt as to whether it was a suitable field, due
to . . . fog conditions," Centner informed the Aerial Transportation
Committee that his department intended to cooperate in any fog survey.

46

The members of the Chamber's aviation committee generally felt that the
fog investigation should be conducted with representatives of the Boeing
Air Transport Company.

Although Boeing informed Omaha that the Municipal

Field "had been condemned" by their experts,
William P. Hoare,

they agreed to send

Superintendent of B o e i n g 's eastern d i v i s i o n , to Omaha.

47

Regardless of the impending official judgement on the suitability
of the airfield,

the Aerial Transportation Committee began to debate a

hard line position.

Amos Thomas argued that "the development of the

field should proceed and if the Boeing Company thought it advisable to

Omaha W o r ld- He ral d, February 21, 1929,
46
ATC Minutes, February 8, 1929, 5-6.
47

I b i d , February,

15, 1929, 9,

10.
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move their headquarters" to Lincoln or somewhere else "to let them do
so."

48

The members of the committee seemed to agree, which represented

a significant alteration in opinion.

From the determination to acquire

Boeing at all costs, by early 1929, the Aerial Transportation Committee
hesitated to allow the whims of the Boeing Air Transport Company to
influence their actions.
William Hoare continued the controversy between his company and
Omaha's aviation leaders.
Bluffs,

On M arch 5, 1929, Hoare told the Council

Iowa, Kiwanis Club that Boeing "would not use the Omaha Mu n i c i 

pal Airport

'under any circumstances.'"

Hoare left the impression that

his company considered the blossoming Council Bluffs airport as a potential future base of operations.

49

The following day he backed away

from this harsh stance and explained that he had misunderstood the
position of his company.

Supposedly, Boeing's actual position was that

they "would not use the muny field 'under present circumstances.'""*^
Hoare's words fit in well with the train of confusing and fluctuating
statements of Boeing people concerning Omaha aviation.

The Aerial Trans 

portation Committee desired to eliminate the delays that occurred from
this inconsistency by ignoring Boeing to a certain extent and urging the
development of the Municipal Field.
Hie report of William Centner concerning the suitability of the
Omaha Airport did much to strengthen the newly-acquired independence of

48
49

Ibid,

10

Omaha World-H e r a l d , March 5, 1929,

~*^ I b i d , March 6, 1929,

1,

1.
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the Aerial Transportation Committee.

According to the Centner report,

the fog threat did not present a major problem:
The general opinion of those with whom I [Centner] discussed
this matter, (and in which I am inclined to concur) is that
fog conditions when they do occur, are general throughout
this section of the country and not localized ....■*■*•
Centner found no reason why the Omaha field should not be developed as
quickly as possible.

The C h a m b e r ’s aerial committee discovered that

certain airmail pilots also approved of the Omaha airfield,

Upon con

sultation with "two of the very best flyers in the air mail service,"
the members of the committee learned that "the objections based on fog
conditions was

’b u g a b o o ’ and was purely selfish propaganda and that they

themselves would have no hesitancy in flying to and from this field."
These revelations did much to advance the position of the Aerial Trans
portation Committee "that the development of the present field should
be carried out
they [would]

[and] if the Boeing Company [made] a thorough investigation

change their attitude as to its usage."

52

The decision of the Airport Advisory Board to move ahead with
the development of the field and place its trust in the Austin Company
marked a major breakthrough in the Boeing matter.

William Arthur of

the Austin Company told Amos Thomas that Boeing approved of
airfield improvements.
engineers closely,

his planned

If Omaha followed the blueprints of the Austin

argued Thomas,

" ’the Boeing Company would be glad

to move its Omaha operations from Fort Crook to the Muny Field,

51

and

lb i d , March 7, 1929, 1, 11; Mr. Milton Wuerth, Chief of Opera
tions, Omaha Airport Authority, to author, October 20, 1928.
~^ATC Minutes,

February 15, 1929,

9.
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build its own hangar at the muny airport . . ■.™
Near the end of June, 1929,

53

the Boeing Company became concerned

about the security of its license to operate from Fort Cook.

Boeing al

ready deemed the field at Fort Crook "too small for the larger type planes"
and they expected the movement of some United States Array Air Corps planes
to Fort Crook

from

Fort Riley, Kansas,

in July to initiate the possi

bility of very cramped quarters in the near future.

Rumors were rampant

that Boeing planned to move to the Omaha field very soon.

54

In July,

Commissioner Dean Noyes confirmed these rumors after a conversation with
Frank Caldwell of Boeing.
that D.D.

Colyer,

Caldwell was very encouraging and announced

a Vice President of the Boeing Air Transport Company,

would travel to Omaha within a w e ek to "look the situation over."

55

That summer it seemed merely a matter of time until Boeing transferred
to Omaha and "the indefiniteness that
to an end.

. . . befogged the airport" came

For the first time Omaha had Boeing

’over a b a r r e l . 1

Boe

i n g ’s arguments against the Municipal Field were successfully m i n i 
mized,
tainty.

and the utilization and improvement of the field seemed a cer
The fact that the Array was "anxious to have the Fort Crook

Field vacated,

and would probably require this if another field were avail

able for the airmail," further undermined the position of Boeing.

Omaha

aviation leaders realized that speedy development remained the only ob
stacle to B o e i n g ’s appearance and the certain transformation of Omaha

Omaha World-H e r a l d , June 5, 1929,
~^I bid, June 26, 1929,

1.

55Ibid, July 9, 1929, 1.

7.
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. .
56
into a key aviation center.
On July
finally granted
ments,

24, 1929, eleven days after the Airport Advisory Board
the Austin Company complete control over airfield improve

the Boeing Air Transport Company gave "Definite assurance" that

they planned "to move
that fall.

[their] local operations to the municipal field"

President Phillip Johnson of the Boeing Company said the

move was conditional upon the field being in readiness "for day and
night flying and equipped against adverse weather conditions."

Johnson

told

Dean Noyes

that Boeing watched O m a h a ’s progress in aviation with

much

interest and said that his company was "anxious to m ove " to Omaha,

The announcement of Boeing was directly related to the acceptance of
the improvement plans of the Austin Company,
about the low level of the field,
water,

Johnson remained concerned

its location between two bodies of

and the absence of lighting and r u n w a y s , but had great confidence

that these facilities would be forthcoming due to the organizational
ability of the Austin Company.

57

Although the controversy over the transfer of Boeing to the
Omaha Municipal Field continued into 1930, little doubt remained by
August,

1929,

that the airmail would land at Omaha in the future,

Aviation leaders in Omaha had tried since 1924 to achieve the return
of the airmail planes to their city and since 1927 to convince Boeing
to move its operations to the Municipal Field.
Boeing were often difficult and frustrating.

36I b i d , June 10, 1929, 12,
57I b i d , July 24, 1929, 1 & 2,

Negotiations with
At every turn Boeing
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officials belittled and criticized O m a h a ’s airfield.

After the acqui

sition of the airmail contract Boeing disapproved, rightfully, of the
Omaha Municipal Field due to its lack of facilities.

When the success

ful Legion-Airport Hangar drive and the passage of the Aviation Bond
Charter Amendment promised to solve the facility problem, Boeing turned
to the fog situation as their primary reason for refusing to move to
the Municipal Field.

Boeing also frequently threatened to move to a

variety of fields around Omaha, hampering the c i t y ’s ability to move
ahead with improvements to the Carter Lake site.

Only after the Army

considered requesting their removal from Fort Crook did Boeing officials
take the Omaha field seriously.

58

The often vascillating statements of Boeing officials hurt the
comp any ’s

credibility

and

by the middle of 1929 aviation leaders in

Omaha paid little attention to their statements.

Instead, Omaha avia

tion enthusiasts decided to ignore the views of the Boeing Company and
concentrate upon field development.

This decision brought assurance of

B o e i n g ’s transfer to Omaha and began the events which led to substantial

Sources explaining the Boeing side in this matter were unavail
able.
The Omaha Airport Authority suggested that the Boeing office in
Bellevue, Nebraska, might have the proper materials.
Boeing officials
there, however, stated that the Boeing Commerical Airplane Company in
Seattle, Washington, would have sources relating to Boeing's initial
contracts with Omaha.
Gordon S. Williams, Public Relations Director for
the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, was encouraging but claimed that
his office did not have these sources and that United Airline's h e a d 
quarters in Chicago, Illinois, "could be of assistance in this matter."
James A. Kennedy, Vice-President, Corporate Communications, United A i r 
lines, was also unable to provide any materials and suggested that the
airport in Omaha be contacted, where the search for these materials
began.
It is unfortunate that the Boeing position cannot be explored
because the actions and statements of their officials, from 1927 to 1929,
surely were not as spiteful and unorganized as herein portrayed.
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improvement of the Municipal Airfield.

CHAPTER VI

FINAL IMPROVEMENTS 1929-1930

By August,

1929,

the Omaha Airport Advisory Board had finally

accepted the complete plans of the Austin Company and received verbal
agreement from Boeing to station their operation at the Municipal Field.
The events of the next sixteen months culminated in a vastly improved
airfield and the dedication of a huge airport hangar-terminal by the
Boeing Air Transport Company.

The problems encountered by Omaha avia

tion leaders did not lessen during this period but,
previous months,

in contrast to

these difficulties failed to stagnate aviation improve

ments in the city.

The plans of improvement were too organized and the

impetus for development remained too strong during 1930 for controversy
to hinder the quest of the city for aviation superiority.
Work proceeded rapidly at the Omaha field after the Airport A d 
visory Board agreed to abide by the specifications of the Austin Company.
The city spent $28,000 preparing a proper drainage system for the air
port during the summer and fall of 1929.

Commissioner Dean Noyes still

considered the thirty-six inch piping specified by Austin engineers
overly expensive and much larger than needed.^

Although at this time

nothing could be accomplished by complaining, Noyes spoke out against
the piping and said "if any rain occurred to fill it,

I
cemberl7,

the field would

~
Omaha Chamber of Commerce.
Executive Committee Minutes,
1929, 209.
Hereafter cited as Executive Minutes.
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all be under w a t e r . ”

The engineers of the Austin Company explained

that they had specified this type of piping so that the drainage system
could "carry the heaviest rainfall of record for the locality" and N o y e s ’
criticism of the drainage system did not gain support.

3

Commissioner

Noyes had been justifiably concerned over the expense of the drainage
materials because the $28,000 spent on drainage during the summer and
fall took the greatest proportion of the $50,000 allotted in 1929.
the $22,000 balance,

Of

the city spent $14,000 on grading and resurfacing

the runways which had consisted of grass and dirt since the purchase of
the field,

$3,600 on the construction of a switch house, and $4,400 on

engineering and miscellaneous s e r v i c e s /
Due to the rapid expenditure of the 1929 bond funds,
found itself seriously short of money.

Still,

the city

the Airport Advisory

Board advertised for lighting bids in August and the LeBron Electrical
Company submitted the low bid of $26,352.87,
not afford at that time.

an amount the city could

Omaha needed this lighting equipment badly

because the Boeing Air Transport Company had announced in their verbal
agreement to transfer to the Omaha Municipal Airfield that the airport
must be "available for night flying" before they moved, 3
proper lighting system and as an encouragement

to Boeing three members

of the Airport Advisory Board, James E. Davidson,

^Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , August 4, 1929,

To insure a

Gould Dietz, and A.H.

3A.

3Ibid.
4

Executive Minutes, December 17, 1929,

209.

3Omaha Chamber of Commerce J o u r n a l , XVIII
Hereafter cited as Chamber Journal.
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Fetters volunteered to "finance the lighting on a five hundred dollar
£
monthly rental" until the following year.

As September approached,

aviation leaders in Omaha seemed confident that lighting would be in
stalled .^
Another event that proved O m a h a ’s promising future as an aviation
center came in September when Rapid Air Lines Corporation began negotia
tions to purchase the American Legion Airplane Hangar.

The Legion workers

had conducted the hangar drive during the summer of 1927 under the prem
ise that they planned to return all subscriptions in the future.

Walter

F. Hailey, president of Hailey Aviation which controlled Rapid Air Lines,
offered the Legion $20,000 for the hangar.

If the Legion-Airport Cor

poration accepted that figure, the city would be "morally,

though not

legally committed" to repay the remaining $8,000 of the structure's
g
original cost to the stockholders.
Some aviation enthusiasts in the
American Legion did not want to return the money and had other hopes
for the $20,000,

Since "those who subscribed stock really regarded that

money as a gift," many Legionnaires thought that nothing prevented "those
stockholders from returning their stock to the American Legion . . .with
the understanding that the money be used at Muny field."

The Omaha World-

Herald also felt this way and expressed confidence that "This large group
of good citizens who wanted to see Muny field a success probably to the
last man, would agree to any business-like proposition to further avia-

Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , August 6, 1929,
August 4, 1929, 3A.
^Omaha W orl d- H e r a l d , August
^Ibid, September 17,

1929,

1; Sunday Wor l d - H e r a l d ,

7, 1929, 16,
3.
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tion in Oma ha. ”

9

The American Legion decided to accept the proposal of Rapid Air
Lines and turned the hangar over to Rapid Aviation in November after the
City Council approved a long term l e a s e . ^

Stockholder Henry Doorly,

Vice President of The World Publishing Company,

remained very adamant

on the future of the $20,000 and expressed the view of many in the
Legion-Airport Corporation:
In my opinion it would be a great pity to return this money
to the stockholders.
It was given for a project that is by
no means finished and should be kept intact for further air
port d e v e l opm en t.H
The hangar subscribers were not as civic-minded as the World-Herald and
Henry

Doorly

hoped and on January 14, 1930, the Legion-Airport stock

holders voted to distribute the proceeds of the sale back to the cont n b u t o r s .12
While the final outcome of the Legion-Hangar settlement could be
described as a disappointment to those who advocated rapid expansion of
aviation in Omaha,

an event had occurred in September,

m uch air-mindedness in the city.

1929, that prompted

On September 9 the first All-Nebraska

Air Tour began from the Municipal Field in Omaha.

The Chamber of Com

merce Aerial Transportation Committee organized the six day tour to
prompt ”a greater interest in air transportation and to encourage various

9

lb id, September 18, 1929,

20.

^ Sunday Wo rld -H e r a l d , November 24, 1929,
November 19, 1929, 8.
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cities to develop their air terminals."

13

The members of the Aerial

Transportation Committee approached this tour in a serious, methodical,
manner,

reminiscent of the effort placed into the passage of the November,

1928, Aviation Bond Charter Amendment.
Contrary to the polarized response on that issue,
Commerce received wide support for this event.
in Omaha and every city along the route,
Grand Island,

the Chamber of

There was cooperation

including Lincoln, McCook,

and North Platte, Nebraska— all of which volunteered to

absorb the cost for the "meals and hotel bills" of those taking part in
the tour.

14

The Skelly Oil Company cooperated by providing "all the oil

and gas for the entire tour."

Skelly had taken part in air tours in

Kansas and Oklahoma and was very happy "to continue this procedure in
Nebraska."

The Aerial Transportation Committee limited the number of

planes to thirty and offered rides at every stop because that "was the
best selling argument for aviation.
generated,

Impressed with the interest it

the members of the Aerial Transportation Committee expected

the tour to "have a lasting result and undoubtedly bring about improved
airports, not only in the cities visited, but in other cities" as well.
This tour fulfilled the hopes of the committee members and they expressed
their warm appreciation to Skelly who "furnished over 8,500 gallons of
gas and several hundred gallons of oil."

The Aerial Transportation

Omaha Chamber of Commerce,
Aerial Transportation Committee
Minutes, August 1, 1929, 13,
Hereafter cited as ATC Minutes,
14

Ibid; Omaha Chamber of Co mm e r c e f
Minutes, August 19, 1929, 16,
"^ATC Minutes, August 1, 1929, 14,

Special Air Tour Committee
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Committee felt they had accomplished a great deal-— over 2,500 persons
throughout the state had received airplane rides,
braska seemed closer together,

the cities in Ne 

and public spiritedness in favor of Omaha

.
.
. 16
avxation was at a peak.
The high tide of aviation awareness in Omaha became very obvious
during the fall of 1929.

Various leaders in the community called for

an increased civic-mindedness along aviation lines.

James E. Davidson

of the Airport Advisory Board advocated that Omaha must be made 111 airm i n d e d , ’” and take advantage of its natural l o cat ion , to achieve aviation
supremacy.

A.H. Fetters, also of the Airport Advisory Board,

renewed

the story of Guiseppi Belanca and the lack of support he received from
Omaha in 1921.

Fetters urged the city not to lose another great oppor

tunity for aviation advancement.

Roy Page, Chairman of the Omaha Chamber

of Commerce Industrial Committee and Assistant General Manager of the
Nebraska Power Company,

argued that Omaha was " ’ideally located*" and had

"'many other advantages from the standpoint of transportation facilities,
labor and living conditions,

c l i m a t e " ’ and other factors sure to prompt

the growth of the aviation industry.
The Chamber of Commerce Journal also contributed to the accolades
concerning the future of Omaha aviation.

The Journal received much en

couragement from the successful Nebraska Air Tour and the apparently good
relations with the Boeing Air Transport Company.

The idealistic rhetoric

1£
10, 1929,

lb i d , September 27, 1929,
10.

17-18; Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , September

^^Omaha World-Herald, October 9, 1929 1 ? 2,
Guiseppi Belanca
was a well known airplane designer and manufacturer.
Belanca did not
receive enough financial support in Omaha and had to leave the city in 1921.
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expressed in an October Journal editorial exemplified the Chamber's
optimism:
. . . we must be preparing for transportation of another sort—
aerial transportation, that knows no rails nor channels nor
highways, but cuts a straight and swift path from point to
point.
The fervor for the growth of aviation seemed contagious.
October 10, 1929,

On

the Omaha World-Herald announced that it approved of

the sudden rebirth of support for the Omaha Municipal Field.

The World-

Herald called for city wide acceptance of the necessity for airfield
improvement and said:
Men must be daring if they are to build a city.
They must
have a bold spirit that is never content with letting well
enough
alone.
They must be driven by some gallant energy
that never lets them rest when opportunity is near.
They
must be inspired by a community feeling which enables them
to forget self and w o r k shoulder to shoulder for the common
good.1"
Support also came from outside the city.

Harry H. Culver, Presi

dent of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, visited Omaha on
October 26, 1929, and his statements fit in well with publicity the
airport received that fall.

Culver was convinced of the importance

that a well equipped airport would have to a community;

'"After covering

some 86 thousand miles in the last 18 months we've found that in a city
with a dumpy airport, new buildings are conspicuous by their absence
. , .

Culver favorably compared the blossoming airfield in Omaha

with any in the country and thought that the city was destined to b e 
come a "cultural,

educational,

financial, commercial,

18Chamber J o u r n a l , XVIII
19

(October 10, 1929), 8,

Omaha World-Herald, October 10, 1929,

14.

industrial,

and
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agricultural" center.

At times C u l v e r ’s enthusiasm for aviation over

flowed the realms of logic.

He thought that in a very few years trips

around the world would "'be as common as a Sunday school p i c n i c , ’" and
also predicted the demise of the parachute.
chute,
a chute

Rather than wearing a para

thought Culver, pilots of the future could soon "pull a lever and

20

[would] take

the whole ship down . . . .”

Although the

calls for aviation advancement and the satisfaction

over the f i e l d ’s development sometimes

seemed idealistic,

Omaha were justified in their expressions of optimism.

leaders in

Proof that the

Omaha airport was improving rapidly came in November when the city tested
the newly-financed lighting system at the Municipal Field.

On November

4, 1929, City Commissioner Dean Noyes threw the switch "that bathed the
Municipal airport in

the glare of six five thousand watt lamps

Along with the huge flood lights,

the city

equipped the

. .

. ."

field with com

plete boundary lighting and a "one thousand candle power beacon" which
rotated on top of a one hundred foot

tower.

This demonstration proved

the adequacy of the lighting system because "At nearly any part of the
field, one could read a newspaper with ease when all the lights were
on.

,,21
Rather than opening the door for B o e i n g ’s movement to the Munici

pal Field,

the installation of lighting equipment only forced the long

sought after company to develop another excuse for not favoring the
Carter Lake location.

Frustration appeared frequently among Omaha

‘^ Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , October 27, 1929,

21

Omaha World-H e r a l d , November 5, 1929,

2A.
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aviation leaders due to the ongoing difficulties with Boeing,
attitude of Hird Stryker,

The

a member of the American Legion-Airport Cor

poration and an associate in the law firm of Crofoot, Fraser, Connoly,
and Stryker,
said,

toward Boeing gained followers in the fall of 1929.

" ’The city must treat this company like any other organization,

22

It has waited upon it long e n o u g h . ’1'
tempting because in October,
was a virtual certainty,
again.

As he

The view of Stryker seemed

after the rapid installation of lighting

Boeing officials changed their position once

Now the absence of night flying facilities no longer formed

B o e i n g ’s main objection to the field.

Early in the month,

officials

of the Boeing Air Transport Company "requested the Airport Commission
to give consideration to the removal of trees

. . . near the airfield"

which promised to obstruct flying, especially at night.

23

Boeing

sources offered no explanation as to why they had not mentioned the
tree problem years earlier,

or at least that summer when they gave the

city verbal assurance of their eventual transfer.

The opening of the

’cottonwood controve rsy ’ began a six-month quest by the city to secure
the removal of the offending trees and satisfy still another objection
of Boeing.
Despite their new objections,

the Boeing Air Transport Company

requested information on the cost of leasing space at the Municipal Air
field.

Boeing officials were interested in a fifty-year lease but made

22

lb i d , October 7, 1929,

^ A T C Minutes,

2,

October 11, 1929,

12; December 27,

1929,

27.
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it clear that their request was "for information only."

24

B o e i n g ’s re

quest encouraged the members of the Airport Advisory Board and the City
Council.

Instead of ignoring the tree controversy each group sought

the rapid removal of any airfield obstruction.
Most of the offending trees were on private property to the north
and south of the field but some were in Carter Lake Park on the west side
of the airport.

Discussion of the destruction or topping of trees on

park property brought Park Commissioner Joseph Hummel into the spot
light.

Hummel explained that "he was powerless to take any action"

regarding the trees on park property.

The Commissioner pointed out that

" ’the ground for Carter park . . . was deeded to the city with a reversion
clause that would give it back to the owners if not used for park purp o s e s . ’"

25

With this knowledge in hand the city embarked upon a plan

to pressure the donors into agreeing to the tree removal.

The decision

of the city to seek the removal of the trees met with the approval of
William Arthur of the Austin Company.

Arthur claimed that the "removal

of the trees would enlarge the usability of the runways 20 to 25 per
cent,” and urged Omaha to eliminate these obstructions so it could come
to terms with Boeing as soon as possible.

26

The property that constituted Carter Lake Park was donated to
Omaha by Mrs.

Edward Cornish.

She and her husband, who was a former

Omaha Park Commissioner and currently served as President of the National
Lead Company,

resided in New York City and consistently refused to allow

^ Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , November 12, 1929, 1..
^~*I b i d , December 21, 1929, 2,
26I b i d , 7,
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Omaha to cut any trees on Carter Lake Park property.

After unofficial

attempts in December failed to persuade the Cornishes,
1930,

on January 7,

the City Council "decided to send an official resolution citing

the need for removal of the cottonwoods bordering Carter Lake as a safe
guard for flyers."

The Council sent Airport Advisory Board member James

E. Davidson to New York City to present this resolution to Mr. and Mrs.
Cornish.

City Commissioner John Hopkins reflected very evident dis

pleasure on this issue, and although he

supported the Davidson journey,

he did not care if the city lost the park property as long as the trees
were removed.

Hopkins thought " ’It would be a great help to the c i t y 1"

if the property reverted b ack to the owners and the commissioner felt
that "the city had expended more with less return on the place than on
any other project

. . . .

„27

Dean Noyes agreed with John Hopkins on the necessity of the
proposed tree removal.

D.D. Colyer, a Vice President of the Boeing

Company, had informed Noyes that the obstructing trees were the only
barrier prohibiting his company from moving its planes to Omaha;
" ’ . . . we cannot consider moving to the Municipal Airport until the
trees are removed, nor can we sign a lease unless it carries a guarantee
that the trees will be r e m o v e d . ’"

28

Noyes did not think forty cotton

wood and willow trees should prevent Omaha from expanding in aviation.
He received permission to cut down certain trees on the north end of the
airport but thought that if all the trees obstructing the Municipal Air-

27

Ib_id, January 7, 1930,

^ I b i d , January 10, 1930,

1; January 8, 1930,
30.

1.
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field could not be eliminated,

" ’the city might as well pick up its

lights and hunt another a i r p o r t . ’"

29

Dean Noyes received little comfort from the visit J.E. Davidson
made to New York City.

E.J.

Cornish had earlier claimed that the Omaha

airfield represented purely a ’’’business venture'" and not worth the
sacrifice of a beautiful park.

The destruction of these trees would be

a " ’c a l a m i t y , ” 1 thought Cornish:

" ’To sacrifice them to the airport is

to recognize aviation . . . but defaces what in time will be the most
sightly varied and beautiful park possible in any of the western cities.'"
Cornish also threatened that further donations of land would not be
forthcoming if any of the park property was subjected to such " ’vand a l i s m . *"

30

In the meeting with Davidson he stated that he and his

wife planned no concessions at all concerning the trees along the west
side of the airfield.

Cornish felt that the area east of Carter Lake

represented a terrible choice for an airport.

Why should the city spend

great amounts of money toward the development of the current site,
Cornish, when "'Across the river in [Council Bluffs]

thought

Iowa there is avail

able an excellent and an adequate site for an airfield.'"

Labelling the

airfield a " ’cheap proposition,'" Cornish absolutely refused any cooperation whatsoever.

31

Many aviation enthusiasts in Omaha viewed the

Cornish stance as arbitrary and ridiculous.

Upon his return to Omaha,

J.E. Davidson still possessed some hope that Mr.

29
30

Cornish would change his

Sunday W o rl d-H er ald , January 19, 1930, 3A.
Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , January 18, 1930, 2.

~ ^ I b i d , February 4, 1930,

9.
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mind about the trees.
wait

32

City Commissioner John Hopkins did not want to

and became very bitter about the whole subject.

Hopkins did not

consider it fair that "a few scraggly old cottonwoods should stand in the
way of O m a h a ’s Municipal a i r p o r t ’" and said that he ” 'would vote to cut
them down,
r e s u l t . ’"

suffer the consequences, and pay any damages that might

33

At a time when the situation seemed hopeless, Dean Noyes began
to advocate a method by which the city could avoid the destruction of
park property.

Noyes suggested that Omaha enlarge

the

"Municipal air

field [sic.] to the east, taking in all the land in Douglas County
between the field and the river . . . ."

The Commissioner felt that

this was "a way out of the difficulty" over the cottonwood trees in
Carter Lake Park and an excellent opportunity to improve the airport:
This will make the Omaha airport one of the best in the country
. . . besides removing the danger that exists now to
fliers, it
will afford ground for construction of a great northwest to
southeast runway of suitable length for the largest ships which
may easily be connected up to the present runway system. 34
•Commissioner N o y e s ’ proposition would have solved the. problems encountered
by the

obstructing trees in Carter Lake Park.

visory

Board,

The entire

Airport Ad

though, did not favor the purchase and most members felt

that the field should be improved first.

35

The city did not act upon

the Noyes proposal and the Municipal Airfield grew only twenty acres in

^ I b i d , February 7, 1930,
33
34

1,

Omaha B e e - N e w s , February 7, 1930, 4.
Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , February 17, 1930,

^"*ATC Minutes, February 27, 1930, 9.

1.
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size from 1925 to 1 9 3 1 . ^
As the situation developed,

the trees on park property were not

as potentially dangerous as officials of Boeing and the Austin Company
first believed.

Upon further investigation,

the Aerial Transportation

Committee proved that these trees did not pose a severe problem and most
of the danger to flying came from the trees north and south of the field.
The removal of these obstructions promised to "reduce the hazard very
materially

and Dean Noyes agreed to secure their destruction.

As soon as weather permitted,

Commissioner Noyes

led

37
a "force

of workmen from the Street Cleaning and Maintenance department" to a
site north of the airfield and chopped down over eighty willow trees.

38

The willows were eliminated with the permission of Randall Brown, who
owned the property,

and their removal provided "an additional 500 feet

of open field," ending the problem of an obstructed northern approach
to the Municipal Airport.
brought to the airport,
great controversy.

39

Despite the added safety factor this

the actions of the Commissioner enveloped him in

Rumors began that Dean Noyes and his crew had chopped

down trees on park property and the Commissioner "received many letters
of protest."

The possibility that the city took it upon itself to chop

36
Dean Noyes, "The City of Omaha and Aviation," Official Souvenir
Program of the Omaha Air Races, May 15-18, 1931, 25, There seemed to be
some confusion as to the actual size of the airfield.
In his annual
report to the Executive Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, Amos
Thomas gave the size of the airport as 230 acres.
See ATC Minutes,
December 27, 1929, 29.
37

ATC Minutes,

February 27, 1930, 8 .

30
20, 1930,

Omaha B e e - N e w s , March 20, 1930, 3; Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , March
8.
Omaha Bee-News, March 20, 1930, 3.
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down the trees on park property caused quite a stir and Noyes emphatically
denied that any park property was destroyed:

M,I h a v e n ’t touched any

trees in the park— not even to top them . . . the only trees that have
been chopped or topped were on private property,

and it was done with

i
- .
ri|40
the consent of the owners.
Noyes became highly upset during the

’cottonwood controversy'

and threatened to resign as Chairman of the Airport Advisory Board,
claiming that the tree situation "caused more trouble” than any other
problem.

41

Commissioner N o y e s ’ biggest objection was with the Omaha

Chamber of Commerce which had written him a letter urging immediate
removal of all obstructing trees.

According to the Chamber,

this letter

"had evidently been misconstrued as a criticism” and the Aerial Trans
portation Committee denied that they made any attempt to criticize
Noyes or the way he handled airfield improvement.

42

Noyes no longer

wished the removal of the cottonwoods on park property and agreed with
Edward Cornish that their destruction was unnecessary.

This altered

stance, however, had not changed his feelings toward rapid elimination
of the primary airfield obstructions.

By May, all offending trees to

the north and south of the airport were gone and the city met the last
important objection of the Boeing Air Transport Company.

43

40

Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , March 23, 1930, 1A; September 3, 1961, 4J •
Omaha B e e - N e w s , March 20, 1930, 1; William Dean Noyes, private interview
held in Omaha, Nebraska, April 3, 1979.
41
42
1930,

ATC Minutes, March 28, 1930,

14; Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , March 23,

ATC Minutes, April 10, 1930,

21; Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , March 23,

1A.
43

1930,

Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , March 23, 1930, 1A.
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The ability of the city to avoid the removal of trees on park
property pleased Edward Cornish.

On April 8 , 1930, Cornish showed this

pleasure by donating Ma 23-acre tract lying between Sixteenth street”
and Carter Lake Park to the Omaha park system.

This deed carried a

reversion clause similar to the other donation of acreage in the park
and could "never be diverted from park purposes."

Cornish made his

offer due to the controversy over "his refusal to permit the cutting of
trees in the park adjacent to the Omaha Municipal airport
He thought it important that no "personal reason . . .

. .

.

be attributed"

to him for his refusal to cooperate on the tree issue and he felt his
donation proved that his desire to beautify Omaha was genuine.
The

44

’cottonwood c o nt rov ers y’ was by no means the most important

difficulty to beset Omaha aviation in the first months of 1930.

During

the summer of 1929 Commissioner Dean Noyes forecasted financial disaster
if the entire drainage specifications of the Austin engineers were
accepted.

Near the end of that year, after Omaha borrowed money to in

stall a lighting system, aviation leaders in the city found the Noyes
warning prophetic.
Airport

The monetary requirements of the Omaha Municipal

in 1930 promised to exceed the $50,000 allotment by a consider

able extent.

The city was obligated to pay back the money it borrowed

from private sources to secure lighting— an amount that eventually
reached $30,000 and aviation authorities saw no possibility of suitably
improving the field with the remaining $ 2 0 ,000 1 which could not be carried
over to the following year.

44

According to Amos Thomas of the Aerial

Omaha B e e - N e w s , April 8 , 1930, 4; April 9, 1930, 11; Omaha
W o r l d - H e r a l d , April 7, T930, 1.
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Transportation Committee the

runways

needed complete resurfacing with

a "six inch oil-plastic surface" and there were "a number of holes and
low areas on the field that should be filled to proper grade

. . . ."

Thomas thought that "The minimum program for 1930 should be three com
pletely drained, graded, and surfaced runways" and saw no chance of their
completion if the city could not alter the money situation.

45

In the annual report of the Aerial Transportation Committee
submitted to the Omaha Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee at the
end of December,

1929, Amos Thomas explained why the airfield improve

ments had not proceeded as rapidly as expected.

Thomas argued that

Omaha tried to achieve a series of improvements with $50,000 that "could
not be accomplished with less than $150,000" and airport development
should not suffer likewise in 1930.

In his report Thomas suggested

three methods of obtaining field improvements in excess of the $50,000
limit.

Under the first possibility the city could acquire adjoining

land on its own without reference to aviation bonds.

A second suggestion

.involved the leasing of the airport to a private party "on condition
that he would finance and make certain improvements during 1930."

The

city would pay the operator $50,000 annually for the four remaining years
of the bond issue in compensation for continuing the program of improve
ments.

A third plan necessitated an amendment to the present provision

to allow the expenditure of the fourth and fifth y e a r s ’ allotment of
bonds during 1930 to facilitate development.

46

^ A T C Minutes, December 27, 1929, 30.
46

I b i d , 29-30; Chamber J o u r n a l , X V U I (December 28, 1929), 4; Omaha
W o r l d - H e r a l d , December 17, 1929, 4.
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Viable suggestions were needed at this time because the good
feelings toward aviation in Omaha after the All-Nebraska Air Tour had
deteriorated greatly during December.

The primary group criticizing

the Municipal Airfield were pilots and some saw no reason why the airport
was not completely improved.
Aviation,

Lawrence Enzminger, president of Mid-West

criticized the Airport Advisory Board and thought that the

airport should be under the control of one person:

" ’One man in charge

would have accomplished as much with half the money

. . .

Grace,

Frank

President of Pioneer Aviation, a group that considered stationing

itself at the Municipal Field, agreed with Enzminger and stated that
. . fliers who would be expected to stop there [were] studiously
avoiding Omaha because of lack of facilities."
and Dean

Noyes,

47

Led by Amos Thomas

aviation authorities in Omaha were determined to find

a solution to the financial problems that threatened to hinder further
improvement of the Omaha airport.
The proposal to alter the terms of the 1928 bond issue received
support from the Airport Advisory Board and the Aerial Transportation
Committee.

The City Council,

then, decided to ask the voters at the

May 6 election for permission to sell the 1932 and 1933 aviation bonds
in 1930.

If passed,

this measure would provide an additional $100,000

for field improvement and the C h a m b e r ’s aviation committee thought that
Omaha could accomplish very much with these funds.

With this money the

city could grade,

fill in low areas in

surface, and drain three runways,

the southern part of the field, eliminate all offending trees north and

47

Omaha World-Herald, December 16, 1929, 4,
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south of the field,

and begin construction of an administration building.

The committee members remained highly optimistic and believed that the
approval of this measure would assure the development of the Omaha Municipal Airfield into "first class condition."

48

On March 28, 1930, Amos

Thomas appointed a special election committee and the campaign that it
launched to pass this amendment proved the seriousness with which its
members approached this issue.

49

The Omaha World-Herald supported this charter amendment as it
had in 1928 and agreed that its passage was closely linked to Omaha's
future in aviation.

The World-Herald thought that the city had

everything to gain and nothing to lose by expending this money
now.
To string it out over a period of years will only mean
continued delay in m aking the airport efficient and practical
for the great commercial passenger and air mail companies
whose planes are winging through the air in increasing numbers
each day.50
The newspaper left no doubt as to the importance of this issue and thought
the voters must realize that this amendment did not provide new bonds,
merely the early expenditure of already authorized funds.

This measure

represented an important step toward the development of aviation in

48

ATC Minutes February 27, 1930,
ruary 19, 1930, 1-2, 4.

7-8; Omaha W o r l d-H era ld, Feb

49

ATC Minutes, March 28, 1930, 17-18. Not everyone at the Chamber
of Commerce agreed that a bond issue was the best solution.
On January
10, 1930, the Public Finance Committee decided that "greater progress
could be made in the development of Omaha as an air center if the field
was leased to private interests."
See Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Public
Finance Committee Minutes, January 10, 1930, 2.
Hereafter cited as
Public Finance Committee Minutes.
~*^Sunday W o r l d - H e r a l d , February 23, 1930,

6E.
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Omaha,

said the Wo rld -H e r a l d , a step that ought to be taken without

a
i
51
delay.
Through the auspices of their special election committee,

the

Aerial Transportation Committee rapidly formulated plans to see that the
amendment passed.

As they had in 1928,

the special committee organized

a speaker ’s bureau headed by committee member Vern Vance.
speakers for luncheon clubs, political meetings,
stations WOW, WAAW, and KOIL.

Vance provided

schools, and on radio

The committee also mounted a training

plane on a motor-operated swivel and charged twenty-five cents per
ride.

Pro-amendment efforts also included announcements in theaters

and a continuously running ’'talking mailbox" in front of the County
Courthouse.

52

Along with these attempts at public persuasion,

the Aerial

Transportation Committee members tried to convince "the voters that this
was not a n e w bond issue, but one that had already been approved at the
election in November,

1928 . . . .”

53

One of the s p e a k e r ’s bureau

objectives was to point out this difference and Vern Vance remained
very concerned that the message would not reach the electorate:
Frankly, we fear for the airport proposal, not because we
suspect its soundness, but because of the misunderstanding
of its provisions.
If the voters all realized that it is
not a tax levy or bond issue, if they realized that they
can have their airport immediately and by a painless
method, the proposal would carry unanimously.
The fact that this misunderstanding existed m ade the role of V a n c e ’s

_

----_ ^__ . t
51
Omaha W o rl d-H er ald , M a r c h 19,, 1930, 10,

”*^ATC Minutes, April 10, 1930, 21; April 15, 1930,
23, 1930, 25; Sunday B ee - N e w s , May 4, 1930, 14B.
53

ATC Minutes, April 15, 1930,

22.

22-23; April

147

s p e a k e r ’s bureau highly important and it was very busy gathering support
during the week prior to the election.

54

Regardless of the apparent misunderstanding,

the M a y 6 aviation

charter amendment passed by a 55% to 45% ma jority— 31,329 to 25,511.
total amount of votes cast on this issue,

The

56,840, was considerably lower

than the 74,473 cast on the 1928 proposition.

The most obvious possible

reason for the decline was that the 1930 election may have lacked the
interest that the presidential election had prompted in 1928.
the lessened electorate,

Despite

the geographic breakdown of votes was vaguely

reminiscent of the initial charter amendment

(see map on following p a g e ) .

South Omaha remained the base of anti-aviation sentiment in the city.
In wards 5, 6 , and 7 the measure failed by 59% to 41%-— 7,972 to 5,479.
As in 1928,

the precinct vote was one-sided,

38 out of the 43 precincts

in wards 5, 6 , and 7 voted against the aviation amendment.

Ward 8 , a

section where the bonds had barely failed in 1928, supported the May,
1930,

issue by a 53% to 47% m arg in— 2,888 to 2,533.

In this election

every ward north of Pacific Street joined ward 8 in support of the
aviation amendment.

The strong base of support for the 1928 measure,

wards 2, 3, 4, 9 a n d 10, in central and west central Omaha,

continued

and the issue passed by a 64% to 36% m arg in— 14,169 to 7,682,

The p r e

cinct vote in these five wards was an astounding 86 to 4 in favor of the
aviation measure.

Wards 1, 11, and 12,

in the north and northwestern

part of the city, which as a unit had voted against the 1928 amendment,
joined ward 8 in approving this aviation issue.

54

Omaha Bee- N e w s , May 3, 1930, 22,
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measure by 55% to 45%— 8,377 to 6,708, and with a 40 to 13 precinct
margin.

The newly-found support for the aviation issue undoubtedly

resulted from the realization that the May amendment did not authorize
new bonds, but merely changed the status of bonds already a c c e p t e d . ^
The lack of presidential election-year interest was obvious by
these election returns.
November,
In May,

1928,

1930,

Of the 92,512 registered voters in Omaha in

80% of them, or 74,473, voted on the charter amendment.

only 67% or 56,840 of the 84,029 registered voters cast a

ballot on the aviation question.

In South Omaha, wards 5, 6 , 7, and 8 ,

all of which voted against the aviation amendment in 1928,

the per

centage of registered voters casting ballots dropped from 78% in 1928
to 69% in May,

1930.

In wards 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10, which strongly

supported aviation in both elections,
in .1928 to 63% in May,

1930.

this percentage dropped from 75%

In wards 1, 11, and 12, which also voted

against the aviation issue in 1928,

there was a drop from 83% to 67% in

eligible voters casting ballots in May,

1930.

The lessened voter

interest had little importance to the May aviation issue because all
sections of the city experienced similar r e s p o n s e s . ^
Aviation advocates were pleased with the immediate $100,000 pro
vided by the amendment but the additional money failed to solve all their
problems.

Improvements to the Omaha field were very expensive and by

^^Map taken from Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , April 9, 1928, 10; Results
taken from official Douglas County Election Returns, May 6 , 1930,
Douglas County Election C o m m i s s i o n e r ’s Office, Omaha-Douglas Civic
Center, Omaha, Nebraska.
Hereafter cited as Douglas County Election
Returns.

July,

Douglas County Election Returns, Registration Statistics to
1936.
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October,

1930,

the city had budgeted the entire $250,000 allowed by

the 1928 bond issue.

In this budget the city could not plan for an

administration building, additional runways,
passenger "comfort station."

fencing, a depot, or a

The failure of the city to budget these

improvements reflected the lack of planning common throughout O m a h a ’s
struggle to

establish an aviation field and the City Council decided

to submit a third aviation bond measure to the electorate on November 4.
This would further amend the city charter to permit an additional
$ 100,000 worth of bonds to be sold annually for the next five years
with the funds designated for aviation development.
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Once again the

Aerial Transportation Committee and the Executive Committee of the
Omaha Chamber of Commerce felt that they could put the $500,000 pro
vided by this amendment to very good use and strongly endorsed the

i 58
proposal.
On October 14, 1930,

the Aerial Transportation Committee formed

another special election committee to take charge of the a m e ndm ent ’s
passage.

This committee divided into three subcommittees,

committee,

a speaker's bureau,

and a stunts committee.

a publicity

The publicity

committee handled newspaper coverage and printed and distributed over
60,000

pamphlets

"urging

[a] favorable vote on the amendment and giving

information as to . . . what improvements were necessary in Omaha."

”^ A T C Minutes,

October 3, 1930,

44.

58

1930,

I b i d , September 15, 1930, 39; Executive Minutes,
139-140.
59

ATC Minutes,

October 14, 1930,

59

48.

September 16,
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The subcommittee on publicity also saw that addresses were given in
support of the amendment on radio stations WOW and KOIL up until the
election.

W O W also ran a daily radio program about the airfield and

its potentials to the community.

60

The duties of the s p e a k e r ’s bureau

were very similar to those during the previous bond elections and its
members appeared before clubs,

luncheons, and political gatherings

urging support for the aviation measure.

61

The committee on special

stunts organized a series of aviation maneuvers and stunts to take
place on Sunday, November 2, 1930,

two days before the election.

Included in the show were airplane races, "dead stick landings," bag
drop contests, and parachute j u m p s . ^
The members of the Aerial Transportation Committee seemed to
possess a greater amount of confidence about the outcome of this
election than they had prior to the passage of the other two aviation
bond issues.

Still,

the subcommittee was very concerned over the

attitude in South Omaha because "most of the opposition at the last
election

[November, 1928]" came from that area.

Unlike their counter

parts in Dundee, Benson, and Florence, many businessmen in South Omaha
were against the aviation amendment and refused to allow the committee
to place pro-aviation stickers in their windows.

The C h a m b e r ’s aviation

committee spent much time trying to convince them to support

60 Ibid,

October 23, 1930, 52;

^Ibid,

October 14, 1930, 48.

/

October 31, 1930, 56-57,

ry
Ibid,

^Ibid,

this i s s u e d

October 23, 1930, 52,
October 31, 1930, 55-56,
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The members of this committee were correct both in their expecta
tions of a wider victory margin and in the fear of South Omaha opposition.
The amendment passed with a 52% to 48% m a j ori ty— 27,162 to 25,051, not
an overwhelming margin but considerably larger than the 1928 election.
Although the 52,213 vote tally in November,
than the 74, 473 votes cast in November,
56,840 total in May,

1930,

1930, was quite a bit less

1928, and even lower than the

the geographical distribution was v ery

similar to the initial aviation measure

(see map on following p a g e ) .

This similarity was very obvious in the ward returns.

Ward 8 barely

rejoined the anti-aviation block in South Omaha and the issue generally
failed badly south of Pacific Street.

Wards 5, 6 , 7, and 8 defeated

these new aviation bonds by 58% to 42%'— 9,744 to 6,945.

The precinct

vote again was clear as 48 out of 61 southern precincts voted against
this measure.

As ward 8 had done in May, ward 1 in the north switched

sides from its November,

1928, stand and joined the pro-aviation central

and west central section consisting of wards 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10.

These

six wards passed the aviation issue by a 60% to 40% m a r g i n — 15,933 to
10,461 and with the support of 92 out of 108 precincts.

Wards 11 and 12

in the northwest returned to the anti-aviation sentiment they had shown
in 1928 and the bonds failed there by 53% to 47%— 4,670 to 3,999 and with
26 out of 31 precincts voting against the issue.

64

The drop in voter interest reflected in May continued in November
as only 62%,

64

or 52,213, of the 84,029 registered electorate cast ballots

Map taken from Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d , April 9, 1928,
County Election Returns, November 4, 1930,

10; Douglas
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In South Omaha, wards 5, 6 , 7, and 8 experienced

on the aviation bonds.

a rise in the percentage of the electorate that voted.
Street,

South of Pacific

76% of the registered voters went to the polls compared with

69% in May.

In wards 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10 the percentage dropped from

the May figure of 63% to 60% of the total electorate in November,

1930.

This trend continued to wards 1, 11, and 12 where 63% of the registered
voters cast ballots compared with 67% in the May election.

These figures

marked a significant drop in the percentage of voting electorate of
from 80% in November,

1928,

to 62% in November,

1930.

Obviously the

success of the aviation issues in 1930 despite the continued geographic
polarization of the city, proved that this disinterest was common through
out Omaha and did not have an adverse affect upon the quest for airfield
- 65
improvement.
The two Aviation Bond Charter Amendments occupied most of the
time and discussion of the Aerial Transportation Committee and the A i r 
port Advisory Board during 1930.

The second All-Nebraska Air Tour

also required the attention of Omaha aviation leaders and took place
from June 23 to June 28.

The committee created a special air tour sub

committee on March 15 and, along with the Lincoln, Nebraska,
committee,

its members organized the event.

66

air tour

At first there appeared

little chance that the 1930 tour would be as successful as the initial
tour in 1929.

The members of the Chamber's aviation committee learned

Douglas County Election Returns, Registration Statistics to
July, 1936.
The records at the Election Commissioner's office do not
mention any change in the total registered electorate from May to
November, 1930.
f\f\

ATC Minutes, March 15, 1930,

12.

15 5

that the "Skelly Oil Company and other large distributors, had signed a
joint agreement not to furnish free gas and oil for State Air Tours
. . .

"67

biggest commitment air tour officials received from any

oil company was to offer 6 per cent off the regular price of oil and
gas.

The Omaha and Lincoln committees,

then, decided to investigate

further to see if the air tour was still feasible.

68

Tour officials

found that the event still had much support and they decided to require
all towns along the route to "guarantee a fund of from $1.75 to $5.00
per plane."

With the cost of the tour underwritten in such a manner,

the second All-Nebraska Air Tour began in Lincoln and ended in Omaha as
another huge success.

69

The rebirth of a Bellevue airport plan also captured the at
tention of Omaha aviation leaders during 1930.
by its Bellevue sponsors,

Labelled "Port of Omaha"

the projected multi-million dollar field was

"south of Bellevue and east of Fort Crook . , . ."

Immediate plans

for the 400 acre tract amounted to $977,442 and its future improvements
included an administration building housing dining rooms, a first aid
room, and "a lounging room equipped with showers for the pilots."

Pro

ponents of the airfield said that the location had a record of good
weather that was unmatched anywhere in the United States:

"Three hundred

and nine of the past 365 days here have been suitable for flying, accord-

67 Ibid, April 10, 1930, 21,
^ I b i d , April 24,

1930,

27.

69 Ibid, June 5, 1930, 30-31,
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ing to

. . . engineers reports."7^

The Bellevue project, however, did

not progress "as rapidly as had been expected

. . . due to lack of fi

nancial backing. "7^"
As they had since 1927, Boeing officials closely watched the
actions of Omaha throughout 1930.

In contrast to other years, Omaha

leaders often seemed not to care about Boeing's response to their
actions and concentrated fully upon their plans of field development.
On March 17 the Airport Advisory Board appointed three of its members,
John S. McGurk, Amos Thomas,

and James E. Davidson,

to meet with Boeing

officials "on the leasing of several hundred square feet at the municipal
field

. . . ."

By that time "both parties favored the lease" and "only

minor details" stood in the way of a long term agreement.
meeting with D.D.

Colyer of Boeing,

72

In the

the three Airport Advisory Board

members learned that only the Cornish trees, the lack of completely sur
faced runways,

and the Nebraska gasoline tax stood in the way of a

fifty-year Boeing lease on a 100 foot by 225 foot plot at the Omaha air
field.

These complaints, especially about the gasoline tax which Boeing

must have known about for quite a while, were easily refuted and Omaha
officials argued that the f i e l d ’s many advantages outweighted these
dif f i c u l t i e s :
To counterbalance these problems the Omaha airport offers the
advantages of a lighting system, drainage, partially con
structed runways, accessibility to downtown Omaha, and advanced
development.^

^ O m a h a W o r l d - H e r a l d , February 18, 1930,
71ATC Minutes, June 5, 1930,
72
73

29.

Omaha W or l d - H e r a l d , March 18, 1930, 4.
Ibid, March 20, 1930, 8.

12; March 26, 1930,

29.
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Indeed,

the Boeing Company had no other suitable airfield avail

able for their use and the elimination of the trees at the north and
south of the airfield,

the passage of the May 6 bond amendment,

the natural advantages of the field,
latest series of excuses.

and

successfully undercut B o e i n g ’s

On June 5 the Aerial Transportation Committee

announced that the city had reached an agreement with Boeing.

The

Boeing Air Transport Company immediately planned to "enter into con
tract for a hangar north of the Mid-West hangar, size 100 x 225 feet,
...

to be completed before September 1st."

Boeing had asked and

received assurance from the city that they would complete all field
improvements by that date.

74

The Austin Company contracted for the

construction of the Boeing hangar but minor delays in airfield improve
ments pushed the completion date b ack three months.
By the end of November,
substantially.

1930, the Omaha field had been improved

The drainage system was completed,

the runways that

ran northwest to southeast and north to south were surfaced "with plastic
asphalt to a depth of six inches," and the city continued the process of
squaring the field according to the specifications of the Austin Company.
The establishment of Mid-West and Rapid Aviation Corporations had made
the Omaha Municipal Airfield a very busy place and the acquisition of
the Boeing Company promised to bring even more aviation activity to the
city.

75

^ A T C Minutes, July 3, 1930,

34.

^ P u b l i c Finance Committee Minutes, January 10, 1930, 1-2; Dean
Noyes, "The City of Omaha and Aviation," Official Souvenir Program of
the Omaha Air Races, May 15-18, 1931, 25.
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The official opening and dedication of the Boeing hangar-terminal
building took place on November 30, 1930.

The new hangar was a massive

structure compared to what had been built at the field up to that time.
The hangar cost $60,000 and consisted of an administration unit, a
passenger loading section, and an area for the housing of aircraft.

76

The open house for the Boeing terminal building took place on the same
date and was a gala event under the direction of the Aerial Transportation
Committee.^

The main attraction at the open house was a Boeing Tri-motor

that was on public display throughout the day.

Another crowd pleaser

came when Marcelle Folda, Queen of Ak-Sar-Ben,

released four balloons,

"each w ith a small vial of air attached."
sphere from New York City,
and Montreal,

San Fransisco,

The balloons carried atmo
California, Dallas,

Texas,

Quebec, each of which had been delivered in Omaha

"within 24 hours after they were posted via

'air mail,'" signifying

"Omaha's accessibility via the aerial route."

78

Boeing's arrival ful

filled the dreams of many aviation leaders in Omaha and marked the end
of the early development of the city's airfield.
mittee of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce,

The Executive Com

in their discussion of the

November 30 celebration over the acquisition of Boeing and the re
appearance of the airmail planes,

dismissed the event with an under

statement— commenting only that this "was something upon which the

7

Sunday Bee - N e w s , November 26, 1930, 4A.

^ A T C Minutes, November 29, 1930, 58.
78

Omaha B ee-News, November 29, 1930,
December 1, 1930, 6.

2; Omaha W o r l d - H e r a l d ,
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Aerial Transportation Committee had been working for some time.”

79

Executive Minutes, November 25, 1930, 170.

79

CONCLUSION

In 19 31 Commissioner Dean Noyes wrote that "Omaha was prepared for
aviation" in the 1920's.^

Of all people in the city, he should have

realized the fallacy of that contention.
an aviation status in June,

Omaha began the quest for

1924, amidst the tumult that surrounded the

destruction of the Chamber of Commerce Hangar by a tornado.
of November,

By the end

1930, much of O m a h a ’s prestige as an aviation center had

been acquired.

The quest to put Omaha on the map in aviation,

was a constant struggle,

though,

far from the impressions of public air-minded

ness expressed by Noyes in 1931.
From 1927 to 1931 Commissioner Noyes was directly involved in
airfield improvement and must have known his c o mmu ni ty’s ambivalence
toward aviation matters.

Up until 1929, when the airfield had

little public funding at all, Noyes continued improvements as best he
could with money taken from the budget of his Street Cleaning and M a i n 
tenance Department.

When progress at the field during these months did

not meet the expectations of air enthusiasts in Omaha, Dean Noyes
received most of the criticism.

From 1929 to 1930, when the Omaha

airport finally began to take shape, his position as Chairman of the
Airport Advisory Board kept hi m in the aviation limelight.
criticism of Austin Company specifications,

Noyes'

despite his lack of formal

^Dean Noyes, "The City of Omaha and Aviation," Official Souvenir
Program of the Omaha Air Races, M a y 15-17, 1931, 24,
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training in airport planning, his often emotional responses to adverse
publicity such as the ’cottonwood c on t r o v e r s y , ’ and his many expres
sions of confidence in himself and those in his employ were examples of
the tremendous drive and enthusiasm which the Commissioner possessed.
At times this enthusiasm seemed out of place or ridiculous.
ect

such as this, however,

In a proj^

emotion and dedication were needed and Dean

Noyes possessed both in great amounts.
As the personal abilities of Dean Noyes were instrumental in the
formation and improvement of the Omaha Municipal Airfield, so were the
organizational talents of Amos Thomas.

Thomas sat on the Aerial

Transportation Committee of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce throughout
this period and served as its Chairman from August,

1928,

to June,

1930.

The time that Amos Thomas served as the Chairman of the C h a m b e r ’s avia
tion committee was the most important period in the formation of the Omaha
airport and his leadership proved fundamental to the success of his
c o m m i t t e e ^ goals.

Indeed, Thomas served on and presided over a com

mittee whose only objective was to establish aviation in the city and
its many successes proved the dedication of its members.
When the loss of the Ak^-Sar-Ben Field and the withdrawal of the
airmail planes left Omaha devoid of any significant aviation facilities,
members of the Aerial Transportation Committee,
Council,

aided by the City

rapidly moved to acquire the future airport site.

When the

proposed 1928 aviation charter amendment faced an uncertain fate at the
polls, Amos Thomas and the members of the Aerial Transportation Com
mittee organized a massive campaign and the measure passed by a margin
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that represented

.002 per cent of the total vote.

2

When serious attempts

were made to discredit the Omaha field through unfavorable publicity,
the members of the Aerial Transportation Committee stuck to their
convictions and proved the suitability of the Municipal A i r f i e l d ’s
location.

Finally, when the vacillation and uncooperative attitude of

the Boeing Air Transport Company augured to continue indefinitely,
these men patiently held to their belief in the airport.

Finally,

Boeing recognized O m a h a ’s aviation advances and came back to the city
after a six year absence.

The majority of these and other difficulties

took place when Amos Thomas was at the helm of the Aerial Transportation
Committee and his contributions and those of his associates to the
development of the airport were immense.
The roles of Dean Noyes and Amos Thomas in the formation of O m a h a ’s
airport seem more important when one considers that public air-minded
ness had not grown appreciably by 1931.
supported aviation,

More than likely,

including politicians, businessmen,

those who

and the rela

tively affluent,' did so from the realization of the benefits it could
bring to themselves as well as the city.

Among those who voted against

or did not actively support airfield improvement,
considered an elitist,

aviation was still

far from common, method of transportation.

Heads

still turned in Omaha when an airplane flew by and many times hundreds
of people flocked to the airfield to watch the planes land or to see
the boundary and search lighting.

2

The elitist contention was proven

Results taken from official Douglas County election returns,
M ay 8 , 1928,
Douglas County Election Commissioner's Office, OmahaDouglas Civic Center, Omaha, Nebraska.
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three times at the polls in Omaha from 1928 to 1930.

In these years,

despite the huge propaganda and publicity campaign launched by airport
supporters,

three aviation charter amendments barely escaped defeat.

These elections showed an extremely class-structured,
polarized,

geographically-

response of the Omaha electorate toward aviation.

as November,

1930,

As late

this elitist notion still existed and many Omahans,

perhaps understandably,

could not recognize the future importance of

aviation.
While public acceptance of aviation grew very slowly,
tion industry had grown tremendously by 1931.

the avia

The increased size and

weight of aircraft made the complexities of airport development and
planning more difficult and expensive.
the new trend in airplanes.

The Boeing Tri-Motor exmplified

With a wingspan of 80 feet, a length of

over 56 feet, a gross weight of 17,500 pounds,
transportation of 12 passengers,

and facilities for the

the tri-motor prompted new problems in

runway planning and was thought to be "the last word in luxurious air"
3
travel.

In the 1 9 3 0 ?s public airfields would have to meet the demands

of the tremendously expanding aviation industry.

Many Omahans, however,

were very slow in recognizing the need of public responsibility for the
improvement of landing fields.

The expansion of the c i t y ’s aviation

facilities during the next decade and beyond would remain an important
challenge.

3

4

Pedigree of Champions,
Company c. May, 1977), 21.

Boeing Since 1916

(Seattle:

The Boeing

^For a brief discussion of the Omaha Municipal A i r f i e l d ’s develop
ment during the next three decades see section J of the Sunday WorldHerald , September 3, 1961.
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